Columbia  WLnibtx&itf  T^ 
in  tije  Cttp  of  Jgeto  gorfe      * 

LIBRARY 


SOCIALISM  AND  WAR 


By  Louis  B.  Boudin 


Author  of 
"The  Theoretical  System  of  Karl  Marx"    "Govern- 
ment by  Judiciary"  etc. 


New  York 
New  Review  Publishing  Association 
1916 


Copyright  1915 

by 

The  New  Review  Publishing  Association 


Entered  at  Stationers'  Hall 

London,  England,  1916,  by 

Louis  B.  Boudin 


All  Rights  Reserved  by  Louis  B.  Boudin,  Including  that  of 

Translation  into   Foreign  Languages,   Including 

the  Scandinavian. 


Press 

The  Language  Printery 

New  York 


PREFACE. 

The  six  lectures  contained  in  the  volume  which 
is  herewith  offered  to  the  public  at  large  were 
first  delivered  at  Arlington  Hall,  New  York  City, 
on  the  six  Thursdays  beginning  with  Thursday, 
November  17,  1914.  It  was  intended  from  the 
first  that  they  should  not  only  be  delivered  orally, 
but  published  in  book  form  so  as  to  give  them  a 
larger  audiene.  Owing  to  some  untoward  inci- 
dents, however,  the  work  of  publication  was  de- 
layed ;  so  that  their  appearance  in  print  will  occur 
almost  exactly  one  year  after  the  oral  delivery  of 
the  first  lecture. 

It  seemed  to  me  at  first  that  this  long  delay  be- 
tween delivery  and  publication  made  it  necessary 
to  undertake  some  revision,  in  order  to  notice  some 
developments  or  incidents  which  have  taken  place, 
or  have  become  known,  since  the  lectures  were 
prepared  about  a  year  ago.  But  on  further  con- 
sideration I  decided  to  leave  these  lectures  sub- 
stantially as  originally  prepared  for  oral  delivery, 


as  nothing  has  transpired  during  this  year  to 
change  my  views  on  the  subjects  presented  or  shed 
any  great  additional  light  upon  them,  with  one  ex- 
ception which  will  be  noted  further  below. 

The  lectures  as  printed  in  this  volume  are  not, 
however,  in  quite  the  same  form  as  when  delivered 
orally.  Nor  is  the  substance  exactly  identical. 
The  exigencies  of  oral  delivery  sometimes  made  it 
necessary  to  treat  the  different  points  touched 
upon  in  the  lecture  in  a  different  order  from  that 
originally  intended;  and  occasionally  leave 
some  points  untouched  upon,  when  the  lecture 
became  too  long  for  delivery  in  the  lecture  room. 
The  lectures  as  here  presented  are,  therefore,  not 
in  the  form  in  which  they  were  delivered,  but 
rather  in  the  form  in  which  they  were  intended 
to  be  delivered.  The  substance  remaining  the 
same,  except  for  the  omissions  in  the  oral  delivery 
but  included  in  the  present  volume. 

Except  in  one  instance  where  I  have  deviated 
both  from  the  original  intentions  as  well  as  from 
the  delivered  lecture,  so  as  to  leave  out  from  the 
book  something  that  I  had  treated  orally.  This 
omission  relates  to  the  last  lecture.  As  originally 
prepared,  and  as  delivered  orally,  it  contained  a 
somewhat  extended  review  of  the  attitude  taken 
by  the  Socialists  in  the  different  warring  countries 
to  the  war.    I  have  decided  to  leave  this  review 


from  the  present  volume,  partly  because  I  did  not 
want  to  burden  it  with  too  much  controversial 
matter ;  although  I  have  taken  great  care  to  make 
my  own  attitude  to  the  subject  clear,  and  therefore 
furnished  the  criterion  by  which  I  believe  the 
action  of  the  socialists  in  the  different  countries 
should  be  judged.  Another  circumstance  which 
weighed  with  me  in  making  the  change  is  the  fact 
that  the  subsequent  developments  along  this  line 
were  such  that,  under  the  new  circumstances,  my 
original  treatment  of  the  subject  seemed  to  me  in- 
adequate. It  seemed  to  me  best,  therefore,  to  leave 
this  particular  branch  of  my  original  subject  for 
separate,  and  I  hope  adequate,  treatment  later  on. 

L.  B.  BOUDIN 

New  York,  October  17,  1915. 


COIN  TENTS 

Page 

Preface         ...       m  iji 

I.  Clearing  the  Ground        -  1 

II.  The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  44 

III.  The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  81 

IV.  The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War  and 

the  Stakes  Involved         -      -      -  121 

V.  The  War  and  the  Socialists         -      -  169 

VI.  Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories      -      -  213 


I. 

CLEARING  THE  GROUND. 

When  one  decides  to  put  up  a  building,  his  first 
task  is  to  clear  the  ground  upon  which  he  intends 
to  build.  This  may  not  be  exactly  "constructive" 
work,  but  it  is  nevertheless  a  necessary  part  of 
any  construction.  It  is  the  same  in  any  mental 
building  operation.  You  cannot  do  the  work  of 
construction  properly  without  first  clearing  your 
lot  of  any  rubbish  that  may  have  accumulated,  or 
of  the  old  structures  that  you  may  find  occupying 
the  place  where  you  want  to  build  the  new.  I 
have  therefore  decided  to  devote  this  introductory 
lecture  to  a  discussion  of  the  many  current  mis- 
conceptions about  the  war  and  its  causes.  Incident- 
ally, this  critical  process  may  accustom  my 
audience  to  examine  the  questions  involved  from 
many  angles  and  therefore  be  in  a  better  position 
to  judge  more  critically  my  own  performance  when 
I  get  to  the  "constructive"  part  of  my  task.  Let 
us,  therefore,  look  at  the  explanations  which  have 


2  Socialism  and  War 

so  far  been  advanced.  But  before  doing  so  we 
must  formulate  the  question  that  the  explanation 
is  supposed  to  answer. 

This  question  presents  itself  to  us  in  two  forms : 
First :  Who  or  what  caused  the  war  ?  And,  second : 
What  is  this  war  all  about?  These  two  formu- 
lations while,  naturally,  closely  resembling  each 
other,  and  often  covering  the  same  ground,  are 
by  no  means  identical.  The  second  formulation 
of  the  question  is  deeper,  and  also  broader.  It  is 
deeper,  because  it  is  not  satisfied  with  finding  the 
"guilty  party",  but  wants  the  cause,  the  reason, 
for  his  guilt.  It  is  broader,  because  it  is  not 
satisfied  by  finding  someone  who  may  be  justly 
said  to  have  caused  the  war,  but  wants  to  know 
why  he  was  permitted  to  do  so.  Or,  to  put  it  in 
another  form,  the  first  question  is  answered  by 
finding  one  "guilty  party,"  whereas  the  second  is 
not  until  we  have  discovered  two  "guilty  parties", 
so  to  say. 

And  there  is  good  reason  for  this  broadening 
of  the  question.  We  all  know  that  it  takes  two  to 
make  a  bargain.  And  it  also  takes  two  to  make  a 
fight.  One  can  no  more  fight  alone  than  he  can 
bargain  alone.  If  one  is  looking  for  a  fight  he 
must  find  somebody  who  is  willing  to  take  him  up 
before  there  can  be  a  fight.    If  we  want  to  find  the 


Clearing  the  Ground  3 

real  explanation  of  this  war  it  is  not,  therefore, 
sufficient  to  find  the  "party"  that  started  the  fight, 
nor  even  the  thing  he  was  after  in  starting  the 
fight.  We  must  go  a  step  further  and  find  the 
reason  why  the  other  party  to  the  fight  was  will- 
ing to  take  up  the  fight  rather  than  give  up  the 
thing  the  aggressor  was  after.  As  you  know,  this 
war  was  started  by  what  is  called  an  "ultimatum", 
—  a  notice  to  "give  up  or  fight,"  —  and  the  party 
receiving  the  notice  deciding  to  fight  rather  than 
give  up.  And  the  real  crux  of  our  problem  is  to 
find  what  made  the  thing  demanded  and  refused 
so  important  to  the  nations  involved  in  the  great 
conflict  as  to  make  it  worth  their  while  to  engage 
in  this  most  bloody  of  wars  about  it.  In  other 
words,  we  must  find  not  merely  a  first  cause,  but 
an  efficient  cause — efficient  to  make  both  sides 
go  to  war. 

Bearing  this  in  mind,  let  us  look  at  the  events 
that  led  up  to  the  war,  in  chronological  sequence, 
in  order  to  see  whether  or  not  we  can  discover 
such  an  efficient  cause  floating  on  the  surface  of 
the  troubled  waters. 

On  July  23rd,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment sent  an  ultimatum  to  Servia  making  certain 
demands,  and  gave  as  its  reasons  therefor  that 
its  demands  were  dictated,  first,  by  a  desire  to 


4  Socialism  and  War 

mete  out  adequate  punishment  to  those  guilty  of 
complicity  in  the  murder  of  Archduke  Franz  Fer- 
dinand, and  second,  by  a  desire  to  stop  a  propa- 
ganda which  was  threatening  the  integrity  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire. 

We  may  assume  for  the  purposes  of  this  first 
step  of  our  investigation  that  the  reasons  stated 
by  Austria  were  sufficient  to  make  that  country 
go  to  war  in  case  her  demands  were  not  complied 
with.  So  far  so  good.  But  at  the  very  next  step 
we  meet  with  difficulties.  Why  should  Servia  have 
refused  to  comply  with  these  demands?  What 
purpose  could  Servia  have  in  protecting  regicides  ? 
Even  republics  are  now-a-days  slow  to  protect 
regicides.  And  surely  the  government  of  His 
Majesty  King  Peter  Karageorgewitch  was  not 
exerting  itself  on  behalf  of  any  democratic- 
republican  principles.  Nor  is  there  any  reason 
why  Servia  should  want  to  encourage  a  propa- 
ganda that  would  bring  about  the  disruption  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  Unless  she  had 
some  particular  object  in  view  as  a  result  of  that 
disruption.  But  then  we  are  only  at  the  begin- 
ning of  our  problem,  —  that  of  discovering  the 
object  that  Servia  had  in  either  protecting  the 
murderers  of  the  Archduke  or  encouraging  the 


Clearing  the  Ground  5 

propaganda  complained  of,  that  would  make  it 
worth  her  while  risking  such  a  war. 

And  the  difficulties  grow  as  we  go  along.  For 
it  goes  without  saying  that  Servia  would  not 
have  dared  defy  Austria  had  she  had  no  outside 
backing.  So  that  in  accounting  for  Servia's 
refusal  to  comply  with  the  demands  of  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  we  must  find  an  object  worth 
fighting  for  not  only  for  Servia  but  also  for  her 
backers.    That  brings  us  to  Russia. 

What  did  Russia  have  at  stake  in  this  Austro- 
Servian  controversy,  or  what  other  object  may 
she  have  had,  that  made  her  back  up  Servia?  In- 
deed, the  Czar  of  Russia,  whose  grandfather  died 
at  the  hands  of  regicides  and  who  has  himself 
spent  most  of  his  life  in  fear  of  regicides,  must 
have  had  some  very  strong  reasons  in  backing  up 
Servia  that  would  make  him  not  only  risk  a  world- 
war  but  act  as  the  protector  of  regicides.  You  will 
recall  Wilhelm's  letter  to  Nicholas  in  which  the 
German  Kaiser  urged  upon  his  Russian  cousin 
their  common  interest  in  punishing  regicides.  To 
my  mind  this  was  the  most  telling  appeal  that 
could  be  made  to  the  Russian  Czar.  And  yet,  it 
remained  without  an  effect.  What  was  it  that 
robbed  this  appeal  of  its  efficacy  ? 

The  official  explanation  that  Russia  went  into 


6  Socialism  and  War 

this  world-war  in  order  to  protect  a  "Slavic" 
nation  against  an  alien  race,  is,  of  course,  a  mere 
hollow  pretext,  —  a  pretext  that  would  hardly  be 
advanced  even  by  Russia  except  for  home  con- 
sumption, and,  perhaps,  for  the  most  gullible  and 
ignorant  foreigners.  We  all  know  that  the  non- 
Russian  Slavs  are  much  worse  off  in  Russia  than 
in  Austria.  The  Poles  are  Slavs.  And  yet  that 
did  not  deter  Russia  from  instigating  the  par- 
tition of  Poland.  Nor  from  ruthlessly  destroying 
all  signs  of  national  life  among  the  Poles  within 
the  Russian  Empire.  Nor  yet  from  otherwise 
oppressing  them  in  such  a  manner  as  to  gain  their 
everlasting  hatred.  And  even  the  Balkan  nations 
themselves  have  had  occasion  to  find  out  what 
Russian  protection  of  its  "little  brothers"  of  the 
southern  peninsula  really  meant.  With  the  result, 
among  other  things,  that  Bulgaria  is  playing  the 
role  of  a  German  dependency  from  fear  of  Russian 
aggression.  Clearly,  therefore,  the  "protection 
of  a  Slav  nation"  could  not  have  been  the  real 
moving  cause  which  made  Russia  enter  upon  this 
world-conflict.     What  was  it? 

After  Russia  came  Germany.  Russia  having 
declared  her  readiness  to  "protect"  Servia  against 
Austria,  Germany  came  upon  the  scene  with  the 
announcement  that  if  Austria  was  not  permitted 


Clearing  the  Ground  7 

by  Russia  to  have  her  way  with  Servia,  she,  Ger- 
many, would  go  to  war  with  Russia,  and,  if  neces- 
sary, with  Russia's  allies.  What  interest  did  Ger- 
many have  in  this  quarrel?  History  fails  to  disclose 
any  particular  love  or  affection  between  the  mem- 
bers of  the  royal  house  of  Hohenzollern  and  the 
Princes  of  the  Hapsburg  family.  If  history  dis- 
closes any  predilection  at  all  in  that  regard,  it  is 
to  fight  each  other  rather  than  fight  for  each  other. 
Surely  the  killing  of  the  Hapsburg  Prince  could 
not  cause  Germany's  hosts  to  form  in  battle  array. 
Nor  was  there  anything  in  the  "propaganda" 
complained  of  by  Austria  to  cause  Germany  to  go 
to  war.  Viewed  from  a  purely  German-national 
point  of  view  that  propaganda  could  only  be  wel- 
come to  Germany.  The  disruption  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  —  assuming  that  the 
"nefarious  propaganda"  could  really  have  that 
effect,  as  was  asserted  by  the  Austro-German 
statesmen — would  mean  the  attainment  of  the 
dream  of  German  patriots  for  generations  past, — 
a  real  United  Germany.  The  continued  existence 
of  the  Hapsburg  Empire  is  depriving  Germany  of 
her  choicest  provinces,  of  the  most  ancient  seats 
of  German  culture,  of  the  most  German  part  of 
Germany.  Why,  then,  should  Germany  enter 
upon  the  most  stupendous  struggle  the  world  has 


8  Socialism  and  War 

ever  seen  in  order  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy? 

The  official  answer  is  that  Germany  was  bound 
to  Austria  by  treaty,  and  therefore  had  to  come 
to  her  assistance.  But  this  answer,  like  the  "Slav 
brother"  answer  of  Russia,  cannot  be  taken 
seriously  even  in  Germany.  How  can  it  be?  Has 
not  Germany  herself  declared,  almost  in  the  same 
breath,  that  treaties  were  mere  "scraps  of  paper" 
when  serious  interests  are  involved?  If  the  mere 
exigencies  of  a  campaign  were,  according  to  Ger- 
many's own  declaration,  a  sufficient  reason  for 
the  breaking  of  a  treaty  which  involved  the  com- 
mission of  a  crime  besides,  it  goes  without  saying 
that  the  existence  of  a  treaty  could  not  possibly 
make  Germany  engage  in  a  war  in  which,  as  she 
herself  claims,  her  very  existence  is  at  stake. 
Besides,  there  were,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  no  such 
treaty  obligations.  The  terms  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  bound  its  members  to  come  to  each 
other's  rescue  only  in  case  of  a  defensive  war. 
Austria  was  clearly  the  aggressor.  This  was  the 
position  officially  taken  by  Italy,  the  third  member 
of  the  Triple  Alliance.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  Italy's  course  has  found  many  defenders  even 
in  Germany,  and  in  quarters  where  the  defensive 
character  of  the  war  waged  by  the  Teutonic  Allies 


Clearing  the  Ground  9 

is  vehemently  insisted  upon.  These  German 
defenders  of  Italy  assert  that  Italy's  vital 
interests  dictated  a  policy  of  neutrality,  and  that 
this  absolved  her  from  her  treaty  obligations 
towards  Germany  and  Austria.  If  these  argu- 
ments are  good  enough  to  excuse  a  faithless  ally 
they  would  most  assuredly  have  been  found  more 
than  sufficient  to  justify  Germany's  course  had 
she  desired  to  stay  out  of  the  fight — aside  from  the 
fact  that  if  Germany  had  desired  to  stay  out  there 
would  have  been  no  fight.  It  is  therefore  clear 
that  treaty  obligations  could  not  have  caused  Ger- 
many to  enter  into  this  war.  She  evidently  must 
have  some  object — some  vital  interest — of  her 
own,  to  assert  or  defend  which  she  is  fighting. 
What  is  it? 

Then  France  took  a  hand  in  the  matter  and 
decided  to  join  in  the  war.  France  was  far  re- 
moved from  the  seat  of  trouble  and  had  no  ap- 
parent interest  in  the  original  quarrel,  nor  in  any 
of  its  complications,  except  as  an  ally  of  Russia. 
But  we  have  already  seen  that  "treaty  obli- 
gations", as  such,  do  not  make  nations  go  to  war. 
And  France  is  no  exception  to  the  rule :  Had  she 
no  interest  of  her  owir  she  certainly  would  not 
have  gone  into  this  terrible  war.  What,  then,  was 
France's  reason  for  going  to  war?    An  attempt 


10  Socialism  and  War 

is  made  of  explaining  France's  entry  into  the  war 
by  her  desire  to  revenge  herself  on  Germany,  for 
the  injury  and  humiliation  suffered  by  her  forty- 
four  years  ago.  It  is,  to  say  the  least,  passing 
strange  that  a  country  burning  with  the  passion 
of  revenge  to  the  extent  of  being  willing  to  risk 
the  eventualities  of  a  war  like  the  present  one, 
should  have  been  able  to  restrain  herself  for  a  gen- 
eration and  a  half,  and  that  the  flames  of  this 
passion  should  burst  forth  now  when  most  of 
those  who  have  witnessed  the  injury  and  felt  its 
effects  most  keenly  have  died  out  and  a  new  gene- 
ration has  arisen  to  whom  the  wrongs  of  1870- 
1871  are  but  a  distant  tradition.  The  truth  is, 
that  at  no  time  was  the  feeling  for  revenge  less 
prevalent  in  France  than  at  the  time  immediately 
preceding  the  outbreak  of  this  war.  Besides,  going 
to  war  under  the  conditions  under  which  this  war 
opened  was  certainly  a  poor  way  of  revenging  her- 
self on  Germany.  You  must  remember  that 
France  was  hardly  half  prepared  for  a  war  like 
this,  and  her  allies  were  even  less  so.  It  was  also 
well  known  that  Germany's  first  move  after  the 
declaration  of  war  would  be  to  overrun  France. 
Even  if  this  should  not  mean  final  disaster  for 
France,  it  would  certainly  mean  at  least  enormous 
sacrifices.    Such  sacrifices  are  not  made  in  order 


Clearing  the  Ground  11 

to  redress  injuries  which  have  been  quietly  borne 
for  forty-four  years. 

Then  comes  the  entry  of  England,  even  more  of 
a  puzzler,  when  only  the  surface  of  things  is  con- 
sidered, than  the  action  of  the  countries  we  have 
already  discussed.  England  was  not  a  party  to  the 
original  quarrel.  She  is  neither  kith  nor  kin  to  the 
Serbs.  She  had  no  apparent  interest  in  protecting 
the  murderers  of  the  Austrian  Archduke;  nor  in 
the  propaganda  looking  to  the  "disruption"  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  She  even  had  no 
"treaty-obligations"  to  fall  back  upon.  Her  own 
explanation  is  that  she  went  to  war  because  Bel- 
gian neutrality  had  been  violated.  I  shall  not  enter 
here  upon  a  discussion  of  the  question  as  to 
whether  or  not  England's  claim  to  be  the  protector 
of  small  nations,  and  particularly  those  that  have 
been  formally  declared  neutral  by  international 
agreement,  is  well  founded.  Although  I  do  not 
hesitate  to  state  my  conviction  that  England's 
protection  of  small  nations  had  about  it  the  air, 
although  perhaps  not  the  brutal  manner,  of 
Russia's  protection  of  the  Slavs.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  enter  here  upon  such  a  historical  discussion 
for  the  reason  that  England's  attitude  in  the 
present  war  is  quite  sufficient  to  disprove  any 
claim,  if  such  be  advanced,  that  England  went 


12  Socialism  and  War 

into  this  war  for  the  only  purpose  of  protecting 
the  principle  of  the  inviolability  of  neutral 
nations. 

It  should  be  recalled  that  Belgium  is  not  the 
only  country  whose  neutrality  has  been  violated 
by  Germany  in  this  war.  Before  Belgium  was  in- 
vaded, the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg — a 
country  neutralized  by  international  agreement 
in  the  same  manner  as  was  Belgium — had  been 
invaded  by  the  German  army.  And  yet  England 
did  not  say  a  word  about  it,  so  far  as  we  know. 
England  never  claimed  and  does  not  claim  now 
that  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg 
caused  her  to  draw  the  sword.  There  certainly 
is  no  particular  sacredness  about  Belgian  neu- 
trality that  would  put  it  in  a  class  by  itself  as 
compared  with  the  neutrality  of  other  "neutral" 
countries,  such  as  Switzerland  or  Luxemburg. 
Why,  then  should  England  bear  with  equanimity 
and  without  so  much  as  a  protest  the  violation  of 
Luxemburg's  neutrality,  and  at  the  same  time  be 
ready  to  go  to  war  for  the  violation  of  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium? 

Now,  this  does  not  necessarily  imply,  as  some 
assert,  that  England's  claim  that  she  was  moved 
to  enter  into  this  war  by  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality,  is  sheer  hypocrisy.  That  is  a  question 


Clearing  the  Ground  13 

which  need  not  be  gone  into  here.  It  is  sufficient 
for  our  purposes  that  England's  discrimination 
between  Luxemburg  and  Belgium  proves  that  if 
England  did  go  into  the  war  because  of  the  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality,  it  is  not  because  of  her 
desire  to  protect  the  principle  of  neutrality,  but 
because  of  some  vital  interest  that  she  has  in 
maintaining  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  And  we  are 
consequently  confronted  with  the  problem  of  dis- 
covering that  interest. 

And  while  we  are  about  looking  for  efficient 
causes  we  must  not  restrict  ourselves  to  those 
who  willingly  entered  into  the  fight,  but  look  into 
the  case  of  all  of  those  who  are  in  the  fight 
whether  willingly  or  not.  This  includes  Belgium. 
I  have  said  in  the  beginning  that  it  takes  two  to 
make  a  war.  And  while  it  is  true  that  Belgium 
did  not  go  to  war  in  the  same  sense  that  the  other 
warring  countries  did,  she  nevertheless  took  up 
the  fight,  having  refused  Germany's  demand  for 
a  "peaceful"  passage  through  her  territory.  This 
action  on  the  part  of  Belgium  requires  just  as 
strong  reasons  as  does  the  action  of  the  countries 
which  formally  went  to  war.  In  fact  even  more  so. 
For  the  consequences  to  Belgium  were  immeasur- 
ably more  serious,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  of 
the  fact  that  Belgium  could  not  but  realize  the 


14  Socialism  and  War 

consequences  to  herself  of  her  defiance  of  Ger- 
many's wishes.  On  the  other  hand,  it  does  not 
seem,  on  the  surface  of  things,  that  any  harm 
could  have  resulted  to  Belgium  from  a  com- 
pliance with  Germany's  demands.  Why,  then, 
should  Belgium  have  taken  the  awful  risks  con- 
sequent upon  the  defiance  of  the  greatest  and  most 
ruthless  military  power  of  modern  times? 

The  idea  that  Belgium  would  permit  herself  to 
be  "crucified"  on  the  altar  of  the  neutrality  prin- 
ciple— the  "scrap  of  paper"  which  her  more 
powerful  neighbors  signed  only  to  tear  up 
whenever  it  proved  an  inconvenience — is  too 
absurd  to  contemplate.  What  interest  did  she 
have  to  preserve?  The  official  documents  do  not 
disclose  any.  It  may  be  added  that  Belgium  did 
not  even  have  any  "honor"  to  protect.  Belgiuni 
is  not  a  Great  Power,  and  there  is  therefore 
nothing  "dishonorable"  for  her  in  submitting  to 
the  demands  of  Germany;  and  her  compliance 
would  not  have  involved  any  loss  of  position  in 
the  "council  of  nations"  as  she  had  none  to  lose. 

The  very  fact  that  she  was  a  "neutral"  country 
took  her  out  of  the  category  of  states,  great  or 
small,  which  claim  such  position.  Her  position  was 
rather  that  of  a  ward  of  the  so-called  Concert  of 
Powers.    By  the  treaty  of  neutrality  she  had  dis- 


Clearing  the  Ground  15 

claimed  all  pretensions  as  a  military  power,  rely- 
ing on  her  own  arms  for  the  defense  of  either  her 
interests  or  her  "honor".  She  put  herself  frankly 
at  the  mercy  of  her  stronger  neighbors.  This  put 
all  considerations  of  so-called  honor  out  of  the 
question.  And  the  only  thing  that  could  have 
possibly  induced  her  to  pursue  the  course  that  she 
did  would  be  some  great  and  vital  interest.  What 
was  it  ?  No  representative  of  Belgium  has  so  far 
given  us  any  intimation  thereof.  Nor  has  it  been 
suggested  by  her  opponents.  The  claim  has 
recently  been  put  forward  on  behalf  of  Germany 
that  long  before  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war 
Belgium  had  made  an  arrangement  with  either 
France  or  England  or  both  to  pursue  the  couse 
which  she  actually  did  follow  in  the  present  war. 
But  as  to  why  she  would  have  done  so,  no  ex- 
planation is  vouchsafed  us. 

The  result  of  our  examination  of  the  surface  of 
things  for  the  discovery  of  an  efficient  cause  for 
this  war,  has  thus  proven  fruitless.  The  nearest  we 
could  get  to  it  has  been  the  discovery  of  an  ap- 
parent reason  for  one  of  the  original  parties  to  the 
quarrel,  —  that  is,  if  her  own  declarations  be 
taken  at  their  face  value;  —  but  absolutely  no 
reason  whatever  for  the  other  party  to  the  quarrel 
to  take  Austria  up,  nor  any  reason  for  the  other 


16  Socialism  and  War 

countries  to  intervene  and  turn  what  was  on  its 
face  a  local  quarrel  into  a  world-war.  There 
evidently  must  have  been  some  other  reason  or 
reasons  than  those  professed  by  the  parties  en- 
gaged in  this  war,  —  some  reason  lying  deep  below 
the  surface  of  things,  a  reason  deep  enough  and 
comprehensive  enough  to  be  an  efficient  cause  for 
a  conflagration  embracing  almost  the  entire  world. 

In  leaving  the  surface  of  things  and  the  ex- 
planations offered  by  the  combatants  themselves, 
we  are  confronted  with  a  maze  of  suggestions  as 
to  who  or  what  caused  this  war,  in  which  it  is  at 
first  glance  rather  hard  to  find  one's  way.  But 
after  a  while  we  discover  that  after  all  they  are 
merely  variations  on  a  few  easily  recognizable 
themes :  It  is  interesting  to  note  in  his  connection, 
that  the  only  thing  on  which  most  of  those  who 
have  so  far  offered  any  explanation  for  the  war 
agree,  is,  that  whoever  or  whatever  may  be  to 
blame  for  it,  capitalism — that  is  the  economic  con- 
ditions under  which  we  are  living — is  not  to  blame 
for  this  war.  This  it  true  even  of  Socialist 
writers,  and  is  in  striking  contrast  to  the  opinions 
expressed  by  Socialists  on  the  same  subject  prior 
to  the  outbreak  of  the  present  conflict. 

When  we  come  to   classify  the  explanations 


Clearing  the  Ground  17 

offered  we  shall  find  that  they  fall  under  six 
heads : 

The  first,  and  most  prevalent  in  this  country,  is 
that  the  German  Kaiser  is  at  the  bottom  of  the 
whole  trouble.  This  is  also  the  view  of  most 
American  Socialists.  "The  German  War  Lord  did 
it,  with  his  little  hatchet  Militarism"  shout  most 
American  Socialists  in  chorus. 

Next  in  importance,  because  of  their  number 
and  vociferousness,  come  those  who  put  the 
responsibility  for  this  war  upon  the  Russian  Czar. 

Then  come  those  who  say  that  it  is  all  due  to 
England's  jealousy  of  Germany's  growing  trade. 

Then  comes  a  class  consisting,  as  far  as  I  can 
ascertain,  of  Joshua  Wanhope — a  Socialist 
writer  of  some  standing  and  chief  editorial  writer 
L  of  the  New  York  Call,  the  most  important  Social- 
ist newspaper  in  this  country — who  puts  it  up 
squarely  to  Rothschild. 

These  four  explanations,  as  you  will  have 
noticed,  put  it  up  to  some  particular  person,  group 
of  persons,  or  nation.  Then  there  are  two  which 
put  the  blame  on  more  general  causes :  One  is  that 
"autocratic  institutions"  did  it,  in  their  desire  to 
stem  the  rising  tide  of  freedom  and  democracy; 
the  others  is  that  "the  ruling  classes"  did  it  —  not 
the  ruling  class  of  any  particular  country  but  the 


18  Socialism  and  War 

ruling  classes  as  a  whole,  in  their  desire  to  crush 
the  oncoming  revolution. 

Now  let  us  see  what  there  is  to  these  expla- 
nations. 

The  first  explanation — that  the  German  Kaiser 
did  it — should  not  detain  us  very  long.  Mr.  Wan- 
hope,  whom  I  have  already  mentioned,  has  dis- 
posed of  this  contention  in  an  article  which 
appeared  in  the  Sunday  Call  last  August, 
under  the  title  "Was  the  German  Kaiser  Framed 
Up?"  In  this  article,  in  which  Wanhope  advances 
his  remarkable  theory  that  Rothschild  did  it,  he 
incidentally,  and  as  a  preliminary  step,  disposes  of 
the  German-Kaiser  theory  so  effectively  and  in 
such  a  brilliant  manner  that  I  can  do  no  better 
than  refer  you  to  that  article  for  detailed  and  com- 
prehensive treatment  of  the  subject.  I  shall 
therefore  limit  myself  here  to  a  summary  of  his 
argument.    In  substance  it  is  this : — 

It  is  utterly  absurd  to  imagine  that  one  man 
could  bring  on  such  a  war  as  the  present  one.  It 
is  particularly  absurd  for  any  Socialist  to  make 
such  an  assertion.  The  Materialistic  Conception 
of  History,  which  is  the  basis  of  all  Socialist 
theory,  would  have  to  be  turned  inside  out 
before  such  an  explanation  of  the  war  could  be 
accepted.     But  you  need  not  necessarily  accept 


Clearing  the  Ground  19 

the  Materialistic  Conception  of  History  in  order 
to  see  the  absurdity  of  blaming  it  on  the  Kaiser. 
All  you  need  is  to  use  some  common  sense.  No 
war,  much  less  a  war  like  the  present  one,  can  be 
carried  on  without  the  expenditure  of  immense 
sums  of  money,  such  as  the  War  Lord  could  not 
possibly  raise  without  the  assistance  and  active 
co-operation  of  the  Money  Lords.  Alone  he  was 
utterly  powerless  to  cause  this  war.  He  cannot 
therefore  be  considered  the  real  cause  of  the  war, 
and  we  must  look  elsewhere  if  we  want  to  get  to 
the  bottom  of  this  business. 

All  of  which  is  undoubtedly  true,  and  quite  self- 
evident.  And  I  may  add,  that  the  assertion  that 
the  German  Kaiser  did  it,  by,  through,  or  for  Mili- 
tarism, does  not  really  explain  anything.  It 
reminds  me  very  much  of  the  explanation  of  the 
mechanism  of  the  world  which  ascribes  the  sta- 
bility of  our  planet  to  the  fact  that  it  is  supported 
by  a  gigantic  whale  or  turtle.  The  German 
Kaiser  went  to  war  because  of  Militarism.  But 
Militarism  is  no  more  a  first  cause  than  the  enor- 
mous whale  or  turtle  on  whose  back  the  Earth  was 
supposed  to  rest.  The  phenomenon  which  we  call 
Militarism  itself  needs  an  explanation.  It  too, 
must  have  some  cause.  So  that  this  and  similar 
explanations,  like  the  aforementioned  explanations 


20  Socialism  and  War 

of  the  world-mechanism,  simply  put  the  problem 
one  remove  further  back.  They  are  really  no 
explanations  at  all. 

The  reasoning  that  disposes  of  the  Kaiser 
theory  of  the  war,  also  disposes  of  the  Czar 
theory.  If  the  German  Kaiser  could  not  have 
caused  the  war,  the  Russian  Czar  most  assuredly 
could  not.  Neither  his  military  nor  his  financial 
powers  are  at  all  comparable  to  those  of  his  Ger- 
man cousin.  Furthermore,  it  must  be  said  in 
defence  of  the  Czar  that  whatever  his  trans- 
gressions may  be,  the  crime  causing  war  cannot 
be  laid  at  his  door,  for  he  was  clearly  not  the 
prime  mover  in  this  drama.  The  first  and  last 
steps  in  the  opening  chapter  of  this  world-drama 
were  taken  by  the  Teutonic  Allies.  The  curtain 
opens  on  Austria  delivering  her  ultimatum  to 
Servia,  making  demands  which  it  was  clear  could 
not  possibly  have  been  complied  with  without 
Servia  giving  up  her  independence.  And  it  closes 
on  Germany  declaring  war  on  Russia  and  France, 
refusing  to  submit  anything  to  arbitration  as  re- 
quested by  the  Czar.  All  that  the  Czar  did  was  to 
declare  his  readiness  to  go  to  war  if  Austria  in- 
sisted on  crushing  Servia.  He  may  not  have  been 
pacific,  but  he  was  certainly  passive.  The  active 
parts  were  clearly  played  by  his  opponents.    He 


Clearing  the  Ground  21 

could  not  therefore  have  caused  the  war.  At  most 
he  may  have  helped  his  opponents,  whoever  or 
whatever  may  have  been  the  real  moving  cause 
of  this  war. 

The  theory  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  —  alias 
English  jealousy  —  caused  this  war  is  not  in  any 
better  condition  as  an  explanation  of  events  than 
either  of  the  two  theories  examined  so  far. 
England  was  not  only  not  the  prime  mover  in  the 
events  that  led  up  to  the  war,  but  she  was  actually 
not  in  it  until  the  war  was  well  under  way.  It  is 
conceded  that  England  tried  to  have  the  Austro- 
Servian  dispute  settled  by  arbitration;  also  that 
she  was  ready  to  stay  out  of  the  war  upon  certain 
conditions  looking  towards  the  protection  of  Bel- 
gium and  France.  This  would  seem  a  rather 
strange  course  for  the  country  that  wanted  to 
bring  about  the  war.  But  let  us  pass  that  over. 
Let  us  assume  that  all  this  was  part  of  a  deep- 
laid  scheme  by  which  "perfidious  Albion"  sought 
to  inveigle  her  innocent  competitor  into  a 
disastrous  war,  —  a  war,  by  the  way,  which  this 
same  innocent  competitor  assures  us  England 
never  had  the  slightest  chance  of  winning.  For,  as 
is  well  known,  England  is  not  only  very  jealous, 
but  also  extremely  stupid.  Does  that,  after  all, 
explain  this  war? 


22  Socialism  and  War 

I  think  not.  To  begin  with,  English  Jealousy, 
like  French  Revenge,  woud  have  to  be  of  a  queer 
kind  to  cause  a  war  between  Germany  and  Eng- 
land just  now.  As  is  well  known,  Anglo-German 
relations  were  much  more  amicable  during  the 
period  immediately  preceding  the  war  than  they 
had  been  at  any  time  during  this  century.  This 
condition  was  due  in  no  small  degree  to  England's 
readiness  to  make  concessions  to  Germany,  a  readi- 
ness which  sometimes  surprised  the  Germans 
themselves,  but  which  fully  accorded  with  Eng- 
land's declared  policy  of  keeping  out  of  a  great 
war  as  long  as  she  could.  It  was  this  policy  that 
kept  her  out  of  a  war  with  Russia  since  the 
Crimean  War  notwithstanding  their  traditional 
and  continued  enmity,  due  to  the  serious  diver- 
gence of  interests  and  intense  competition  of  these 
countries  on  the  Asiatic  continent. 

But  there  is  even  more  serious  objection  to  the 
English  Jealousy  theory.  At  most  it  could  explain 
only  England's  participation  in  the  war.  Just  as 
French  Revenge  could  explain  only  French  par- 
ticipation in  it.  Neither  could  explain  the  par- 
ticipation of  all  the  other  nations.  In  other 
words,  either  of  these  theories  might  at  most 
explain  the  participation  of  the  respective  coun- 
tries to  which  they  apply  in  the  World  War,  but 


Clearing  the  Ground  23 

neither  separately  nor  together  could  they  explain 
the  bringing  about  of  a  World  War.  England  and 
France,  it  should  also  be  remembered,  are  ancient 
enemies.  The  Fashoda  incident  is  still  fresh  in 
our  memory.  Granted,  however,  that  English 
Jealousy  and  French  Revenge  are  sufficient  to 
account  for  France  and  England  now  joining 
hands  against  the  common  object  of  their  aforesaid 
respective  national  attributes,  how  could  these 
have  caused  Russia  to  take  the  position  which  she 
took  on  the  Austro-Servian  question,  which  was 
the  pivot  on  which  the  question  of  peace  and  war 
hinged  after  Austria  set  the  ball  rolling  by  her 
ultimatum  ?  Assuredly  Russia  was  not  going  into 
this  greatest  of  all  wars  known  to  history  merely 
to  help  her  ancient  enemy,  England — many  of 
whose  people  even  now  openly  declare  that  the 
alliance  with  Russia  is  a  disgrace  to  their  country, 
and  with  whom,  it  is  even  now  freely  asserted,  she 
will  ultimately  have  to  go  to  war  in  order  to 
settle  their  Asiatic  and  Mediterranean  accounts. 

Then  there  is  Belgium  to  baffle  us  still  further. 
Why  should  Belgium  sacrifice  herself  on  the  altar 
of  English  Jealousy  of  Germany? 

English  Jealousy  as  an  explanation  of  the  great 
World  War  is,  therefore,  a  complete  failure. 

So  we  must  turn  to  the  next  explanation  in 


24  Socialism  and  War 

order,  —  Mr.  Rothschild.  I  bespeak  your  earnest 
attention  for  that  gentleman.  For,  fanciful  as  the 
Rothschild  theory  seems  to  be,  and  utterly 
erroneous  though  I  hope  to  prove  it,  it  is  a  laudable 
attempt  to  cut  away  from  the  dry  rot  and  the 
beaten  tracks  in  which  most  of  the  discussion 
about  the  causes  of  the  present  war  has  been  wan- 
dering. It  has  at  least  the  merit  of  originality 
and  of  considerable  ingenuity.  The  substance  of 
this  theory  is,  that  Rothschild,  disliking  the 
Kaiser,  "sicked"  him  on  to  the  Allies,  giving  him 
the  money  necessary  to  wage  war  on  them,  in  the 
hope  that  the  poor  Kaiser  would  break  his  neck 
in  the  enterprise.  To  use  Mr.  Wanhope's  own 
expressive  phrase:  The  Kaiser  was  "framed  up" 
by  Rothschild,  who  was  acting  the  part  of  an  in- 
ternational agent  provocateur. 

Unfortunately,  the  theory  of  a  "frame  up"  does 
not  "hold  water"  upon  closer  scrutiny.  It  is  con- 
fronted at  the  very  outset  with  the  difficulty  that 
every  argument  which  Wanhope  advances  to 
prove  the  absurdity  of  the  idea  that  one 
man  could  cause  such  a  world-war  as  is  the  pre- 
sent conflict,  can  be  advanced  with  equal  force 
against  the  idea  that  one  man  could  do  it  even  if 
that  one  man  were  Rothschild.  Rothschild  is  by 
no  means  in  a  better  position  to  accomplish  that 


Clearing  the  Ground  25 

gigantic  feat  than  is  the  Kaiser.  Of  course,  by 
"Rothschild"  Mr.  Wanhope  does  not  mean  an 
individual,  but  the  great  banking  interests.  But  it 
must  be  remembered,  that  by  "the  Kaiser,"  and 
"the  Czar",  when  used  in  this  connection,  is  not 
meant  the  persons  of  Wilhelm  II,  or  Nicholas  II, 
but  the  group  of  which  these  two  worthies  are  the 
respective  heads,  otherwise  known  as  "The  Mili- 
tary Machine",  "The  Military  Clique",  "Junker- 
dom",  "The  Grand  Ducal  Cabal",  "Hofcamarilla", 
etc.,  etc.  In  other  words :  The  Military  Party  in 
Germany  and  whatever  may  correspond  to  it  in 
Russia.  And  if  the  German  Kaiser  and  the  Jun- 
kers who  compose  the  Military  Party  in  that 
country  could  not  bring  about  the  war  then  surely 
Rothschild  with  his  group  of  bankers  could  not 
do  it. 

The  preference  which  Wanhope  gives  to  Roth- 
schild over  the  Kaiser,  as  a  cause  of  war  is  based 
on  the  assumption  that  Rothschild  has  sufficient 
money  for  war-purposes  while  the  Kaiser  hasn't. 
But  this  assumption  is  clearly  unwarranted. 
"Rothschild"  has  no  more  money  for  such  pur- 
poses than  "the  Kaiser".  Bankers  never  lend  their 
own  money.  If  those  who  borrow  from  bankers, 
including  the  governments  which  borrow  from 
"Rothschild",  would  depend  on  the  banker's  own 


26  Socialism  and  War 

money  they  would  be  very  badly  off.  In  fact  a  man 
who  lends  his  own  money  is  not  a  banker.  He  is 
an  investor.  It  is  of  the  essence  of  banking  that 
you  lend  other  people's  money.  But  when  it  comes 
to  lending  other  people's  money  you  must  ask 
them  whether  they  want  their  money  loaned  and 
to  whom.  Of  course,  that  does  not  apply  to  lend- 
ing small  sums,  nor  of  comparatively  large  sums, 
made  up  of  small-fry  deposits.  But  when  it 
comes  to  lending  the  many  billions  of  dollars 
which  the  German  Kaiser  needs  to  carry  on  this 
war  the  gentlemen  bankers  must  ask  the  capitalist 
class,  who  alone  can  furnish  it.  And  if  the 
capitalist  class  as  a  whole  does  not  want  the  war, 
the  money  will  not  be  forthcoming,  either  through 
the  bankers  or  otherwise. 

Of  course,  the  bankers  are  themselves  an  im- 
portant and  very  influential  portion  of  the  capital- 
ist class.  But  they  are  not  the  capitalist  class  by 
any  means.  And  as  a  separate  group  they  are  by 
no  means  a  more  substantial  economic  group  than 
the  Kaiser  and  the  "Military  Party".  Mr.  Roth- 
schild's importance  is  not  in  his  own  right,  so  to 
say,  but  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  he  usually  re- 
presents the  capitalist  class.  And  his  importance, 
therefore,  adheres  to  him  only  so  long  as  he  does 
in  fact  represent  the  capitalist  class.    The  idea, 


Clearing  the  Ground  27 

therefore,  that  Mr.  Rothschild  as  Mr.  Rothschild, 
that  is  in  his  character  as  banker,  representing 
only  the  banking  interests  as  such,  could,  with- 
out reference  to  the  capitalist  class  as  a  whole, 
furnish  the  Kaiser  with  the  sinews  of  war  is 
utterly  fallacious.  This  makes  it  unnecessary  for 
us  to  discuss  the  reason  given  by  Wanhope  for 
Rothschild's  dislike  of  the  Kaiser  which  led  him 
to  arrange  the  "frame  up".  That  is,  in  so  far  as 
those  reasons  are  sufficient  for  Mr.  Rothschild  in 
his  narrow  and  limited  character  of  banker  with 
special  banking  interests.  There  is  still  the  possi- 
bility that  Mr.  Rothschild  is  speaking  in  his  larger 
capacity  of  leader  of  the  capitalist  class,  re- 
presenting not  narrow  banking  interests  as  such 
and  distinguished  from  the  interests  of  the  capital- 
ist class  as  a  whole,  but  the  entire  capitalist  class, 
or  at  least  its  controlling  economic  powers.  But 
then  Mr.  Rothschild  expands  into  the  capitalist 
class  not  only  in  his  money-furnishing  capacity, 
but  also  in  the  reasons  for  the  dislike  of  the 
Kaiser.  That  is,  the  dislike  of  the  Kaiser  must 
be  by  the  capitalist  class,  or  at  least  its  most  im- 
portant section,  and  then  the  question  is  to  be 
answered :  "What's  the  matter  with  the  Kaiser  ?" 
from  the  capitalist  point  of  view. 

The  suggestion  is  offered  that  Mr.  Rothschild — 


28  Socialism  and  War 

that  is,  the  capitalist  class — does  not  like  the 
interference  of  autocrats  in  his  business,  and 
therefore  prefers  the  republican  or  parliamentary- 
form  of  government.  But  this  suggestion  is  in- 
sufficient on  its  face  as  a  reason  for  the  "framing 
up"  of  the  Kaiser.  In  the  first  place,  it  must  be 
conceded  that  autocratic  as  the  German  Kaiser 
undoubtedly  is,  he  is  considerably  less  so  than  his 
cousin  the  Russian  Czar.  That  he  should  be 
singled  out  for  destruction  while  his  cousin  of 
Petrograd  is  not  only  let  alone  but  actually  made 
a  pet  of  is  certainly  strange.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
the  liking  of  the  capitalist  class  for  republican- 
democratic  forms  of  government  is  a  mere  tra- 
dition. It  would  be  no  difficult  matter  to  prove 
that  while  the  capitalist  class  can  and  does  thrive 
very  well  under  republican-democratic  forms  of 
government,  and  under  certain  circumstances 
actually  prefers  them,  its  ardor  for  these  forms  of 
government  has  not  only  cooled  off  considerably 
during  the  life  of  this  generation,  but  has  actually 
largely  turned  into  its  opposite.  So  that,  on  the 
whole,  the  capitalist  class  to-day  not  only  gets  on 
very  well  with  "the  Kaiser",  but  grows  to  like  his 
government  more  and  more  from  day  to  day.  In 
fact,  the  only  kind  of  autocratic  government  of 
which  the  capitalist  class  still  disapproves — in  so 


Clearing  the  Ground  29 

far  as  it  still  does  disapprove  of  any  kind  of  auto- 
cratic government — is  the  obsolete  one  of  the 
Russian  type. 

And  yet  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  Mr.  Roth- 
schild, representing  the  capitalist  class,  overlooked 
the  Russian  Czar,  indeed  entered  into  alliance  with 
him,  but  singled  out  the  German  Kaiser  for 
destruction. 

But  let  us  pass  that  for  a  moment.  Let  us 
assume  that  for  some  reason  as  yet  undiscovered 
by  us  the  capitalist  class  does  not  approve  of  the 
Kaiser,  and  that  its  business-committee,  the 
"banking  interests",  have  decided  to  put  him  out 
of  business.  Is  it  at  all  likely  that  they  would  go 
about  it  in  the  manner  assumed  by  the  Rothschild 
theory  of  the  war? 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  Kaiser  could 
not  be  where  he  is,  nor  what  he  is,  if  the  capitalist 
class  disapproved  of  him  as  thoroughly  as  must  be 
assumed  in  order  to  make  this  theory  at  all  in- 
telligible. If  the  capitalist  class  disapproved  of 
the  Kaiser  as  seriously  as  all  that,  he  could  no  more 
maintain  himself  as  the  head  of  the  German  people 
than  Mr.  Huerta  could  as  the  head  of  the  Mexican 
people  when  "we"  disapproved  of  him;  but  if  he 
could  perchance  maintain  himself  at  the  head  of 
the  governmental  machine  of  Germany,  it  is  beyond 


30  Socialism  and  War 

possibility  that  he  could  not  maintain  that  govern- 
ment in  the  degree  of  efficiency  which  it  has  at- 
tained, and,  above  all,  he  could  not  maintain  the 
German  army  in  that  degree  of  efficiency  that 
makes  it  the  formidable  weapon  of  warfare  that 
it  undoubtedly  is.  To  maintain  the  German  army 
in  its  present  state  of  efficiency  "three  things  are 
needed  —  money,  money,  and  money." 

If  it  were  true,  therefore,  that  the  capitalist 
class  wanted  to  put  the  Kaiser  out  of  business, 
the  surest,  indeed  the  only  way  of  accomplishing 
that  result  would  be  for  them  not  to  give 
him  the  money  which  was  necessary  to  put  his 
government  and  his  army  and  navy  in  their  pre- 
sent state  of  efficiency.  That  would  probably  have 
compelled  him  either  to  entirely  abdicate  or  to 
change  his  attitude  towards  the  capitalist  class  by 
instituting  such  reforms  in  the  government  of 
Germany  as  the  capitalist  class  might  demand. 
And  if  he  should  prove  utterly  unamenable  to 
reason,  then  it  would  have  been  time  enough  to  call 
in  outsiders.  And  then  it  would  hardly  have  been 
a  war,  it  would  probably  have  been  called  "inter- 
vention"— an  enterprise  much  less  costly,  and, 
above  all,  much  more  certain  of  the  desired  result 
than  a  war  like  the  present  one.  It  would  seem  an 
utterly  absurd  and  extremely  unbusinesslike  way 


Clearing  the  Ground  31 

of  "framing  up"  the  Kaiser  to  first  give  him 
all  the  money  he  needed  for  the  purpose  of  so  per- 
fecting his  war-machine  as  to  make  it  well-nigh 
unconquerable — if  not  actually  so — and  then  try 
to  beat  him  at  his  own  fighting-game. 

The  absurdity  of  the  idea  becomes  even  more 
apparent  when  we  recall  that  according  to  Mr. 
Wanhope's  own  statement — a  statement  un- 
doubtedly true  —  even  with  his  military 
machine  in  its  present  state  of  efficiency,  the 
Kaiser  could  not  have  entered  upon  this  war  with- 
out the  funds  supplied  to  him  by  Mr.  Rothschild, 
representing  the  capitalists.  In  other  words, 
without  these  funds  his  war  machine  could  not 
have  functioned  on  a  war  basis.  He  could  not 
therefore  have  gone  into  the  war,  or  if  he  did  go 
into  it  he  would  not  have  maintained  himself  for 
any  appreciable  length  of  time.  Why,  then,  did  the 
capitalist  class  furnish  the  Kaiser  with  the  neces- 
sary funds  to  give  him  the  fighting  chance,  a  fight- 
ing chance  which  he,  in  his  collective  capacity 
undoubtedly  a  good  "fighting-man",  considered 
good  enough  to  risk  a  war  of  aggression  on,  a 
fighting-chance,  indeed,  which  may  yet  prove  Mr. 
"Rothschild"  to  have  made  a  grievous  error  in  his 
calculations  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  fighting.  The 
idea  is  simply  preposterous! 


32  Socialism  and  War 

You  must  remember  that  this  war  is  no  play- 
matter  even  for  the  capitalist  class.  I  know  it  is  the 
fashion  among  Socialists  to  assume  and  assert 
that  the  burdens  and  miseries  of  war  are  borne 
wholly  by  the  working  class,  and  that  for  the 
capitalist  class  it  is  a  sort  of  picnic,  abounding  in 
fun  and  excitement,  besides  being  a  good  business. 
I  shall  not  enter  here  upon  a  discussion  as  to  how 
far  this  is  true  of  war  in  general.  But  as  to  the 
present  war,  I  must  say  that  the  idea  is  utterly 
baseless.  This  war  is  certainly  no  picnic  for  any 
social  class.  Certainly  not  to  the  capitalist  class, 
either  in  the  Alliance  or  the  Entente  countries. 
It  is  even  doubtful  whether  it  is  good  business. 
The  destruction  of  property  is  entirely  too  great 
for  that.  As  to  the  destruction  of  life  it  is  so 
appalling,  and  so  indiscriminate  as  to  class,  as  to 
make  the  sacrifices  of  the  capitalist  class  very  real 
and  very  substantial.  In  fact,  from  their  point 
of  view  their  sacrifices  are  much  greater  than 
those  of  the  working  class,  which  has  nothing  but 
its  limbs  and  lives  to  offer  for  its  country.  Of 
course,  this  last  assertion  on  the  part  of  the  capi- 
talist class  is  due  entirely  to  its  narrow- 
minded  capitalist  outlook  upon  the  world  and 
inhabitants  thereof.  But  even  this  erroneous 
claim    is    of    importance    when    we    come    to 


Clearing  the  Ground  33 

consider  the  likelihood  of  the  capitalist  class  going 
into  this  war  either  thoughtlessly  or  needlessly. 
For  even  an  erroneous  idea  born  of  narrow- 
minded  class-bigotry  is  a  real  psychological  factor 
which  may  exert  a  great  influence  upon  action. 

There  can,  therefore,  be  no  doubt  of  the  fact 
that  the  capitalist  class  is  backing  up  this  war 
with  its  money  and  its  lives  not  because  it  wanted 
to  "frame  up"  somebody  so  that  he  may  break 
his  neck,  but  because  some  great  capitalist  in- 
terests are  involved;  interests  for  which  it  con- 
siders it  worth  while  to  make  great  sacrifices  in 
lives  and  money — which  accounts  for  the  enthu- 
siasm displayed  by  the  capitalist  class  for  this 
war  in  all  the  belligerent  countries,  by  the  capital- 
ists fighting  on  the  side  of  the  Kaiser  at  least  as 
much  as,  if  not  more  than,  by  the  capitalists  of 
the  countries  fighting  against  him.  What  is  that 
interest?  So  that  we  are  still  on  the  quest  for  the 
interest  of  any  of  those  engaged  in  this  war. 

And  our  labors  are  not  likely  to  be  better  re- 
warded by  an  examination  of  the  two  remaining 
explanations.  That  this  is  a  war  of  "autocratic 
institutions"  on  the  one  hand  against  Freedom 
and  Democracy  on  the  other  is  a  proposition  which 
needs  only  to  be  stated  in  order  to  be  refuted.  For 
when  you  have  stated  it  you  will  find  yourself  at 


34  Socialism  and  War 

a  loss  to  point  out  which  is  which.  And  unless  it 
is  known  in  advance  on  which  side  you  are  no  one 
will  be  able  to  tell  which  you  refer  to  as  "Auto- 
cratic Institutions"  and  which  as  "Freedom  and 
Democracy."  It  seems  to  me  quite  self-evident 
that  in  a  war  in  which  Germany,  Austria  and 
Turkey  are  ranged  on  the  one  side  and  Russia, 
France  and  England  with  Japan  on  the  other,  it 
is  quite  impossible  for  any  quibbler  on  either  side 
to  claim  that  the  war  was  started  either  by  Free- 
dom and  Democracy  to  stamp  out  the  remnants 
of  Autocracy  or  by  Autocracy  to  stem  the  "rising 
tide  of  Democracy".  It  seems  to  me  self-evident 
that  were  this  a  struggle  between  Autocracy  and 
Democracy  as  such,  the  alignment  of  powers  would 
have  been  quite  a  different  one.  If  anything  can 
be  considered  certain  in  international  affairs  it  is 
this :  In  such  a  struggle  the  Czar  and  the  Kaiser 
would  be  fighting  side  by  side  instead  of  against 
each  other. 

So  there  remains  only  the  explanation  that  the 
ruling  classes  of  all  the  countries  engaged  in  this 
war,  have  brought  this  war  about  in  order  to 
stifle  the  revolutionary  movement. 

I  must  confess  I  am  somewhat  biased  in  favor 
of  this  explanation,  —  it  accords  with  an  opinion 
long  held  by  Socialists  that  when  the  capitalist 


Clearing  the  Ground  35 

class  of  any  country  finds  itself  threatened  by 
internal  revolution  it  will  resort  to  external  war 
in  an  attempt  to  weaken  the  working  class  phy- 
sically and  morally.  It  must  also  be  conceded  that 
it  is  the  only  explanation  offered  thus  far  which 
shows  any  appreciation  of  the  laws  of  cause  and 
effect  and  of  the  relation  in  which  a  means  stands 
to  its  object.  Those  who  take  this  view  at  least 
can  point  to  the  fact  that  this  war  has  had  the 
result  of  practically  destroying  the  international 
Socialist  movement,  or  at  least  incapacitating  it 
L  for  decades  to  come.  At  least  that  will  in  all  likeli- 
hood be  its  effect,  unless  this  madness  is  carried 
so  far  —  the  war  carried  on  so  long  —  that  it 
will  bring  the  entire  capitalist  system  to  the  verge 
of  collapse,  when  the  sheer  weight  of  the  accumu- 
lated misery  shall  have  caused  a  decided  re- 
vulsion of  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  working 
class.  If,  therefore,  the  purpose  of  the  ruling 
classes  had  been  the  disorganization  of  the  work- 
ing class  and  the  crippling  of  its  emancipatory 
movement,  they  certainly  could  not  have  selected 
a  better  means  of  accomplishing  their  purpose 
than  the  present  war. 

And  yet,  notwithstanding  the  obvious  tempt- 
ation to  ascribe  to  a  ruthless  and  crafty  foe  the 
deliberate  designing  of  a  certain  baneful  result 


36  Socialism  and  War 

which  his  acts  have  brought  about,  I  am  sure  that 
a  careful  and  dispassionate  examination  of  the 
actual  facts  will  not  justify  such  a  conclusion.  The 
break-down  of  the  international  labor  movement 
was  undoubtedly  a  prize  well  worth  making  some 
sacrifices  for.  But  neither  the  condition  of  the 
movement  in  the  different  countries  during  the 
time  immediately  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  nor  the  manner  in  which  the  war  was  brought 
about,  nor  yet  the  manner  in  which  it  has  been 
conducted  since  its  outbreak,  at  all  accord  with 
the  theory  of  either  a  real  or  a  sham  battle  be- 
tween the  different  groups  of  the  ruling  classes 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  revolutionary 
efficacy  of  the  working  class. 

The  idea  of  this  war  being  a  sham  battle  as  far 
as  the  ruling  classes  of  the  different  countries  are 
concerned,  and  that  the  war  is  a  "frame-up" 
upon  the  working  class,  deserves  to  be  classed  for 
absurdity  and  preposterousness  with  the  theory 
that  Rothschild  "framed  up"  the  Kaiser.  In  fact 
it  goes  that  theory  one  better.  For  that  theory 
at  least  conceds  the  realty  of  the  fighting  on  the 
part  of  all  concerned,  while  this  proceeds  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  only  real  fighting  is  done  by 
members  of  the  working  class.  But  as  I  have  al- 
ready stated  before,  in  this  war  at  least,  the  ruling 


Clearing  the  Ground  37 

classes  fight  with  might  and  main  as  much  as  the 
working  class.  There  is  certainly  no  sham  about 
the  fighting  in  this  war,  and  this  applies  about 
equally  to  all  concerned.  So  that  the  only  version 
of  this  theory  that  can  be  seriously  considered  is 
that  one,  or  some,  or  all  the  countries  engaged  in 
the  present  war  deliberately  brought  about  this 
greatest  of  conflicts  in  an  effort  to  avert  an  im- 
pending revolution  or  throttle  a  growing  revo- 
lutionary movement. 

The  efficacy  of  fighting  a  foreign  enemy  as  a 
means  of  suppressing  an  internal  enemy,  has  been 
brilliantly  vindicated  in  this  very  war,  the  causes 
of  which  we  are  investigating.  The  recipe  is,  how- 
ever, of  ancient  origin,  and  has  been  repeatedly 
tried  with  marked  success  by  sundry  rulers  and 
ruling  classes  in  ancient  as  well  as  modern  times. 
War  might  well  be  called  the  grave  of  incipient 
revolutions.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  war  might 
with  equal  propriety  be  called  the  mother  of  re- 
volutions, for  many  a  revolution  was  born  of  war, 
or  at  least  had  its  birth  hastened  by  war.  And 
we  do  not  have  to  go  far  afield  into  history  in 
order  to  find  examples  of  war-born  revolutions. 
The  present  French  Republic  is  the  result  of  a 
revolution  brought  about  by  a  war,  —  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War  of  1870-71 ;  and  the  last  great  war 


38  Socialism  and  War 

preceding  the  present  war,  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  had  as  its  aftermath  a  revolution,  —  the 
Russian  Revolution. 

This  double-character  of  war  as  a  preventive  of 
revolutions  and  as  a  cause  of  revolutions,  naturally 
requires  extreme  care  in  its  handling  whenever  it 
is  desired  to  make  use  of  it  in  its  first  character. 
Two  circumstances  must  unite  before  any  ruler 
or  ruling  class  will  resort  to  it  as  a  means  of 
combating  a  revolutionary  movement :  the  danger 
of  revolution  must  be  imminent,  and  the  prospect- 
ive war  must  have  some  inherent  element  of  popu- 
larity. War  is  a  serious  matter  for  any  country, 
at  any  time.  It  is  particularly  serious  for  a 
country  threatened  with  revolution,  both  as  a  war 
and  as  a  possible  revolution-breeder.  Going  to  war 
to  prevent  a  revolution  is  therefore  in  the  nature 
of  a  capital  operation,  which  no  one  would  be  fool- 
hardy enough  to  undergo  unless  the  danger  sought 
to  be  avoided  is  so  imminent  as  to  make  death 
almost  a  certainty  if  the  operation  is  not  risked. 
On  the  other  hand,  no  matter  how  grave  the 
danger,  the  operation  will  not  be  undertaken 
unless  the  circumstances  are  such  as  to  give  some 
chance  of  success  instead  of  insuring  the  end 
which  it  is  desired  to  avoid.  An  unpopular  war 
would  be  almost  sure  to  hasten  an  impending  re- 


Clearing  the  Ground  39 

volution,  instead  of  averting  it.  Let  us  therefore 
make  a  brief  survey  of  conditions  in  the  countries 
engaged  in  the  present  war  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  they  were  such  as  to  justify  the  assump- 
tion that  all  or  any  of  them  could  have  caused 
this  war  in  order  to  prevent  an  impending  re- 
volution. 

There  was  Austria-Hungary,  who  set  the  ball 
rolling.  I  do  not  think  there  is  a  man  living  who 
would  dare  to  assert  that  there  was  in  that  country 
the  slightest  indication  of  impending  revolution, 
not  only  imminent  but  even  remote.  It  is  true 
that  in  Austria  at  least  there  was  a  strong  Social- 
ist movement,  but  the  movement  was  of  a  kind 
that,  whatever  else  might  be  thought  of  it,  surely 
no  one  could  think  for  a  moment  that  it  would  or 
might  break  out  into  revolt  at  any  time  within  the 
near  future.  And  by  this  I  do  not  at  all  mean  to 
reflect  on  the  revolutionary  character  of  the 
Austrian  Socialist  movement,  although  one  is  very 
much  tempted  to  do  so,  seeing  the  way  they  re- 
acted on  the  call  to  arms  issued  by  their  govern- 
ment. Hindsight  is  proverbially  better  than  fore- 
sight. And  we  may  now  from  the  vantage-point  of 
after  the  fact  safely  place  a  low  estimate  on  the 
revolutionary  character  of  the  Austrian  Socialist 
movement.    But  we  do  not  need  our  post-bellum 


40  Socialism  and  War 

experience  to  take  the  revolutionary  measure  of 
the  Austrian  Socialist  movement.  "Revolutionary" 
being  used  here  in  the  sense  and  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  government  which  is  supposed  to  be 
seeking  to  suppress  it.  In  this  sense  "revolution" 
means  an  acute  eruption.  For  a  government  will 
no  more  attempt  to  prevent  an  "evolutionary"  re- 
volution by  means  of  a  war,  than  an  individual 
would  attempt  to  cure  by  a  capital  operation  one 
of  those  chronic  ailments  with  which  men  often 
live  to  die  of  old  age. 

And  what  was  said  of  Austria  is  equally  true  of 
her  ally  and  mentor,  Germany.  The  Socialist  move- 
ment in  Germany  was,  indeed,  considerably 
stronger  than  in  Austria.  But  to  offset 
that,  the  spirit  of  orderliness,  decorum,  and  "evo- 
lutionism" was  much  stronger  in  the  German 
movement  than  in  the  Austrian.  Its  determination 
not  to  be  provoked  into  a  premature  fight  was  well 
known.  Whether  from  choice  or  necessity  it  had 
long  ago  resolved  to  attain  its  purposes  by  legal 
ends,  and  it  was  quite  certain  in  July,  1914,  that  it 
would  not  take  the  initiative  to  transfer  the  fight 
to  extra-legal  fields ;  at  least,  not  unless  something 
quite  extraordinary  happened  to  swerve  it  from 
its  former  course. 

So  much  for  the  Austro-German  combination. 


Clearing  the  Ground  41 

And  substantially  the  same  is  true  of  the  other 
side. 

There  was,  indeed,  a  very  serious  strike  in 
Russia  immediately  preceding  the  war.  But  it 
was  certainly  not  of  a  character  to  warrant  a 
resort  to  war.  And  of  all  European  rulers  the 
Russian  Czar  was  the  least  likely  to  be  tempted 
to  resort  to  war  as  means  of  suppressing  a  revo- 
lution. The  disastrous  effects  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  on  the  internal  affairs  of  his 
Empire  were  too  fresh  in  his  memory  for  that.  It 
may  also  be  stated  parenthetically  that  had  the 
Russian  Czar  really  found  himself  in  such  a  cri- 
tical situation  as  to  require  a  resort  to  such  heroic 
measures,  his  good  friend  and  cousin  of  Berlin 
would  have  come  to  his  assistance,  and  if  there 
had  been  a  war  at  all  it  would  have  assumed  an 
entirely  different  character. 

Of  Russia's  allies,  neither  France  nor  England 
were  threatened  with  any  revolutionary  move- 
ment that  anybody  was  aware  of.  In  France  there 
were  some  individuals  who  talked  loud,  but  the 
old  saying  that  "barking  dogs  don't  bite"  seems 
to  have  been  specially  cut  to  fit  them.  They  had 
barked  for  years  without  doing  anything  in  par- 
ticular. It  may  also  be  remarked  that  they  did 
not  even  bark  their  loudest  about  this  time.    So 


42  Socialism  and  War 

there  was  no  occasion  for  any  extraordinary- 
measures  in  the  way  of  revolution-preventing. 
And  certainly  not  the  slightest  reason  for  a  war 
on  that  score. 

England  hadn't  had  a  revolution  nor  any  real 
revolutionary  movement  in  so  long  a  time  that  the 
idea  of  England  going  into  this  world-struggle 
in  order  to  avert  a  revolution  strikes  one  like  an 
echo  from  Gilbert  and  Sullivan.  As  far  as  we  know 
neither  the  Parliamentary  Labor  Party,  nor  the 
Independent  Labor  Party,  nor  the  British  Socialist 
Party  were  at  all  likely  to  institute  a  revolution 
within  the  near  future.  It  is  true  that  there  were 
two  disturbing  factors  to  ruffle  England's  peace 
of  mind  in  the  persons  of  Mr.  Hilaire  Belloc  and 
Sir  Edward  Carson.  But  the  danger  was  hardly 
imminent  enough  to  require  immediate  mobili- 
zation. Mr.  Belloc's  mystical  speculations  had 
hardly  assumed  definite  enough  shape  to  make 
immediate  action  urgent.  And  Sir  Edward's 
differences  with  His  Majesty's  Government  were 
of  a  kind  that  are  never  settled  by  the  same  means 
as  are  differences  between  ruling  classes  and  the 
"lower  orders".  If  Sir  Edward's  opposition  had 
really  become  very  serious  the  chances  are  that 
the  dispute  would  have  been  terminated  by  Sir 
Edward  becoming  His  Majesty's  Government  and 


Clearing  the  Ground  43 

Mr.     Asquith     turning     into     His     Majesty's 
Opposition. 

In  short,  the  very  first  element  of  a  situation 
requiring  a  war  to  suppress  "the  rising  tide  of  the 
revolution"  —  namely  the  presence  of  that  "ris- 
ing tide"  —  is  entirely  lacking.  As  without 
a  threatening  revolution  there  could  be  no  war  to 
suppress  it,  it  is  unnecessary  to  discuss  the 
second  question,  namely,  whether  the  war  could 
have  been  expected  to  be  popular  enough  to  pre- 
vent a  revolution  if  one  had  been  threatened. 
Nevertheless,  I  shall  say,  "for  the  purposes  of  the 
record",  that  the  war  did  have  all  the  chances  of 
proving  a  very  popular  one  in  all  the  countries 
concerned.  But  this  raises  another  and  very 
interesting  question:  Why  is  this  war  so  popular? 
In  the  lectures  which  are  to  come  I  shall  therefore 
endeavor  to  answer  not  only  the  question  "What 
brought  about  the  war?",  but  also  the  question: 
"What  makes  this  war  so  immensely  popular?" 


II 

THE    ECONOMIC    CAUSES    OF 
THE    WAR 

In  my  first  lecture  I  stated  that,  in  this  coun- 
try at  least,  it  seems  to  be  agreed  on  all  sides, 
even  among  Socialists,  that  economic  condi- 
tions or  economic  development  did  not  cause 
this  war.  And  I  intimated  that  I  did  not 
share  this  well-nigh  universal  opinion,  and 
was  inclined  to  agree  with  what  is,  or  rather 
used  to  be,  considered  the  Socialist  view  in  such 
matters  and  ascribed  the  gigantic  struggle 
now     raging     in  Europe     to     economic  causes. 

The  opposition  to,  or  dissent  from,  what  might 
be  termed  the  economic  view  of  the  war,  was  thus 
stated  by  a  Socialist  in  a  Socialist  publication, — 
Dr.  Isaac  A.  Hourwich,  writing  in  the  New 
Review : 

"There  is  a  tendency  among  orthodox  Socialists 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  45 

to  blame  everything  upon  capitalism,  and  more 
specifically  upon  the  capitalist  class,  or  'the  capi- 
talist governments/  This  habit  of  thought  is 
particularly  strong  in  the  United  States,  where 
the  capitalists  are  the  dominant,  although  not  the 
only  power  in  politics.  As  I  have  had  occasion 
to  show  elsewhere,  even  in  the  United  States  the 
capitalists  and  the  wage-workers  are  not  the  only 
social-economic  classes.  In  Europe  there  is  no 
nation  whose  government  can  be  scientifically 
defined  as  a  'capitalist  government'  .  .  .  The 
manufacturers  of  armaments  are  the  only  group 
of  the  capitalist  class  that  is  directly  interested  in 
militarism.  The  Imperialistic  adventures  further 
the  interests  only  of  a  limited  group  of  manufact- 
urers, directly  or  indirectly  interested  in  the  ex- 
port trade  with  the  Colonies.  Nowadays  piracy 
is  no  longer  an  integral  part  of  maritime  trade, 
as  in  the  days  of  the  Phoenicians.  German  manu- 
facturers can  safely  ship  their  goods  to  South 
America  in  competition  with  English  manufact- 
urers, without  the  protection  of  the  German  navy. 
It  is  therefore  misleading  to  seek  the  causes  of 
this  war  in  the  wiles  of  'the  capitalist  class.' " 

Now,  while   I   acknowledge   myself   belonging 
among  those  here  referred  to  as  "orthodox  Socia- 


46  Socialism  and  War 

lists",  and  intend  to  present  here  their  point  of 
view,  I  have  no  sympathy  whatever  with  the 
manner  in  which  some  of  them  attempt  to  ex- 
plain the  phenomenon  of  war  generally  and  the 
present  war  in  particular.  Such  hackneyed 
phrases  as  "wars  are  the  result  of  capitalism", 
"capitalists  need  new  markets",  etc.,  etc.,  unfor- 
tunately so  much  in  vogue  among  Socialists,  are 
either  false  or  meaningless.  And  I  do  not  at  all 
blame  those  to  whom  such  formulas  are  offered 
as  a  ready-made  explanation  of  all  wars — without 
any  real  attempt  to  look  into  the  facts  of  the 
particular  situation — for  rejecting  them  as  an 
unwarranted  attempt  to  "blame  it"  all  on  capital- 
ism, and  an  easy  way  for  the  mentally  lazy  to 
escape  the  necessity  of  studying  a  rather  compli- 
cated problem.  That  all  wars  were  not  the  result 
of  capitalism  is,  of  course,  self-evident,  as  quite 
a  considerable  number  of  wars  took  place  before 
the  capitalistic  era.  But  it  is  not  even  true  that 
capitalism  is  particularly  warlike,  as  a  glance 
into  the  pages  of  history  will  conclusively  show. 

On  consulting  any  reliable  history  we  shall  find, 
for  instance,  that  the  XIX  Century,  the  century 
which  saw  the  greatest  development  of  capitalism, 
was  far  from  being  a  war-era.  On  the  contrary: 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         47 

compared  with  the  two  or  three  centuries  that 
preceded  it,  it  was  of  a  distinctly  peaceful 
character. 

We  shall  find,  furthermore,  that  England,  the 
classic  country  of  capitalism  in  the  XIX  Century, 
was  very  far  from  being  a  warlike  nation  during 
that  century.  Whatever  may  have  been  John 
Bull's  reputation  for  bellicoseness  in  the  days  of 
long  ago,  he  was  a  distinctly  pacific  individual  dur- 
ing the  past  one  hundred  years.  We  are  therefore 
confronted  with  the  indisputable  fact  that  the 
most  capitalistic  nation  in  the  most  capitalistic 
age  was  distinctly  peaceful. 

In  fact,  an  examination  of  the  chronology  and 
geography  of  wars  during  the  last  couple  of 
hundred  years  might  easily  lead  us  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  world  instead  of  becoming  more 
warlike  with  the  growth  of  capitalism  was  steadi- 
ly becoming  more  and  more  pacific  under  its  in- 
fluence. Let  us  consider  this:  The  "civilized 
world",  that  is,  the  capitalistic  world,  hasn't  had 
a  general  war  in  a  hundred  years — since  the  close 
of  the  Napoleonic  Wars;  and  no  great  war  in 
forty-four  years — since  the  Franco-Prussian 
War.  The  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1878  was  hardly 
a  great  war;  and  even  that  was  thirty-six  years 
ago.    In  fact,  the  Franco-Prussian  War  was  not 


48  Socialism  and  War 

only  the  last  great  European  war,  but  was  the 
last  war  of  any  kind  waged  by  any  of  the  capital- 
istically  developed  nations  of  Europe  among 
themselves.  All  that  there  was  of  war,  in  Europe, 
since  then  was  confined  to  one  spot — the  most  un- 
capitalistic  corner  of  Europe — the  Balkans. 

The  conclusion  that  capitalism  is — as  such — 
peaceful,  would,  however,  be  just  as  erroneous 
as  the  contrary  assertion  that  it  is,  by  its  very 
nature,  warlike.  The  truth  is,  that  capitalism — 
as  such — is  neither  peaceful  nor  warlike.  Different 
groups  within  capitalist  society  are  either  peace- 
ful or  warlike  as  their  interests,  or  supposed  in- 
terests, may  dictate.  There  is,  therefore,  very 
seldom  any  unanimity  of  opinion  in  the  capital- 
ist class  as  to  the  desirability  of  war  at  any  given 
time  in  any  given  nation.  Nevertheless,  it  must  not 
be  assumed  that  the  capitalist  class  as  a  whole 
and  the  nations  which  it  dominates  are  utterly 
devoid  of  character  on  the  subject  of  war  and 
peace ;  or  that  this  character  stands  in  no  organic 
connection  with  its  capitalist  economy.  A  careful 
examination  of  "all  the  facts  in  the  case"  will 
show  that  the  question  of  war  and  peace  is  deeply 
rooted  in  the  economy  of  nations.  Our  conclusion 
must,  therefore  be :  capitalism  is  neither  peaceful 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         49 

nor  warlike,  but  has  its  peaceful  and  warlike 
moods,  corresponding  to  different  phases  of  its 
development. 

Without  going  into  detail  it  may  be  stated  as 
a  general  proposition  that  the  life-history  of  cap- 
italist society  may  be  divided,  for  our  purposes, 
into  three  epochs — two  of  them  warlike  and  one 
peaceful  In  its  youthful  days  capitalism  is  com- 
bative— its  growth  from  infancy  to  manhood  be- 
ing accompanied  by  a  series  of  wars  in  which  its 
distinctively  capitalistic  character  asserts  itself. 
After  it  has  reached  to  "man's  estate"  capitalism 
grows  pacific;  and  its  attention,  in  the  prime  of 
its  vigor,  is  directed  mainly  to  household  economy, 
in  the  belief  that  a  well-ordered  household  and 
"attention  to  business"  are  the  sure  basis  of  pros- 
perity. But  after  capitalism  —  understanding 
under  that  term  a  society  based  on  the  principle 
of  free  competition — has  passed  its  zenith,  when 
on  the  downward  grade,  it  develops  extreme  irri- 
tability of  temper  and  returns  to  the  warlike  mood 
of  its  earlier  days. 

The  history  of  England  well  illustrates  this 
proposition.  There  was  a  time  when  England 
was  a  very  warlike  country.  The  two  hundred 
years  which  elapsed  from  the  accession  of  Eliza- 


50  Socialism  and  War 

beth  to  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  wit- 
nessed an  almost  unbroken  procession  of  English 
wars ;  and  it  was  during  these  two  hundred  years 
that  England  established  her  position  as  the  lead- 
ing commercial  and  manufacturing  country  of 
the  world.  But  with  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  when  England  finally  established  her  posi- 
tion in  the  vanguard  of  commercialism  and 
reached  her  capitalistic  majority,  so  to  say,  she 
"settled  down"  and  entered  upon  a  pacific  era. 
And  she  continued  in  her  pacific  mood  until  the 
day  before  yesterday.  It  is  true  that  she  fought 
the  great  Napoleonic  Wars  during  the  early  part 
of  this  period.  But  the  Napoleonic  Wars  were 
quite  exceptional  in  their  character,  produced  by 
exceptional  circumstances,  and  do  not  militate 
against  England's  generally  pacific  character  dur- 
ing the  period  under  consideration.  During  the 
one  hundred  years  which  elapsed  between  the 
close  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  and  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war  England  practically  had  no 
European  war,  hardly  any  real  war  in  fact.  Cer- 
tainly nothing  that  could  compare  either  in  size 
or  importance  with  any  of  the  great  struggles  of 
previous  epochs  in  her  history  or  with  the  great 
struggle  now  raging. 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  51 

I  have  searched  my  memory  for  the  record  of 
any  European  war  conducted  by  England  during 
the  past  one  hundred  years,  and  the  only  thing 
that  I  can  recall  is  her  participation  in  the 
Crimean  War.  But  that  certainly  was  no  war,  as 
far  as  England's  participation  in  it  was  con- 
cerned. It  was  merely  a  warlike  incident  or  epi- 
sode. And  those  who  are  familiar  with  that  inci- 
dent will  recall  that  the  English  capitalists  were 
dragged  into  that  war  against  their  will.  The  true 
representatives  of  capitalism  were  strongly  op- 
posed to  that  war,  and  when  England  was  finally 
dragged  into  it,  her  half-heartedness  in  the  affair 
limited  her  participation  therein  to  the  sending 
of  an  expeditionary  force. 

That  incident  occurred  sixty  years  ago,  and 
since  then  England  has  been  at  peace  with  all  her 
European  neighbors.  She  has  manifested  the 
same  pacific  character  in  other  quarters  of  the 
globe,  and  down  into  the  modern  imperialistic  era. 
Let  there  be  no  mistake  about  it.  Notwithstand- 
ing her  exceptional  position  as  a  world-empire 
with  interests  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe,  Eng- 
land was  not  a  leader  of  nations  in  the  modern  era 
of  imperialism,  but  modestly  followed  the  lead  of 
others,  principally  that  of  Germany. 


52  Socialism  and  War 

It  is  sufficient  to  look  into  the  history  of  the  so- 
called  "partition"  of  Africa,  during  the  past 
thirty  years  or  so,  to  find  the  proof  of  this  assert- 
ion. Those  who  have  followed  the  manifestations 
of  modern  imperialism  in  that  part  of  the  world 
will  doubtless  recall  that  back  in  1882,  when  Ger- 
many started  on  her  Imperialistic  career,  Ger- 
many made  a  proposition  to  England  for  "joint 
action" — joint  occupation  or  partition — of  the 
Western  coast  of  Africa,  particularly  Southwest 
Africa.  That  was  at  a  time  when  Germany  was 
a  much  weaker  power  than  she  is  to-day,  and  her 
imperialism  much  less  vigorous.  England,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  the  undisputed  mistress  of  the 
seas,  and  in  possession  of  South  Africa,  which 
brought  at  least  Southwest  Africa  within  her 
"sphere  of  influence",  when  viewed  from  the 
modern  imperialistic  point  of  view.  And  had 
England  been  as  imperialistic  as  Germany,  or  as 
she  is  herself  to-day,  she  would  either  have  gone 
into  the  joint  adventure  with  Germany,  or 
grabbed  that  particular  slice  of  Africa  herself 
without  any  partners.  But  that  was  in  1882,  and 
England  was  still  dreaming  dreams  of  peace.  So 
she  did  not  make  any  move,  with  the  result  that, 
after  a  couple  of  years  of  waiting,  Germany  con- 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         53 

eluded  that  there  was  nothing  either  to  expect  or 
to  fear  from  England;  she  therefore  undertook 
the  job  single-handed  and  occupied  what  is  now 
known  as  German  South  West  Africa. 

The  same  story,  in  a  general  way,  is  told  by  the 
history  of  the  occupation  of  the  eastern  coast  of 
Africa.  For  years  England  refused  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  many  opportunities  which  pre- 
sented themselves  to  her  for  the  purpose  of 
strengthening  her  position  in  that  region  by  ex- 
tending its  dominion. 

A  very  marked  proof  of  England's  general  pa- 
cific character  even  as  late  as  1890,  and  the  re- 
moteness of  the  possibility  of  war  to  the  minds 
of  her  statesmen,  is  shown  by  her  cession  of  the 
island  of  Heligoland  to  Germany  in  that  year.  If 
you  will  bear  in  mind  that  the  first  big  naval  de- 
feat suffered  by  England  in  the  present  war  was 
inflicted  upon  her  by  the  Germans  using  their 
naval  base  at  Heligoland,  you  will  appreciate  how 
important  a  strategic  position  Heligoland  is,  and 
how  little  England  must  have  thought  of  war 
with  Germany  in  1890.  How  times  have 
changed  since  then !  To-day  even  the  most  pacific  of 
Englishmen,  those  who  are  opposed  to  England's 
exacting  any  kind  of  "compensation"  from  Ger- 


54  Socialism  and  War 

many  after  a  successful  termination  of  the  war, 
still  insist,  when  discussing  the  terms  of  peace  as 
they  ought  to  be,  on  making  an  exception  of  Heli- 
goland. This  England  should  have  back  by  all 
means.  And  yet  she  gave  it  away  freely  less  than 
twenty-five  years  ago. 

Now,  as  I  have  already  stated,  this  apparent 
love  for  peace  is  not  at  all  a  characteristic  of  the 
English  nation.  There  was  a  time  when  England 
was  one  of  the  most  warlike  nations  of  Europe. 
And  as  I  shall  attempt  to  show  later  on,  England 
is  again  becoming  warlike.  But  for  the  present 
we  are  interested  in  her  pacific  period.  It  is,  of 
course,  hard  to  determine  upon  an  exact  date 
when  the  change  from  the  earlier  warlike  period 
to  the  pacific  one  which  I  have  just  been  discuss- 
ing occurred.  Such  transitions  are  more  or  less 
slow  and  gradual.  In  a  general  way  it  may  be 
said,  however,  as  already  intimated,  that  the  early 
warlike  period  of  English  Capitalism  closed  with 
the  Seven  Years'  War.  The  first  manifestation 
of  England's  turn  to  a  more  pacific  mood  was 
her  management  of  our  War  of  Independence. 

It  may  perhaps  jar  on  the  sensitive  ears  of  our 
good  patriots,  but  the  truth  must  be  told — and  the 
truth  is,  that  the  success  of  our  War  of  Independ- 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  55 

ence  was  due  not  so  much  to  the  prowess  and  love 
of  liberty  of  the  "embattled  farmers"  at  Bunker 
Hill  and  Lexington  or  to  the  military  genius  of 
George  Washington,  as  to  the  fact  that  England 
did  not  care  to  exert  herself  overmuch,  and  to 
make  great  sacrifices  in  order  to  keep  us.  If 
England  had  wanted  badly  to  keep  the  Colonies, 
there  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  war  would  have  had 
another  result.  Of  course  nobody  can  tell  now 
whether  England  could  in  any  event  have  managed 
to  keep  us  as  a  dependency  until  the  present  day. 
But  it  is  safe  to  say  that  she  could  have  retained 
us  as  a  colony  for  a  considerable  time  after  1783. 
That  we  gained  our  independence  at  the  time  we 
did  was  due  mainly,  if  not  entirely,  to  the  fact 
that  England  did  not  really  care  very  much 
whether  we  remained  a  subject  colony  or  became 
a  free  and  independent  nation.  Of  course,  if  she 
could  have  kept  us  without  a  fight  she  would  have 
done  so.  But  the  practical  question  that  con- 
fronted England  was  not  whether  or  not  she 
wanted  to  keep  us,  but  whether  or  not  she  was 
ready  to  wage  a  real  war  in  order  to  keep  us.  And 
this  she  decided  in  the  negative. 

I  stated  in  my  first  lecture  that  it  takes  two  to 
make  a  war.  And  that  before  two  states  will  go 


56  Socialism  and  War 

to  war  there  must  be  ah  object  worth  fighting 
for,  for  both  sides.  In  our  War  of  Independence  we 
had  a  great  object  to  fight  for — independence. 
But  England  did  not  think  that  depriving  us  of 
our  independence  was  object  enough  for  her  to 
wage  a  great  war  about.  And  so  after  making  a 
show  of  fight,  sufficient  to  find  that  we  were  in 
earnest  and  ready  to  fight  a  big  fight,  and  that 
her  own  people  did  not  think  the  fight  worth 
while,  official  England  capitulated,  and  allowed 
us  our  independence.  In  this  connection  it  is  well 
to  remember  that  about  thirty  years  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  War  of  Independence  we  waged 
a  second  war  with  England,  the  War  of  1812. 
And  if  you  will  consult  a  serious  history  you  will 
find  that  in  that  war  we  got  a  sound  thrashing 
from  England,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  we 
were  then  a  much  bigger  people,  with  over  thirty 
years  of  existence  as  an  independent  nation,  and 
that  England  was  exhausted  by  a  generation  of 
war  in  Europe — the  great  Napoleonic  Wars.  If 
England  could  "lick"  us  in  1812  she  would  have 
had  no  trouble  in  doing  so  thirty  years  earlier, 
had  she  really  cared  to. 

But  why  did  she  not  care? 

Of  course,  we  all    remember    Burke's    great 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         57 

speech  on  Conciliation  with  America — the  beauti- 
ful periods  and  fiery  invective  in  which  he  proved 
our  right  to  independence  to  his  and  our  satis- 
faction, but  which  when  stripped  of  their  orator- 
ical garb  simply  proved  that  the  English  public 
opinion  which  he  expressed  did  not  consider 
America  worth  fighting  for.  Of  course,  being 
a  true  orator,  Burke  only  glided  on  the  surface 
of  things.  You  will  not,  therefore,  find  the  true 
reason  for  England's  unwillingness  to  fight  in 
order  to  retain  us,  in  his  celebrated  oration.  But 
you  will  find  it  in  a  less  celebrated,  though  no  less 
important  work — Adam  Smith's  Essay  on  Colo- 
nies. Smith's  Essay  was  the  meat  of  the  meal  of 
which  Burke's  Oration  was  the  dessert,  or  rather 
the  sparkling  champagne. 

As  you  know,  Smith  was  the  father  of  classical 
political  economy — the  sacred  gospel  of  Capital- 
ism in  its  vigor  of  manhood.  And  his  Essay  on 
Colonies  is  part  of  this  gospel,  twin-brother  and 
necessary  corollary  to  the  main  article  of  faith — 
Free  Trade. 

The  sum  and  substance  of  the  Essay  is  that 
colonies  are  not  worth  having.  Smith's  major 
premise — proved  by  a  long  and  rather  devious  pro- 
cess of  economic  reasoning — is  that  exclusive  trade 


58  Socialism  and  War 

between  the  "mother-country"  and  the  colony,  or 
preferential  tariffs  in  favor  of  the  "mother- 
country",  are  harmful  not  only  to  the  colony  and 
the  world  at  large,  but  also  to  the  "mother- 
country".  The  proper  policy,  therefore,  to  be  pur- 
sued by  the  "mother-country"  is  to  permit  the 
colony  to  trade  freely  and  on  equal  terms  with 
the  world  at  large — free  trade  for  the  colonies. 
It  then  follows  as  an  irresistible  conclusion  that 
colonies  are  nothing  but  an  unnecessary  trouble 
and  expense.  If  France  and  the  rest  of  the  world, 
can  trade  with  an  English  colony  on  the  same 
terms  as  England  herself,  England  not  only  does 
not  derive  any  special  benefit  from  "possessing" 
the  colony,  but  is  in  fact  at  a  disadvantage, 
because  she  must  meet  the  competition  of  the 
whole  world  as  if  she  didn't  "own"  the  colony  at 
all,  while  at  the  same  time  carrying  the  burden 
of  her  civil  administration  and  military  pro- 
tection. "Possessing"  a  colony,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, is  like  possessing  a  white  elephant. 

This  is  the  spring  that  fed  the  well  of  Burkian 
oratory.  It  flowed  freely  for  over  a  hundred 
years,  determining  the  character  not  only  of  a 
good  deal  of  English  oratory  but  also  of  English 
colonial  and  foreign  policy. 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  59 

Towards  the  close  of  this  period,  just  one 
hundred  years  after  our  War  of  Independence, 
we  find  England  doing  in  South  Africa  what  she 
had  done  a  hundred  years  before  in  North 
America.  As  I  have  already  stated,  England  was 
rather  tardy  in  asserting  her  rights  of  sovereignty 
in  the  Southern  part  of  the  African  continent.  It 
took  some  time  and  considerable  complications 
before  she  asserted  her  overlordship  over  the  two 
Boer  Republics  adjoining  her  settlements  at  and 
near  the  Cape.  Shortly  after  she  did  bring  these 
two  republics  under  her  protecting  wing,  the 
Boers  inhabiting  them  followed  our  example  of  a 
hundred  years  before  and  declared  their  inde- 
pendence; and  upon  England's  refusal  to  accede, 
they  took  up  arms  to  fight  for  their 
freedom.  The  "embattled  farmers"  of  the  Boer 
country,  like  our  forefathers  of  old,  defeated  the 
English  at  their  Bunker  Hill — which  they  called 
Majuba  Hill — and  England  speedily  gave  in,  con- 
cluding a  peace  whereby  it  recognized  their  inde- 
pendence.   Much  as  in  our  case. 

But  here  the  analogy  ends.  The  Boers,  also, 
had  another  war  with  England — some  fifteen 
years  after  their  War  of  Independence.  But  the 
second  Boer  War  took  an  entirely  different  course 


60  Socialism  and  War 

from  the  second  American  War.  Or,  rather,  the 
course  of  the  war  itself  was  similar  enough,  for 
England  was  victorious  in  both.  But  the  results 
were  as  dissimilar  as  they  could  possibly  be.  After 
the  War  of  1812,  England,  her  victories  notwith- 
standing, was  content  to  leave  not  only  our  inde- 
pendence unimpaired  but  our  territory  un- 
diminished, never  attempting  to  take  away  a  foot 
of  our  soil.  But  when  the  second  Boer  War  was 
over  the  two  Boer  Republics  were  no  more; 
England  insisted  on  robbing  the  Boers  of  the  in- 
dependence of  which  she  had  practically  made 
them  a  free  gift  only  a  few  years  before. 

But  during  the  few  years  which  elapsed  between 
the  first  and  the  second  Boer  War  a  change  of 
spirit  had  come  over  England  and  over  the  world 
at  large.  The  new  imperialistic  era  had  set  in. 
When  the  first  Boer  War  took  place,  in  1884,  the 
wave  of  the  new  imperialism  was  just  beginning 
to  rise.  But  it  had  not  reached  England  yet. 
England  was  still  the  classic  land  of  Capitalism 
— the  land  of  classic  Capitalism:  of  classic 
political  economy,  free  trade,  Manchesterism 
generally,  including  Adam  Smith's  Essay  on 
Colonies.  But  during  the  second  Boer  War 
Joseph  Chamberlain,  of  Birmingham,  was  the 
director  of  England's  colonial  policy. 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  61 

The  change  was  significant.  For  a  century 
Manchester  was  the  leading  city  in  England, 
industrially  speaking.  It  was  the  center  of 
England's  textile  industry,  which  meant  of  the 
world's  textile  industry.  And  the  textile  industry 
was  the  leading  industry  of  the  capitalist  world. 
Capitalism  meant  textiles.  Manchester  was, 
therefore,  the  industrial  capital  of  the  world.  Its 
political  representatives  were  the  typical  states- 
men of  Capitalism.  Its  philosophy  was  the  philo- 
sophy of  Capitalism. 

Birmingham  does  not  deal  in  textiles.  It  is 
the  city  of  iron  and  steel,  the  headquarters  of  the 
iron  and  steel  industry  of  England.  Its  peculiar 
influence  on  English  politics  is  of  recent  date,  but 
quite  marked  in  its  character.  In  1895  Joseph 
Chamberlain,  that  is  to  say,  iron  and  steel,  entered 
the  cabinet  in  a  leading  position — symbolizing  the 
entry  of  iron  and  steel  into  high  place  in  politics 
in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  centre  of  gravity 
in  the  industrial  world  had  shifted  from  textiles 
to  iron  and  steel.  To-day  iron  and  steel  is  the  lead- 
ing industry  of  Capitalism.  Capitalism  is  in  its 
Iron  Age.  If  you  want  to  know  how  the  capitalist 
world,  the  world  of  business,  is  faring — if  you 
want  to  touch  the  pulse  of  Capitalism — you  look 


62  Socialism  and  War 

for  the  market  reports  on  iron  and  steel.  And  if 
you  are  looking  for  the  real  power  in  present-day- 
politics  in  the  most  highly  developed  countries 
of  the  world  you  will  be  wise  to  mark  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  great  iron  and  steel  industry. 

The  official  entry  of  iron  and  steel  as  a  lead- 
ing factor  of  English  politics  has  a  peculiar 
interest  for  us  in  connection  with  the  subject 
which  we  are  discussing.  Some  of  us  still 
remember  the  gasp  of  surprise  with  which  the 
world  received  the  announcement  that  Cham- 
berlain had  selected  the  Colonial  Office  as  his  par- 
ficular  field  of  activity  in  the  Government  of 
which  he  was  to  be  the  leading  factor.  Until  then 
the  post  of  Colonial  Secretary  was  considered  a 
minor  one  in  the  English  Cabinet.  And  the  world 
looked  on  in  astonishment  as  Chamberlain  passed 
the  Chancellorship  of  the  Exchequeur — which  he 
should  have  taken  had  he  followed  tradition — 
and  the  other  great  posts,  until  he  reached  the 
Colonial  Secretaryship,  almost  at  the  bottom  of 
the  list. 

But  the  entry  of  Chamberlain  into  office  meant 
not  only  the  entry  of  a  new  industry  into  a  leading 
position  in  English  politics,  it  meant  a  radical 
change    in    the    entire    character    of    politics, 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  63 

It  meant,  indeed,  the  opening  of  a  new  era  in  the 
history  of  Capitalism — the  era  of  "Colonial 
Policy"  and  "World  Politics".  Or,  at  least, 
England's  entry  into  the  New  Phase.  This  great 
change  was  symbolized  by  the  raising  of  the  Colo- 
nial Secretaryship  to  a  place  of  first  importance 
in  the  English  Cabinet.  But  it  had  more  than 
symbolical  significance.  Chamberlain  meant 
business.  He  did  not  take  the  Colonial  Office 
because  of  a  mere  whim  or  for  sentimental 
reasons.  It  was  in  order  to  give  a  new  course  to 
English  colonial  policy.  Within  a  few  years  the 
full  significance  of  the  change  became  apparent: 
the  Boer  War  was  fought  and  the  Boer  Republics 
blotted  out,  repudiating  not  only  England's  former 
policy  with  reference  to  the  Boer  settlers  in  South 
Africa,  but  her  entire  colonial  and  foreign  policy 
of  more  than  a  century.  And,  incidentally, 
classical  political  economy  and  the  whole  philo- 
sophy of  Manchesterism. 

It  is  true  that  the  triumph  of  the  new  principle, 
the  triumph  of  Birmingham  over  Manchester, 
was  by  no  means  complete.  The  old  order  is 
fighting  for  its  life,  and  the  fight  is  still  going  on. 
But  the  indications  are  abundant  that  notwith- 
standing England's  comparative  backwardness — 


64  Socialism  and  War 

as  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  Chamberlain  could 
not  carry  with  him  even  his  own  party  for  the 
whole  length  of  his  colonial  and  tariff  policy — 
the  new  order  is  making  constant  if  not  rapid 
gains.  England  is  taking  her  place  in  the  Im- 
perialistic procession. 

Modern  Imperialism,  as  I  have  already 
indicated,  is  the  politico-social  expression  of  the 
economic  fact  that  iron  and  steel  have  taken  the 
place  of  textiles,  as  the  leading  industry  of 
Capitalism.  And  imperialism  means  war. 
Textiles,  therefore,  mean  peace;  iron  and  steel — 
war. 

In  order  to  see  the  reason  why,  we  must  hark 
back  for  a  moment  to  Dr.  Hourwich's  criticism 
of  the  so-called  "orthodox"  Socialists,  which  I 
quoted  at  the  beginning  of  this  lecture.  You  will 
remember  his  scoffing  at  the  idea  that  Germany 
had  to  go  to  war  in  an  effort  to  sell  her  goods — 
which  is  supposed  to  be  the  position  of  "orthodox" 
Socialists. 

This  supposed  orthodox-Socialist  view  was 
recently  expressed  by  a  representative  of  the 
Socialist  Party  of  this  country  in  a  public  lecture. 
This  Socialist  spokesman  said,  in  substance,  that 
we  send  missionaries  to  Africa  in  order  to  teach 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  65 

the  poor,  benighted  heathen  negroes  to  wear 
trousers  and  silk  hats,  and  after  our  missionaries 
have  succeeded  in  their  task  we  go  to  war  for  the 
chance  to  sell  the  trousers  and  hats  thus  brought 
into  fashion. 

In  criticism  of  this  position  Dr.  Hourwich  says, 
that,  whatever  necessity  there  may  be  for  the  em- 
ployment of  missionaries  in  order  to  create  a 
market  for  trousers  and  silk  hats,  there  is 
absolutely  no  necessity  for  the  employment  of 
military  force  in  order  to  capture  it.  The  market 
once  there  Germany  had  as  good  a  chance  to  sell 
as  England,  even  though  England  be  "Mistress  of 
the  Seas",  and  even  though  the  particular  market 
be  located  in  territory  colored  on  the  map  with 
the  color  of  the  British  Empire.  English 
supremacy  on  the  sea  does  not  interfere  with  the 
shipment  of  cargoes  from  Bremen  to  Africa  or 
any  other  quarter  of  the  globe.  And  English  over- 
lordship  over  any  particular  territory  does  not 
interfere  with  the  freedom  of  the  world  to  trade 
therein. 

This  criticism'  seems  to  be  justified.  In  fact  it 
is  so.  Or,  rather,  it  was  so.  For  it  does  not  take 
account  of  the  recent  developments  of  the 
economics  of  Capitalism.    It  is  about  a  generation 


66  Socialism  and  War 

behind  time.  It  was  applicable  during  the  period 
of  textiles — during  the  period  when  trousers  and 
silk-hats,  and  other  textiles,  constituted  the  back- 
bone of  industry  and  foreign  trade — but  it  does 
not  apply  to  our  epoch.  Dr.  Hourwich  is  quite 
right  in  his  assertion  that  we  do  not  have  to  go 
to  war  to  get  markets  —  for  textiles.  And  we 
didn't,  so  long  as  textiles  were  the  ruling 
industry — an  era  which  coincided  with  the  period 
when  England  was  practically  in  possession  of  the 
world  market  and  maintained  a  policy  of  free- 
trade  therein. 

But  it  is  quite  different  now,  when  iron  and 
steel  products  have  taken  the  place  of  trousers 
and  silk-hats.  And  here  we  must  pause  for  a 
moment  to  consider  the  part  played  by  foreign 
trade  in  the  economy  of  a  highly  developed 
Capitalism.  Incidentally  we  may,  perhaps,  get  a 
glimpse  of  the  causes  which  relegated  textiles  to 
the  rear  and  pushed  iron  and  steel  to  the  front. 

The  basis  of  all  capitalist  industrial  develop- 
ment is  the  fact  that  the  working  class  produces 
not  only  more  than  it  consumes,  but  more  than 
society  as  a  whole  consumes.  It  is  this  which 
permits  the  enormous  accumulation  of  wealth 
which  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic   of  the 


r 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  67 

capitalistic  era.  A  capitalist  society,  therefore, 
always  has  a  surplus-product  on  hand,  which  it 
must  dispose  of  in  order  that  it  may  "progress" ; 
that  is,  continue  to  accumulate  wealth.  It  there- 
fore always  depends  on  foreign  markets  for  its 
healthy  development.  Of  course,  this  "foreign" 
market  need  not  be  foreign  in  the  political  sense, 
but  only  in  the  economic — that  is  it  must  be  of  a 
lower  order  of  capitalistic  development.  Such  a 
market,  in  order  to  serve  the  purpose,  must  be  an 
absolute  absorbent,  and  not  merely  take  goods 
in  exchange  for  other  goods  of  as  high  an 
industrial  order. 

As  capitalist  industry  began  to  develop  in  spots, 
and  took  a  long  period  of  time  before  even  the 
foremost  capitalist  countries  became  completly,  or 
even  predominantly,  industrialized,  this  "foreign" 
market  could  for  quite  some  time  be  found  at 
home.  That  is  to  say,  the  industrial  centres  of 
any  given  country  could  dispose  of  their  surplus 
products  to  the  agricultural  districts  of  the  same 
country.  This  could  not  be  done,  however,  with- 
out "industrializing"  these  agricultural  districts. 
The  old-fashioned  agricultural  community  with 
its  natural  economy  forms  only  a  poor  market  for 
the  products  of  an  industrial  economy.    It  is  only 


68  Socialism  and  War 


when  this  community  emerges  from  its  natural 
economy  and  starts  on  the  road  of  "progress"  to 
industrialism  that  it  begins  to  count  as  a 
"customer".  But  once  a  community  starts  on  the 
road  of  "progress"  there  is  no  way  of  stopping  it. 
The  districts  which  were  once  the  customers  of 
the  industrial  centre,  absorbing  its  surplus- 
product,  are  soon  its  competitors,  so  that  the 
nation  as  a  whole  produces  a  surplus-product 
which  can  only  be  disposed  of  in  a  foreign  market, 
— this  time  "foreign"  in  the  political  sense.  The 
foreign  market  can  only  be  in  a  foreign  country, 
but  it  has  not  lost  its  economic  meaning — for  the 
foreign  country  must  also  be  on  a  lower  plane  of 
capitalistic  development.  And  so  we  find  the 
countries  of  a  higher  stage  of  capitalistic  develop- 
ment disposing  of  their  surplus-product  to 
countries  on  a  lower  stage  of  that  development. 


But  that  cannot  last  forever.  For  soon 
there  are  more  countries  producing  a  surplus  than 
there  are  countries  in  a  condition  to  absorb 
it.  Most  of  the  countries  touched  by  the  magic 
wand  of  capitalistic  development  soon  produce  a 
surplus-product  of  their  own.  On  the  other  hand, 
those  countries  which  have  not  been  touched  by 
that  development  are  not  in  a  condition  to  absorb 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         69 

the  product  of  the  other  industrialism, — they  have 
neither  the  taste  for  their  consumption  nor  the 
means  with  which  to  buy  them. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  a  legion  of  missionaries 
could  convert  a  sufficient  number  of  Central 
African  negroes  to  the  fashion  of  wearing  trousers 
to  keep  even  a  moderate  trouser-factory  in  New 
York  busy.  But  even  if  missionaries  were 
exceptionally  skilled  and  in  good  luck,  our  New 
York  trouser-manufacturers  would  still  be  sans 
customers  if  they  had  to  depend  on  the  Central 
African  trade, — not  with  the  missionaries  but  with 
the  negroes.  For  a  customer  in  the  commercial 
sense  of  the  word  is  not  merely  a  man  who  wants 
to  buy  something,  but  one  who  can  also  pay  for 
what  he  wants;  and  the  poor  African  Negro  has 
nothing  with  which  to  pay  for  the  luxuries,  the 
use  of  which  the  missionaries  may  teach  him. 

The  capitalist  world  as  a  whole  finds  itself 
compelled  to  create  new  markets — manufacture 
customers,  as  it  were — by  stimulating  the  develop- 
ment of  undeveloped  countries,  "civilizing"  them, 
hot-house  fashion,  by  means  of  all  sorts  of  "im- 
provements", such  as  railroads,  canals,  etc.  This 
has  a  double  effect:  on  the  one  hand  it  will  ulti- 
mately create  a  new  market  by  bringing  a  new 
country  into  the  vortex  of  capitalistic  develop- 


70  Socialism  and  War 

ment.  But  its  more  immediate  effect  is  that  the 
building  operation  itself  creates  a  demand  for  the 
exportation  of  goods — steel  and  iron  goods. 
Although  incidentally  it  may  also  help  the  ex- 
portation of  some  textile  goods.  When  a  railroad 
is  being  built  in  Africa,  at  an  expense  of,  say  100 
million  dollars,  it  usually  means  the  exportation 
from  the  domain  of  capitalistic  production  of 
probably  80  or  90  millions  worth  of  steel  and  iron 
goods.  The  balance  of  the  money  is  used  for  the 
hire  of  labor  in  Africa  to  do  the  work  of  actual 
building,  and  a  portion  of  that  money  at  least 
would  then  go  to  the  negroes  who  might  be  induced 
to  do  some  of  the  hardest  work.  These  negroes 
would  then  be  in  a  position  to  pay  for  their 
trousers  and  silk-hats,  and  the  work  of  the 
missionaries  in  teaching  them  their  wear  would 
produce  some  tangible  results.  Hence  the  world- 
wide phenomenon  of  "the  exportation  of  capital" 
which  has  accompanied  the  rise  of  iron  and  steel 
to    the    leading    place    in    capitalistic    economy. 

But  this  phenomenon  of  the  exportation  of 
capital  in  the  form,  principally,  of  iron  and  steel, 
from  economically  developed  to  economically  un- 
developed countries,  where  it  is  invested  in  per- 
manent improvements,   principally  railroads,  is 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         71 

only  part  of  a  wider  phenomenon — that  of  the 
distribution  of  production  within  the  domain 
of  capitalism  itself  in  such  a  manner  that  its 
more  developed  parts  produce  principally  means 
of  production,  while  its  less  developed  portions 
produce  means  of  consumption.  This  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  when  a  country  enters  upon  the  career 
of  capitalistic  production  it  begins  with  the  pro- 
duction of  consumable  goods,  doing  it  usually  with 
machinery  purchased  abroad.  So  that  when  the 
new-comer  within  the  family  of  capitalist  nations 
turns  from  a  customer  of  its  older  capitalistic 
brethren  into  their  competitor,  it  does  not  do  so 
in  all  fields  of  production.  On  the  contrary,  it 
continues  to  remain  their  customer  for  a  long  time 
to  come.  Only  it  does  not  buy  from  them  any 
more  textiles  and  other  consumable  goods  as  it 
used  to,  but  machinery  and  means  of  production 
generally.  The  competition  of  the  new-comer 
in  the  production  of  consumable  goods  leads  to  a 
shifting  of  production  in  the  older — industrially 
more  developed — countries.  These  countries  now 
produce,  proportionally,  more  machinery  and 
other  artificial  means  of  production  and  fewer 
consumable  goods.  Generally  speaking,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  capitalist  world  as  a  whole  puts 


72  Socialism  and  War 

its  savings,  its  continued  accumulations  of  wealth, 
into  means  of  production, — iron  and  steel.  It  is 
therefore  natural  that  the  production  of  iron  and 
steel  should  become  increasingly  more  prominent 
in  those  countries  where  this  saving  process — 
the  accumulation  of  wealth — is  most  rapid. 

It  is  this  that  has  led  to  the  supplanting  of 
textiles  by  iron  and  steel  as  the  leading  industry 
of  the  most  highly  developed  industrial  countries ; 
and,  therefore,  of  capitalism  as  a  whole. 

Now,  this  change  from  textiles  to  iron  and  steel 
as  the  leading  industry  of  the  most  highly 
developed  capitalism,  is  the  real  cause  of  the 
change  which  we  have  noted  in  the  character  of 
capitalism  from  a  peaceful  to  a  warlike  mood.  It 
is  this  that  has  brought  about  the  Imperialistic 
era  in  which  we  live.  It  is  this  that  is  the  general 
cause  of  the  present  war. 

And  the  reason  is  simple.  Iron  and  steel  are 
not  sold,  and  cannot  be  sold,  in  the  same  manner 
as  trousers  and  silk-hats  or  any  other  similar 
goods.  Of  course  we  are  not  speaking  of  scissors 
and  knives  and  such-like  small  wares.  But  of  the 
real  heavy  iron  and  steel  goods  with  which 
"permanent  improvements"  are  made. 

The  sale  of  textiles  is,  comparatively  speaking, 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         73 

a  very  simple  affair.  If  you  want  to  sell  trousers 
and  hats  to  the  natives  of  some  primitive  com- 
munity in  Asia  or  Africa,  and  your  missionaries 
have  done  their  missionary  work,  all  that  it  is 
necessary  for  you  to  do  is  to  send  your  cargo  of 
goods  with  an  alert  sales-manager  in  charge,  and 
the  job  is  done.  If  you  can  undersell  your  com- 
petitor, the  market  is  yours.  If  you  are  a  German 
you  need  worry  very  little  about  the  English 
flag  that  may  happen  to  be  flying,  actually  or 
figuratively,  over  the  community  in  question. 

But  the  situation  is  quite  different  if  you  want 
to  sell  these  same  natives  some  of  your  loco- 
motives, cars,  rails  and  other  iron  and  steel  goods 
that  go  into  the  building  and  equipping  of  a  rail- 
road. You  cannot  just  ship  a  cargo  of  this  kind 
of  goods  in  charge  of  a  sales-manager  and  sell 
them  to  the  natives.  The  only  way  to  do  that  is 
to  build  the  railroad  yourself.  And  here  the 
question  of  the  flag  becomes  a  matter  of  the  ut- 
most importance.  While  a  German,  for  instance, 
can  sell  trousers  and  hats  in  British  South  Africa 
as  freely  as  he  could  in  German  South-West 
Africa,  or  in  the  Fatherland  itself,  he  would  find 
insurmountable  difficulties  in  his  way  if  he  were 
to  try  to  build  a  railroad  through  any  of  the 


74  Socialism  and  War 

British  dominions.  The  free-trade  policy  which 
England  has  so  far  maintained  in  all  its  colonies 
as  to  textiles  does  not  apply  to  iron  and  steel. 
Not  only  does  England  reserve  to  her  own  capital- 
ists the  opportunities  of  building  railroads 
throughout  her  vast  colonial  dominions,  but  she  is 
very  jealous  of  other  nations  in  the  matter  of 
building  railroads  even  through  so-called 
"independent"  countries,  if  they  happen  to  be- 
long to  the  "backward"  class  —  such,  for 
instance,  as  Turkey,  Persia,  or  China.  Of  course, 
the  other  countries,  the  countries  that  erect  tariff 
walls  even  against  foreign  textiles,  build  regular 
fortifications  to  protect  their  "nationals"  against 
competition  in  iron  and  steel.  When  we  come  to 
discuss  the  special  causes  that  led  to  the  present 
war,  I  shall  have  occasion  to  illustrate  what  I  have 
here  put  before  you  in  abstract  terms  by  citing 
concrete  examples  from  the  actual  practice  of 
what  has  come  to  be  called  World-Politics.  But 
right  here  I  must  explain  before  closing  the 
present  lecture,  at  least  in  a  general  way,  why 
England,  who  still  maintains  her  free-trade 
policy  as  to  textiles  and  similar  goods,  takes  a 
different  attitude  when  it  comes  to  selling  iron 
and  steel  by  means  of  railroad  building  in  "back- 
ward" countries. 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         75 

The  explanation  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  method 
of  "selling"  and  receiving  payment  for  the  iron 
and  steel  used  in  the  process  of  "civilizing"  back- 
ward countries  has  certain  peculiarities  which 
exclude  free  competition.  Supposing  a  set  of 
enterprising  people  have  conceived  the  idea  of  sell- 
ing some  iron  and  steel  to  the  natives  of  Africa 
by  building  a  railroad,  say,  from  the  Cape  to 
Cairo,  in  accordance  with  the  scheme  of  that 
great  Empire  Builder,  Cecil  Rhodes.  How,  do 
you  imagine,  would  they  proceed?  Just  go  ahead 
and  ship  rails,  cars,  locomotives,  and  money  to 
Africa,  and  build?  By  no  means.  Such  a  rail- 
road might  be  a  wonderful  civilizing  agency ;  but 
it  is  a  very  poor  investment  from  the  ordinary 
commercial  point  of  view.  The  ordinary  mer- 
chant, whether  he  sells  textiles  or  steel,  wants  pay 
for  his  wares,  and  the  ordinary  investor  wants 
dividends  on  his  investment.  In  order,  therefore, 
that  the  building  of  a  railroad  may  be  "practi- 
cable" from  the  business  point  of  view,  it  must 
be  a  dividend-paying  proposition.  But  that  is 
exactly  what  your  Cape  to  Cairo  railroad  couldn't 
be,  what  no  railroad  built  through  these  "back- 
ward" countries  teeming  with  beautiful  railroad 
projects  could  be.      That  is,  not  if  it  were  to  be 


76  Socialism  and  War 

built  in  the  ordinary  way,  by  ordinary  private 
individuals,  on  their  own  hook  and  responsibility. 
That's  why  "civilizing"  railroads  are  not  built 
in  that  way.  The  main  part  of  building  such  a 
railway  is  not  the  work  of  building  the  railroad 
itself,  but  that  of  getting  the  "concession."  Now 
there  are  some  people  who  imagine  that  a  "con- 
cession" is  a  sort  of  permit  to  build  a  railway. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  an  agreement  for  the 
mode  of  payment  for  the  iron  and  steel  and  other 
accessories  which  go  into  the  building  of  the  rail- 
way, other  than  from  the  colllection  of  fares  for 
the  transportation  of  passengers  or  goods,  which 
could  not  possibly  be  sufficient  for  the  purpose. 

The  first  thing,  therefore,  that  our  set  of  enter- 
prising gentlemen  who  wanted  to  build  the  Cape 
to  Cairo  Railroad,  or  engage  in  some  other  civil- 
izing enterprise  of  that  nature,  would  do,  would 
be  to  apply  for  a  "concession."  The  application, 
directed  to  the  ruling  power  of  the  country  to  be 
civilized  by  the  enterprise,  would  state  in  sub- 
stance, that  the  applicants  have  conceived  the 
great  idea  of  building  the  railroad;  that  such  a 
railroad  would  result  in  incalculable  benefits  to 
the  country  through  which  it  is  intended  to  run ; 
that  it  would   transform   the    country   from    a 


c~ 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War         77 

wilderness  into  a  paradise,  and  raise  its  population 
from  poverty  to  affluence;  but  that  before  all  of 
these  beautiful  things  would  happen,  and  the 
railroad  be  in  a  position  to  pay  a  dividend  from  its 
own  earnings  as  a  carrier,  or  even  pay  running- 
expenses  perhaps,  the  applicants,  if  left  to  them- 
selves, would  go  bankrupt  and  the  enterprise  go 
to  smash.  As  good  and  sensible  business-men  the 
applicants  could  not,  therefore,  even  dream  of 
carrying  out  their  magnificent  projects  unless 
they  were  secured  against  loss  and  guaranteed  a 
fair  profit  on  their  investment. 

Now,  there  are  two  or  three  ways  in  which  the 
building  of  a  railroad  which  cannot  pay  expenses 
in  the  ordinary  business  way,  may  become  a  very 
well-paying  business  to  the  "concessionaires". 
They  may  either  receive  a  direct  money-subsidy 
from  the  government  through  whose  domain  the 
railroad  is  to  run;  they  may  be  given  grants  of 
large  tracts  of  land,  particularly  valuable 
mineral  lands,  the  exploitation  of  which  would 
bring  an  immediate  return;  or  they  may  be  given 
monopolistic  rights  to  the  trade  of  the  country, 
or  at  least  some  branches  of  the  same.  Most  con- 
cessions contain  some  or  all  of  these  features- 
are,  in  fact,  mortgages  on  the  future  of  the 


78  Socialism  and  War 

country,  and  usually  very  onerous  mortgages. 
And  here  comes  the  real  difficulty  of  this  mode 
of  selling  iron  and  steel.  Some  of  these  benighted 
heathen  governments  are  very  slow  in  appreciat- 
ing the  beauties  of  these  railroad  projects;  some 
of  them  positively  object  to  being  railroaded  into 
the  pale  of  civilization,  or  at  least  dislike  to  pay 
the  fare  for  the  trip.  Sometimes  their  reluctance 
in  giving  concessions  that  would  pay  is  so  great 
that  they  cannot  be  obtained  except  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet ;  and  no  concession  is  ever  granted 
except  through  the  inteference  of  the  "home" 
government,  at  least  by  the  use  of  moral  suasion. 
And  where  several  sets  of  "concessionaires"! 
belonging  to  different  nations,  ask  for  the  same 
concession,  that  set  will  get  it  whose  "home" 
government  can,  and  is  ready  to,  exercise  the 
greatest  pressure. 

That  no  great  power  under  the  circumstances 
will  give  concessions  for  railroad  building  to 
foreigners  is  self-evident.  England  may  be  willing 
enough  to  let  German  merchants  sell  hats  and 
trousers  to  the  natives  of  her  colonies  on  terms 
of  equality  with  her  own  citizens,  trusting  that  in 
a  field  of  free  competition  her  citizens  will  at 
least  have  an  equal  chance.     But  she  certainly 


The  Economic  Causes  of  the  War  79 

cannot  be  expected  to  mortgage  the  future  of  her 
colonies  to  German  capitalists  in  a  monopolistic 
enterprise.  If  her  colonies  are  to  be  exploited  in 
this  fashion,  her  own  capitalists  are  there  for  the 
purpose.  They,  too,  have  considerable  steel  on 
hand,  and  are  very  anxious  to  dispose  of  it  in 
some  profitable  way.  Each  great  power,  there- 
fore, tries  to  keep  her  colonies  as  a  special  reser- 
vation for  her  own  capitalists  wherein  they  may 
dispose  of  their  surplus-products,  invest  their 
accumulations  of  wealth, — which,  as  we  have  seen, 
now  consists  of  iron  and  steel. 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  colonies  which  these 
great  steel-producing  nations  possess  may  not  be 
sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  absorbing  all  of  their 
surplus-product;  or  the  prospect  of  good  returns 
from  an  investment  in  these  colonies  may 
not  be  as  good  as  that  to  be  found  elsewhere. 
Besides,  a  prudent  business-man  should  have  his 
eye  open  to  the  future.  What  may  be  sufficient 
for  present  purposes,  may  be  inadequate  at  some 
future  time.  A  reserve  must  therefore  be  created. 
Our  Governments  from  Steel  must,  therefore,  do 
what  Chamberlain,  following  Lord  Roseberry,  so 
felicitously  called  "pegging  out  claims  for 
posterity".    Or,  at  least,  the  unappropriated  field 


80  Socialism  and  War 

must  be  kept  open  and  unappropriated  by  others 
until  we  shall  be  ready  and  able  to  assert  our 
claims  thereto.  In  a  word:  the  disposal  of  the 
surplus-product  of  the  modern  industrial  nations 
has  ceased  to  be  a  matter  of  trade  carried  on  by 
the  individual,  and  has  become  a  matter  of  armed 
force,  actual  or  potential,  used  by  large  groups, 
called  Nations.  Hence  the  phenomenon  which  we 
call  Modern  Imperialism. 
\- 


III. 

THE  IDEOLOGIC  CAUSES  OF 
THE  WAR. 

It  has  often  been  charged  that  the  Socialists— 

or  at  least  those  old  offenders,  the  "orthodox" 

Socialists— see  nothing  in  history  but  the  play 

of  "blind  economic  forces",  leaving  no  room  for 

any  spiritual  or  ideal  forces  or  motives.  And  since 

the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  the  charge  has 

been  made  in  our  own  press  that  in  discussing  this 

war   the   "orthodox"    Socialists    see    only    low 

material  forces  and  fail  to  recognize  the  higher 

ideal  motives,  etc.    The  very  title  of  this  lecture 

is  a   sufficient  refutation   of  the   charge  of  the 

failure  to  recognize  any  so-called  ideal  motives 

for  or  causes  of  this  war.    But  I  must  warn  you 

against  a  possible  misunderstanding:  please  do 

not  imagine  that  I  believe  the  present  war  to  have 

had  a  double  set  of  causes,  one  economic  and  one 

ideologic.    On  the  contrary,  I  believe  that  at  bot- 


82  Socialism  and  War 

torn  there  is  only  one  set  of  causes :  the  economic 
changes  which  I  have  endeavored  to  describe  and 
explain  in  my  last  lecture. 

But  these  economic  forces  do  not  work  either 
automatically  or  mechanically.  They  work 
through  the  medium  of  human  beings, — and  the 
entire  complex  machinery  of  the  human  organism, 
both  individual  and  social,  comes  into  play.  The 
Good  Book  says  that  Man  does  not  live  by  bread 
alone.  In  the  course  of  his  eventful  history  on 
this  planet  he  has  developed  a  taste  for  certain 
delicacies,  certain  faculties  besides  those  of  digest- 
ing his  food,  and  certain  wants  besides  those  of 
filling  his  stomach  or  his  pocket.  In  a  word,  he 
has  certain  mental  and  spiritual  faculties  and 
wants  alongside  of  the  more  material  ones.  This 
has  led  the  great  majority  of  people  to  the  belief 
in  the  dual  character  of  human  nature,  dividing 
it  into  a  "higher"  or  spiritual  part,  and  a  "lower" 
or  material  one,  into  a"body"and  a  "soul". Having 
thus  split  up  the  human  entity  into  two,  the  phi- 
losophers began  to  quarrel  as  to  which  rules 
which:  the  "materialists"  claimed  that  tEe 
"lower"  element  of  human  nature  rules  the  higher 
one,  the  body  is  supreme  over  the  soul ;  while  the 
"idealists"  claimed  that  the  soul  always  manages 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  83 

to  get  on  top,  and  that  it  is  therefore  the  power 
that  "makes  history".  Then  came  the  com- 
promisers, who  are  not  wanting  anywhere,  and 
tried  to  compromise  by  putting  the  two  halves  of 
human  nature  on  terms  of  equality  side  by  side, 
sometimes  helping  each  other  and  sometimes 
counteracting  one  another  in  the  business  of  shap- 
ing human  conduct  and  making  history.  It  is  the 
belief  that  "orthodox"  Socialists  are  "material- 
ists" in  the  above  sense,  that  has  brought  upon 
them  the  reproaches  of  some  "idealists"  or 
eclectics  for  the  alleged  neglect  of  "ideal"  causes 
or  motives  in  appraising  historical  events 
generally  and  the  present  war  in  particular. 

Now,  I  am  neither  an  "idealist"  nor  a  "material- 
ist" in  the  above  sense.  Nor  yet  an  eclectic.  I 
have  no  occasion  to  belong  to  any  of  the  said  de- 
nominations, because  I  do  not  start  out  by  splitting 
up  human  nature  and  dividing  it  into  upper  and 
lower  regions.  I  take  it  as  one  harmonious  whole, 
notwithstanding  its  multifarious  complexity  of 
functions  and  wants.  The  great  harmonizer  of 
human  nature  is  a  certain  faculty  with  which  man 
is  endowed,  which  the  great  German  poet  Schiller 
described  as  the  capacity  "of  transforming  the 
work  of  necessity  into  a  work  of  his  free  choice 
and  of  raising  the  physical  necessity  into  a  moral 


84  Socialism  and  War 

one."  This  faculty  permits  the  individual  to  see 
his  material  needs  in  the  glamour  of  spiritual  and 
moral  ones. 

To  this  should  be  added  another  thing,  which 
the  great  German  poet  may  have  overlooked.  And 
that  is  the  fact  that  the  individual  neither  creates 
his  own  world,  nor  does  he  dwell  there  alone ;  both 
his  physical  (material)  as  well  as  his  moral 
(spiritual)  necessities  are  fashioned  for  him  by 
the  society  in  which  he  lives.  And  it  is  this  so- 
ciety, as  a  whole,  which  possesses  that  remarkable 
faculty  of  which  Schiller  speaks,  of  "raising  the 
physical  necessity  into  a  moral  one".  And  when 
society  has  thus  raised  its  physical  necessities 
into  moral  ones,  the  seeming  contradiction  be- 
tween the  rule  of  the  material  forces  in  history 
which  is  plain  to  any  discerning  eye  and  the  high 
motives  and  lofty  ideals  which,  it  is  equally  plain, 
have  actuated  so  many  of  the  great  actors  in  the 
important  historical  dramas — a  contradiction 
which  has  baffled  so  many  historians — entirely 
disappears.  For  society's  physical  necessity  has 
become  the  individual's  moral  necessity,  for  which 
he  is  ready  to  sacrifice  his  individual  physical 
necessities  and  comforts  in  a  transport  of  pure 
idealism. 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  85 

In  my  last  lecture  I  endeavored  to  explain  the 
present  war  from  the  point  of  view  of  society's 
physical  necessities.  In  the  present  lecture  I  shall 
show  you  how  this  material  necessity  had  been 
raised  into  a  moral  one,  and  attempt  to  explain 
this  war  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  individual's 
moral  necessities. 

The  "moral"  or  "spiritual"  conceptions,  as 
distinguished  from  material  or  economic  ones, 
used  in  the  discussions  of  this  war,  are  those  of 
nationalism,  racial  affinity,  and  culture.  We  shall 
do  well,  therefore,  to  begin  our  discourse  with  a 
historical  examination  of  the  development  of  the 
conceptions  or  ideas  of  Nation,  Race,  and 
Culture. 

The  conception  of  the  Nation,  in  our  sense  of 
the  word,  is  of  comparatively  modern  origin. 
During  the  Middle  Ages  there  was  no  such  thing 
in  Christian  Europe.  When  order  emerged  in 
Europe  from  the  chaos  of  the  great  migrations,  by 
the  establishment  of  the  feudal  system,  European 
society  was,  on  the  one  hand,  broken  up  into  in- 
numerable small  fragments,  each  leading  a 
separate  existence;  and,  on  the  other,  these  in- 
numerable fragments  of  humanity  formed  one 
common  group,  referred  to  collectively  as 
Christendom. 


86  Socialism  and  War 

The  inhabitants  of  the  different  parts  of  the 
continent  may  have  had  some  characteristics 
common  only  to  the  dwellers  within  a  certain 
geographical  area,  which  distinguished  them  from 
those  making  their  home  in  a  different  part  of  the 
continent.  But  those  characteristics  were  not 
strong  enough  to  unite  the  dwellers  of  any  large 
geographical  area  into  what  we  would  call  a 
Nation,  or  to  mark  them  as  quite  alien  to  those 
living  elsewhere.  The  masses  of  the  lower  strata 
of  the  population  were  broken  up  locally  into 
small  groups,  each  forming  a  separate  political 
entity,  and  each  having  a  language,  and  often  a 
religion,  of  its  own.  On  the  other  hand,  the  upper 
crust,  the  carriers  of  whatever  intellectual  life 
there  was  then  in  Europe,  formed  one  nation,  with 
a  common  culture, — they  had  one  religion,  one 
language,  and  one  literature.  This  unity  of  the 
whole  of  Christendom  in  everything  that  was  not 
merely  a  local  custom,  was  symbolized  by  the  Pope 
and  the  Emperor, — one  representing  the  spiritual 
and  the  other  the  political  unity  of  all  Christian 
Europe. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages,  with 
the  beginning  of  the  development  of  our  modern 
commercial  and  industrial  era — the  breaking 
up  of  the  old  feudal  order  and  the  substitution 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  87 

therefor  of  what  has  come  to  be  known  as  the 
bourgeois    or  capitalist    economic    system— this 
social  and  political  aspect  of  Europe  began  to 
change.     On  the  one  hand  the  local  differences 
began  to  disappear,  making  great  bodies  of  people 
spread  over  large  areas  of  land  more  akin  to  each 
other  in  manners,  customs,  religious  observances, 
language,  and  modes  of  thought.    On  the  other 
hand,  the  spiritual  and  political  unity  of  the  upper 
crust  of  Christendom  began  to  break  up.  Capital- 
ism needed  larger  economic  units  for  its  develop- 
ment.    The  small  groups    therefore    began    to 
coalesce  and  amalgamate  into  larger  units  which 
would  permit  the  larger  economic  life  which  is  the 
characteristic  of  the  new  era.     But  this   very 
process   of   coalescence   and   centralization    into 
larger  economic  units  had  as  a  necessary  corollary 
a  process  of  separation  and  division,  separating 
and  dividing  the   larger   groups,   when   formed, 
from  each  other.    The  same  process  that  made 
people  within  a  certain  large  territory  more  akin 
to  each  other,  of  necessity  made  them  more  dif- 
ferent and  distinct  from  people  outside  this  terri- 
tory and   inhabiting   some   other   large   district, 
whose    dwellers    were    acquiring  a  homogeneous 
character  of  their  own. 

This  double  process  of  coalescence  and  division 


88  Socialism  and  War 

usually  found  its  limits  and  lines  of  demarcation — 
marking  off  the  territories  within  which  the  pro- 
cess of  coalescence  and  between  which  the  process 
of  separation  should  proceed — in  some  well-de- 
fined geographical  characteristics  of  the  European 
continent.  The  sea  and  the  great  mountain-ranges 
usually  marked  the  boundaries  of  the  several 
divisions  into  which  Europe  was  to  break  up.  The 
dwellers  within  these  boundaries  were  separated 
from  the  rest  of  Europe  and  started  on  the  road 
towards  the  formation  of  one  political,  economic, 
social,  and  linguistic  group — towards  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Modern  Nation. 

Thus  arose  the  Modern  European  nations,  each 
with  its  own  language  and  separate  and  distinct 
social,  political,  and  economic  life:  England, 
France,  Spain,  the  Scandinavian  countries,  Russia, 
Italy  and  Germany. 

With  the  breaking  up  of  the  homogeneity  of 
Europe  and  the  formation  of  separate  nations, 
each  constituting  a  separate  political  state,  there 
began  to  develop  separate  and  distinct  national 
cultures  in  place  of  the  common  European  culture 
which  prevailed  during  the  Middle  Ages.  The 
first  great  manifestation  of  this  new  development 
was  the  Reformation.    Contrary  to  the  assurances 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  89 

of  our  school  histories  and  similar  sources  of  in- 
formation, the  Reformation  was  least  of  all  a 
religious  movement.  In  so  far  as  it  did  not  directly 
aim  at  economic  results,  it  was  essentially  a  poli- 
tical movement  resulting  from  economic  con- 
ditions. 

On  its  formal  side — that  is  in  the  separation 
of  the  "reformed"  churches  from  the  Church  of 
Rome,  and  the  denial  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
Roman  Pontiff — the  reformation  was  merely  a 
solemn  registering  of  the  fact  that  Europe  had 
broken  up  into  separate  nations.  That  each  of 
these  nations,  having  a  separate  economic  life, 
must  also  constitute  separate  political,  spiritual, 
and  intellectual  entities.  That  henceforth  there 
would  be  no  common  church  and  no  common 
language,  as  well  as  no  common  empire.  The 
Roman  Emperor,  the  Roman  Pope,  and  the  Latin 
Bible  had  all  become  anachronisms,  survivals  of  a 
common  nation-less  Europe,  and  must  all  go. 
Henceforth  each  Nation  was  to  have  its  own  in- 
dependent political  head  paying  no  allegiance  to 
any  Emperor;  its  own  independent  church  pay- 
ing no  tribute  and  recognizing  no  soverign  outside 
of  its  own  national  jurisdiction;  and  its  own 
literature,  with  the  vernacular  Bible  as  a  symbol 
of  its  freedom  from  Latin  tutelage. 


90  Socialism  and  War 

The  independence  of  national  development 
secured  in  the  Reformation,  while  registering  the 
act  of  separation,  was  itself  a  means  of  furthering 
it,  and  the  development  of  Europe  has  continued 
along  national  lines  during  the  entire  formative 
period  of  Capitalism. 

This  formative  period  of  Capitalism,  the  period 
when  the  different  sections  into  which  Europe 
broke  up  at  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages  were 
developing  their  own  independent  economic 
existence  along  capitalist-industrial  lines,  is  the 
first  of  the  two  warlike  periods  of  Capitalism  of 
which  I  spoke  in  my  last  lecture.  The  wars  of  this 
period  were  conducted,  principally,  for  what 
might  be  called  natural  territorial  limits;  that  is 
to  say,  for  the  establishment  of  political  units 
which  would  be  economically  self-sufficient  and 
independent. 

For  this  purpose  it  was  necessary  that  the 
political  unit — the  "country" — should  be  of  suf- 
ficient size  to  give  the  development  of  the  econo- 
mic forces  elbow-room.  And  since  freedom  of 
intercourse  is  one  of  the  essentials  of  economic 
development  along  capitalistic  lines,  the  larger  the 
area  comprised  within  a  given  political  unit  the 
better.    There  was,  therefore,  a  general  striving 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  91 

to  bring  within  the  domain  of  one  political  unit 
everything  that  could  be  easily  communicated 
with, — the  sea  and  mountain  ranges  being  con- 
sidered natural  boundaries.  At  the  same  time  it 
was  necessary  to  so  arrange  the  boundaries  of  the 
political  unit  as  to  contain  "within  its  own  four 
corners"  the  raw  materials  for  its  industries  and 
the  other  accessories  of  production.  And  as 
natural  wealth  in  raw  materials  and  other 
accessories  of  production  is  not  evenly  distributed 
on  the  surface  of  our  globe,  it  was  sometimes 
found  necessary  to  break  through  the  so-called 
natural  boundaries  in  order  to  make  the  political 
unit  self-sufficient  economically.  As  great 
mountain  ranges  formed  impassable  barriers,  the 
only  way  of  supplyng  the  deficiency  of  a  country 
in  natural  wealth  would  be  to  establish  over-sea 
colonies  in  regions  rich  in  the  particular  article  in 
which  the  home  country  was  deficient.  This  could, 
of  course,  be  done  only  when  a  country  was 
bounded  on  the  sea  at  least  at  some  point. 

At  the  same  time  the  sea  was  indispensible  as 
a  means  of  intercourse  with  the  outside  world, 
the  world  which  was  the  market  for  the  products 
of  the  countries'  soil  and  manufactories.  Hence 
the  struggle  of  inland  countries  in  this  formative 


92  Socialism  and  War 

stage  of  Capitalism  for  the  extension  of  their 
boundaries  almost  invariably  assumes  the  form 
of  a  march  to  the  sea. 

Politically,  that  is,  internally,  this  formative 
period  of  Capitalism  is  characterized  by  the  con- 
solidation and  centralization  of  governmental 
power, — by  the  growth  of  absolutist  monarchical 
institutions.  In  this  connection  it  may  be  well  to 
point  out  that  the  opinion  so  prevalent  in  our 
intellectual  circles,  and  so  often  expressed  in  print 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  that 
monarchy  is  a  remnant  of  feudalism,  is  anything 
but  intelligent.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  feudalism 
is  absolutely  guiltless  of  the  offense  of  establishing 
the  institution  of  absolute  monarchy.  As  far  as 
Modern  Europe  at  least  is  concerned  that  insti- 
tution is  due  entirely  to  the  political  activities  of 
the  bourgeoisie.  During  the  formative  period  of 
Capitalism  of  which  I  have  just  spoken,  the  rising 
industrial  bourgeoisie  created  the  institution  of 
absolute  monarchy  as  a  means,  on  the  one  hand, 
of  abolishing  feudal  restrictions  upon  trade  and 
industry,  and,  on  the  other,  of  consolidating  large 
areas  into  one  political  and  economic  unit  and  of 
successfully  marching  to  the  sea. 

But  feudalism  overthrown  and  Capitalism 
firmly  established — the  National  territory  self- 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  93 

sufficient,  industrially,  and  the  sea  freely  and 
easily  accessible — the  bourgeoisie  becomes  peace- 
ful and  settles  down  to  develop  its  home  indus- 
tries,— manufacturing  textiles. 

Ideologically  the  reign  of  textiles  is  character- 
ized by  what  might  be  called,  collectively, 
"liberal  ideas".  "Liberalism",  as  a  system  or 
circle  of  ideas  means:  politically, — republicanism 
and  democracy;  in  the  domain  of  international 
relations,  —  the  "open  door"  and  peaceful  cos- 
mopolitanism;  in  philosophy, — classical  political 
economy  and  utilitarianism.  Culture  and  civil- 
ization— which  have  been  growing  nationalistic 
since  the  break-up  of  the  European  community  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  the  disappearance  of  the 
universal  Latin  literature,  and  the  creation  of 
separate  national  churches  and  literatures,  reflect- 
ing the  national  life  and  national  struggles — again 
become  the  common  heritage  of  humanity.  Only, 
the  concept  of  humanity  now  becomes  much 
broader  than  during  the  Middle  Ages,  when  it 
was  practically  limited  to  Christendom. 
"Humanity"  now  means  what  the  term  implies  — 
the  entire  human  race;  and  culture  and  civil- 
ization not  only  lose  their  narrow  nationalistic 
character,    but    they    become    truly    universal, 


94  Socialism  and  War 

making  no  distinctions  on  account  of  race,  re- 
ligion, or  color. 

The  three  branches  or  divisions  of  the  "liberal" 
view  of  life  which  I  have  indicated — its  ideas  of 
political  institutions,  international  relations,  and 
the  laws  governing  human  relations  generally — 
are  closely  knit  together  and  form  one  organic 
whole.  The  demand  of  the  representatives  of  the 
liberal  bourgeoisie  for  a  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment and  democratic  political  institutions 
generally,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  peaceful  cos- 
mopolitanism of  their  international  policy,  on  the 
other,  were  not  mere  accidents  of  "personal 
union",  (to  borrow  a  term  from  European  public 
law),  but  two  phases  of  the  same  cast  of  ideas. 
And  both  were  only  the  logical  consequence  of 
their  view  of  the  laws  which  governed  the  basic 
relation  of  man  to  man, — the  relation  of  produc- 
ing and  consuming  social  wealth. 

The  general  view  of  the  world,  developed  during 
the  classic  age  of  Capitalism,  under  the  aegis  of 
textiles,  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

The  economic  activities  of  man  are  subject  to 
certain  natural  and  immutable  laws,  which  shape 
the  conduct  of  the  individual  and  his  relations 
to  his  fellow-men  in  society.  These  laws  dictate 
to    the    individual    the    best — most    profitable — 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  95 

course  for  him  to  follow  in  his  economic  activities, 
and  the  individual  follows  them,  therefore,  freely 
and  eagerly  in  his  natural  desire  to  get  all  he  can 
out  of  this  world  for  himself.  But  this  world  of 
ours,  instead  of  being  a  "vale  of  tears",  a  place 
of  misery  and  suffering,  as  we  had  been  told  by 
some  ascetic  moralizers,  is  in  reality  so  happily 
arranged  and  organized  that  when  every  in- 
dividual follows  his  own  selfish  bent  of  always 
looking  out  for  himself,  there  results  a  perfectly 
harmonious  whole  which  redounds  to  the  benefit 
and  prosperity  of  society  at  large  and  every 
individual  member  thereof.  The  selfishness  and 
acquisitiveness  of  individuals,  instead  of  clashing 
with  the  interests  of  their  fellow-members  in 
society,  are  really  of  great  benefit  to  them. 

There  is  only  one  pre-requisite  to  this  happy 
result;  and  that  is,  that  the  individuals  should  be 
enlightened  enough  to  understand  their  own  real 
and  permanent  interests,  so  that  they  may  not  act 
from  a  mistaken  notion  as  to  what  that  interest 
really  is  and  thereby  injure  themselves  as  well  as 
their  fellow-men.  Practically  all  of  the  misery 
which  the  human  race  suffered  in  the  past,  and  to 
which  a  large  portion  of  it  is  still  subject,  is  due, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  such  mistaken  notions  by  in- 
dividuals as  to  what  their  own  true  interests  re- 


96  Socialism  and  War 

quire,  leading  them  to  act  in  a  manner  injurious 
to  themselves  and  to  others,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  a  failure  to  understand  the  true  character 
of  the  natural  laws  governing  the  economic 
relations  of  men,  resulting  in  attempts  to  interfere 
with  their  own  free  play  by  man-made  laws.  This 
last  circumstance  is  the  most  important.  For 
when  left  to  himself  man  will  soon  come  to  under- 
stand his  own  true  interests ;  and  the  harm  result- 
ing from  individual  mistakes  as  to  what  is  good 
for  one's  self  is  comparatively  small  and  neg- 
ligible. The  real  source  of  human  misery  is, 
therefore,  the  attempt  by  organized  society  to 
interfere  with  the  free  play  of  the  natural  laws 
of  economics,  due  to  ignorance  of  their  true 
character. 

The  true  remedy,  therefore,  for  all  human  ills, 
is  to  let  well-enough  alone ;  to  permit  the  beautiful 
symphony  of  our  economic  world  to  be  played  by 
the  instruments  naturally  attuned  thereto,  un- 
disturbed by  any  interference  from  the  outside. 
And  the  only  condition  for  the  Millennium  is 
enlightenment  sufficient  to  prevent  such  inter- 
ference. The  economic  laws  of  nature  are  not 
only  immutable,  but  omnipresent  and  all-per- 
vasive. They  are  independent  of  time  and  space. 
In  their  presence  all  human  beings  are  equal, — 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  97 

all  being  subject  to  their  power  and  influence, 
without  distinction  as  to  race,  religion,  or  color. 
Potentially  all  human  beings  are  alike ;  for  all  are 
not  merely  subject  to  the  same  economic  laws,  but 
all  have  the  fundamental  faculty  of  acting  under 
the  influence  of  these  laws  in  a  manner  not  only 
beneficial  to  themselves  but  to  humanity  at  large. 
They  are  all  properly  attuned  by  nature  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  economic  symphony,  which  is 
merely  another  name  for  civilization.  Civilization 
is  our  name  for  the  material  conditions  of  well- 
being  brought  about  by  the  free  play  of  the 
economic  laws  of  nature,  taken  together  with  the 
enlightenment  which  leads  to  the  abolition  of  all 
artificial  restrictions  upon  these  laws,  thus  giving 
them  free  scope.  This  civilization  is,  therefore, 
the  common  heritage  of  mankind;  being  nothing 
more  than  the  natural  condition  of  mankind,  un- 
hampered by  any  artificially  created  barriers  to 
its  natural  progress.  Fundamentally,  all  men  are 
equal;  all  individuals  within  each  nation,  and  all 
nations  within  the  human  species. 

Of  course,  there  are  nations  and  races  at 
different  stages  of  civilization.  So  there  are  in- 
dividuals within  each  civilized  nation  at  different 
stages  of  enlightenment.     But  these  differences 


98  Socialism  and  War 

are  merely  of  degree,  not  of  kind.  It  is  simply  a 
question  of  the  awakening  of  the  latent  faculties 
inborn  in  humanity,  or  the  degree  of  such 
awakening.  Not  only  are  the  races  which  we 
rank  lowest  in  the  scale  of  civilization  naturally 
capable  of  attaining  the  highest  pinnacles  of  this 
civilization ;  but  the  labor  of  doing  so  would  not  be 
so  very  arduous,  as  they  are  in  the  fortunate 
position  of  not  being  hampered  by  a  large  accu- 
mulation of  historical  rubbish  of  a  semi-civil- 
ization, consisting  mainly  of  artificially  created 
barriers  to  the  free  play  of  economic  laws,  which 
must  be  swept  away  before  true  civilization  is 
attained. 

The  "politics"  of  this  view  of  the  world  of 
human  interests  are  simple.  At  "home" — in  the 
internal  management  of  the  nation — the  govern- 
ment should  be  republican  in  form  and  democratic 
in  substance.  But  above  all,  have  as  little  of  it  as 
possible.  Since  Nature  has  been  good  enough  to 
provide  a  set  of  laws  for  the  government  of  the  hu- 
man race  which  work  so  well,  the  best  thing  that 
society  can  do  is  to  let  nature  put  in  the  good  work 
of  her  laws,  and  permit  the  individual  to  work  out 
his  own  salvation  by  obeying  nature's  directions. 
The  only  thing  man  can  do  in  this  connection  is 
to   reinforce   nature's   commands   by   punishing 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War  99 

those  who  foolishly  break  her  laws.  In  short, 
government  has  only  police  duties  to  perform, 
watching  against  any  infractions  of  nature's  code 
of  laws.  Of  course,  it  would  be  a  good  thing  if 
organized  society  could  help  nature  along  by 
providing  means  of  enlightening  the  hitherto  un- 
enlightened as  to  the  meaning  of  her  laws  — 
education.  But  even  enlightenment  should  not  be 
forced  upon  the  unwilling  by  compulsory  means. 
Nature  has  herself  provided  such  magnificent  in- 
centives and  rewards  for  enlightenment,  and  the 
dangers  from  artificial  laws  and  compulsions  of 
any  kind  are  so  great,  that  it  is  advisable 
to  rather  take  a  chance  on  a  possible  small  dose  of 
ignorance  than  on  compulsory  education. 

And  the  same  policy  applies  to  international 
relations.  Nations,  like  individuals,  should  enjoy 
equality  in  the  "family  of  nations".  And  the  only 
thing  essential  in  their  intercourse  is  freedom 
from  artificial  barriers.  In  a  world  of  free  trade 
each  nation  will  be  able  to  work  out  its  own 
destiny;  and  while  acting  economically  from 
purely  utilitarian  motives,  will  contribute  to  the 
general  welfare  of  humanity.  This  equality  of 
treatment  should  be  accorded  not  only  the  so- 
called  civilized  nations,  but  also  those  on  a  lower 
plane  of  development.    And  while  it  may  be  advis- 


100  Socialism  and  War 

able  to  lend  a  backward  nation  a  helping  hand, 
leading  her  on  the  road  to  a  higher  civilization  by- 
according  her  means  of  education  and  enlighten- 
ment, this  should  not  be  done  by  forcible  means. 
The  interests  of  civilization  should  be  left  to  the 
free  action  of  economic  laws  in  a  world  of  free 
intercourse  between  nations  living  on  terms  of 
equality. 

The  "liberal"  view  of  the  world,  which  I  have 
just  sketched,  with  its  democratic-cosmopolitan 
politics,  was  the  ideologic  expression  of  the 
economic  practice  of  manufacturing  and  selling 
textiles.  And  it  prevailed  as  long  as  its  economic 
basis  was  secure.  With  the  passing  of  textiles 
passed  also  Adam  Smith,  Jeremy  Bentham, 
Herbert  Spencer, — who  but  yesterday  were  the 
great  pillars  upon  which  rested  the  temple  of 
bourgeois  ideology.  New  times  require  new  Gods, 
— and  new  priests  to  minister  to  them.  Our  Iron 
Age  has  its  own  God, —  Moloch,  the  God  of  Iron 
and  Steel.  And  Adam  Smith,  Jeremy  Bentham, 
and  Herbert  Spencer  were  superceded  by  a  new 
set  of  priests  and  prophets,  who  serve  the  new 
God  after  a  new  fashion  and  preach  to  the  faith- 
ful a  new  creed. 

The  new  creed — the  creed  of  Imperialism — 
bears  to  the  new  practice,  the  practice  of  selling 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        101 

iron  and  steel  through  military  and  diplomatic 
"agents",  the  same  relation  that  the  old,  "liberal" 
creed  bore  to  the  old  practice  of  selling  textiles 
peacefully  through  ordinary  travelling  salesmen 
by  under-bidding  your  competitor.  It  is  the  raising 
of  the  physical  necessity  of  selling  iron  and  steel 
into  a  moral  one.  That  does  not  mean  that  the 
moral  pretensions  of  the  new  creed  are  necessarily 
hypocritical.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  be  taken 
for  granted  that  individually  and  psychologically 
considered  the  followers  of  this  creed  often  act 
from  as  "lofty"  and  "ideal"  motives  as  their  pre- 
decessors of  the  "liberal"  school,  or  as  any  high- 
minded  "idealist"  of  whom  we  have  any  record. 
We  are  simply  witnessing  the  transformation  of 
social  necessity  into  individual  morality. 

I  shall  therefore  endeavor  to  give  you  a 
description  and  exposition  of  this  new  creed  as 
I  see  it,  without  any  attempt  at  passing  any  moral 
judgment  upon  it,  but  simply  giving  you  my 
explanation  for  its  existence.  I  must  say  a  word 
of  warning  however  in  this  connection :  The  creed 
being  a  new  one,  its  votaries  have  not  yet  had  the 
time  to  systematize  it.  Its  gospels  have  not  yet 
all  been  written,  and  those  that  have  been  written 
have  not  yet  all  been  collected  and  brought  into 
proper  relation  to  one  another.    Its  Bible  is  still 


r 


102  Socialism  and  War 

fragmentary.  What  I  shall  present  to  you  here 
is,  therefore,  only  my  own  systematization  and 
elucidation  of  this  creed  as  I  gather  it  from  the 
fragmentary  writings  and  scattered  remains  of 
its  apostles  that  have  come  under  my  observation. 
Another  thing:  It  must  not  be  assumed  that  this 
creed  suddenly  emerged  from  the  brain  of  an 
Imperialist  Apostle  fully  panoplied,  like  Minerva 
from  Jove's  forehead.  Nor  that  all  those  whom 
we  may  properly  class  as  Imperialists  have  care- 
fully thought  out  all  the  positions,  implications, 
and  logical  consequences  of  the  different  articles 
of  this  creed.  The  truth  is  that  the  Imperialist 
Creed  is  still  in  the  making,  and  its  different  ar- 
ticles have  not  yet  been  settled  by  any  Holy 
Imperialist  Synod.  But  its  essential  character- 
istics and  general  tendency  have  become 
sufficiently  marked  to  permit  of  fairly  accurate 
description. 

Now,  the  cardinal  point  of  the  Imperialist 
philosophy,  the  basic  position  upon  which  every- 
thing else  depends,  is  the  denial  of  the  liberal  idea 
of  natural  economic  laws  operating,  automatically, 
<  upon  all  human  beings.  Or,  viewing  the  matter 
from  a  different  angle,  it  denies  the  essential 
equality  of  the  different  races  of  the  human  spe- 
cies.   Not  merely  their  equality  of  present  condi- 


L 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        103 

tion,  but  the  possibility  of  their  common  develop- 
ment along  certain  lines  of  culture  and  civilization. 
That  is  to  say,  the  Imperialist  denies  that  all  the 
races  of  humanity  are  endowed  with  the  same 
capacity  for  development,  the  capacity  for  develop- 
ing the  same  civilization  under  the  same  circum- 
stances. According  to  this  philosophy,  the  Creator, 
in  making  the    human    species,    created    it    in 
different  molds  which  we  term  races,  and  endowed 
these    races    differently,    setting    before    them 
separate  goals  and  outlining  for  them  different 
courses  of  development.  And  these  endowments, 
goals,  and  courses,  are  not  merely  different,  but 
of   unequal   value.     Some   races    are,   therefore, 
superior   to    others.      Or    rather,    there    is    one 
"superior"  and  a    number    of    "inferior"  races. 
The  superior  race  was  destined  to  rule  the  world, 
and  therefore  cast  in  heroic  mold  and  endowed 
with  kingly  or  aristocratic  characteristics ;  while 
the  other,  the  inferior  races,  were  created  after 
a  different  pattern,  of  inferior  clay,  and  endowed 
with  common  plebeian   characteristics,   such   as 
befit  races  destined  forever  to  remain  subject  and 
subordinate  in  the  scheme  of  things  to  the  rule 
and  tutelage  of  the  superior  race.     The  obvious 
mark  of  distinction  between  the  races  is  the  color 


104  Socialism  and  War 

of  the  skin:  the  white  race  was  intended  by  the 
Creator  not  only  to  rule  the  world  generally,  but 
to  lord  it  over  its  brethren  of  a  darker  hue. 

The  implications  of  this  theory  of  creation  are 
obvious.  The  "inferior  races",  which  means  the 
generality  of  mankind  outside  the  few  hundred 
millions  of  the  white  race,  have  practically  no 
rights  which  we  need  respect.  They  have  no  right 
to  independence,  because  they  were  meant  by 
their  Creator  to  be  subject-races,  and  bow  to  our 
will.  They  have  no  right  to  be  permitted  to 
work  out  their  own  destiny,  because  their  destiny 
is  given  in  the  color  of  their  skin — the  destiny  of 
slavery  and  subjection — and  they  could  not  pos- 
sibly attain  any ,  other  destiny  no  matter  how 
much  freedom  we  gave  them.  Furthermore,  we 
have  no  right  to  give  the  inferior  races  their 
freedom, — that  is,  leave  them  alone  to  work  out 
their  own  salvation.  The  rulership  of  the  earth 
and  the  inhabitants  thereof  given  to  the  White 
Race  by  God  Almighty  is  not  a  mere  privilege 
which  it  may  exercise  or  discard  at  pleasure,  but 
a  duty  which  it  cannot  shirk.  The  White  Race 
can  no  more  voluntarily  renounce  its  right  to  rule, 
than  the  "inferior"  races  can  escape  their  destiny 
to  be  ruled.    It  must — 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        105 

"Take  up  the  White  Man's  burden — 
And  reap  his  old  reward: 
The  blame  of  those  ye  better, 
The  hate  of  those  ye  guard — 
The  cry  of  hosts  ye  humour 
(Oh,  slowly!)  toward  the  light: — 
Why  brought  ye  us  from  bondage, 
Our  loved  Egyptian  night?" 

This  story,  with  variations,  is  told  us  over  and 
over  again;  not  only  in  song  but  in  ponderous 
volumes  of  a  highly  respectable,  scientific  appear- 
ance, and  with  all  the  outward  apparatus  of 
great  learning.  And  usually  the  variations  are 
considerably  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  "inferior 
races".  The  poet  of  Imperialism  at  least  holds 
out  the  hope  that  the  "inferior  races"  may  turn 
"slowly  toward  the  light",  and  places  upon  the 
White  Man  a  sort  of  duty  of  ultimately  leading 
them  "from  bondage".  Not  so  the  scholars  of 
Imperialism  and  its  statesmen:  to  them  the  des- 
tiny of  the  "inferior  races"  holds  no  ray  of  hope ; 
they  are  mere  beasts  of  burden,  to  do  the  drudgery 
in  working  out  the  White  Man's  "higher  destiny", 
and  the  only  duty  of  the  White  Man  towards  them 
is  to  treat  them  as  should  a  good  master. 

But  such  a  theory  cannot  stop  just  there.    In 


106  Socialism  and  War 

the  form  in  which  we  have  just  presented  it — 
making  one  grand  distinction  between  the  White 
Race  and  the  rest  of  the  human  species — this 
theory  is  neither  logical  nor  sufficient  for  the 
purpose  of  "raising  into  a  moral  necessity''  the 
"physical"  necessities  of  the  iron  andl  steel  bus- 
iness. 

There  is  no  logical  reason  why  the  human 
species  should  be  divided  into  two  divisions — 
white  and  non-white — and  the  dividing  process 
then  stopping.  Why  should  the  great  divisions 
not  be  subdivided  further?  There  is  absolutely 
nothing  in  the  color  of  the  skin  which  should 
make  it  the  only  mark  of  distinction:  the  color 
of  the  eyes  or  of  the  hair,  and  many  other  things 
might  serve  such  a  purpose  just  as  well.  Besides, 
there  might  be  marks  of  distinction  of  quite  a  dif- 
ferent order — spiritual,  instead  of  merely  phys- 
ical. Particularly,  within  the  aristocratic  White 
Race  itself,  singled  out  by  the  Creator  to  lord  it 
spiritually  over  the  rest  of  mankind. 

And  the  practice  of  Imperialism  proves  that 
there  must  be  such  further  distinctions.  The 
White  Man's  burden  is,  of  course,  a  thankless 
job — as  Kipling  assures  us.  And  yet  we  find  the 
different  branches  of  the  White  Race,  called  na- 


r 


^ 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        107 

tions,  vying  with  each  other  in  their  enthusiasm 
for  a  chance  to  carry  it.  And  not  only  that, 
but  they  are  actually  ready  to  jump  at  each 
other's  throats  and  slaughter  each  other  in  their 
efforts  to  monopolize  as  much  of  this  "bur- 
den" as  possible.  The  grand  division  into  white- 
superior  and  non-white-inferipr  races  supplies 
the  justification  of  slaughtering  "inferior"  human 
beings  of  the  non-white  races  in  the  process  of 
carrying  out  the  pre-ordained  scheme  of  giving 
the  White  Man  the  rulership  of  the  world;  but  it 
fails  to  supply  a  justification  for  the  slaughter  of 
fellow-white-men,  all  of  whom  have  a  common  in- 
terest as  against  the  "inferior  races",  but  no  ap- 
parent divergent  interests  among  themselves. 

And,  as  Goethe  said  long  ago,  "am  An  fang  war 
die  Tat,"— "the  Practice  is  the  Thing."  So  the 
theory  received  a  further  extension  and  elabora- 
tion which  made  it  at  once  more  logical  and  more 
serviceable. 

In  its  fully  developed  form,  the  philosophy  or 
creed  of  Imperialism  does  not  lay  any  particular 
stress  on  the  sharp  division  between  the  White 
and  the  other  races  of  the  earlier  days  of  this 
theory,  but  rather  emphasizes  the  distinctions 
between  the  different  nations  of  the  same  race, 


108  Socialism  and  War 

particularly  the  White  race.  And  although  the 
general  terminology,  particularly  the  word  "race", 
is  still  used,  the  meaning  given  to  the  terms  is 
quite  different.  Instead  of  one  "superior"  White 
race,  there  are  now  many  White  "races" — the 
word  "race"  being  now  practically  synonymous 
with  "nation" — and  the  distinctions  between  the 
subdivisions  of  the  White  race  are  as  deep-seated 
and  all-important  as  those  between  the  White  race 
as  a  whole  and  the  colored  or  "inferior"  races.  The 
term  "inferior"  itself  has  now  lost  its  original, 
somewnat  technical  meaning,  of  non-white,  and 
assumed  its  etymological  meaning.  Every  race 
is  "inferior"  to  The  Race.  The  other  White  races 
may  not  be  quite  as  inferior  as  the  colored  races, 
but  this  is  a  comparatively  unimportant  detail  in 
the  scheme  of  Creation  and  the  course  of  History. 
The  all-important  fact  is  that  the  Creator  in  his 
wisdom  has  singled  out  one  particular  race,  the 
Race  par  excellence,  and  has  set  it  upon  a  course 
of  development  whose  particular  object  and 
destined  mission  it  is  to  serve  as  an  embodiment 
of  the  particular  virtues  and  characteristics  which 
the  Creator  intended  to  finally  prevail  in  the 
world.  None  of  the  other  races  or  nations,  whether 
white  or  colored,  have  any  of  these  special  charac- 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        109 

teristics  or  possess  any  of  these  particular 
virtues.  And  while  there  may  be  degrees  of 
inferiority,  and  some  other  white  races  may 
possess  virtues  and  characteristics  of  their  own 
which  make  them  in  a  way  superior  when  com- 
pared with  other,  more  inferior  races ;  all  are  just 
"inferior"  and  on  a  common  plane  when  compared 
to  the  one  Chosen  People,  whose  mission  and  des- 
tiny it  is  to  be  the  carrier  of  The  Virtues. 

The  logical  corollary  to  this  theory  of  created 
races,  is  the  negation  of  a  common  human  civil- 
ization. Not  only  is  civilization  not  common  to 
all  humanity  in  the  sense  that  not  all  the  branches 
of  the  human  species  have  attained,  or  can  ever 
attain,  to  the  same  level  of  civilization ;  but  in  the 
more  important  sense  that  there  are  such  funda- 
mental differences  between  the  "civilizations"  of 
the  different  races  and  nations  which  have 
achieved  the  same— or  what  has  hitherto  been 
considered  the  same— level  of  civilization,  as  to 
make  these  "civilizations"  essentially  foreign  to 
each  other.  The  differences  being  not  of  degree, 
but  of  kind ;  so  that  one  race  or  nation  can  never 
achieve  the  civilization  of  another  race  or  nation. 
At  least,  not  to  the  extent  of  becoming  an  active 
carrier  or  propagator  thereof;  although  it  may 


110  Socialism  and  War 

submit  thereto  and  in  some  passive  way  acquire 
its  virtues  at  least  sufficiently  to  enjoy  its  benefits. 
In  order  to  emphasize  this  point  and  in  a 
measure  at  least  explain  its  mysteries,  a  new  term 
has  been  coined;  or,  rather,  a  new  meaning  has 
been  given  to  the  old  term  "culture",  and  a  new 
distinction  drawn  between  it  and  the  term  "civil- 
ization".  According  to  the  most  approved  Im- 
perialist use  of  these  terms,  the  term  "civilization" 
refers  to  external  and  material  achievements, 
while  the  term  "culture"  is  reserved  for  the 
qualities  and  achievements  of  the  spirit.  Bearing 
this  distinction  in  mind,  the  Imperialist 
philosophy  asserts  that  many  races  and  nations 
may  have  a  common  civilization,  but  not  a  com- 
mon Culture.  Further,  that  Culture  is  the 
thing — in  so  far  as  the  world  and  its  destinies 
are  concerned — and  that  the  nations  which  we 
were  wont  to  regard  as  upon  an  equal  plane  of 
civilization — taking  the  word  in  its  broader 
meaning,  which  includes  things  spiritual  as  well 
as  material — are  really  of  different  value  and 
worth  as  far  as  the  Historical  Process  is  con- 
cerned, For  while  they  are  all  on  the  same  level 
of  "civilization",  in  the  new,  restricted  sense,  they 
still  are  the  carriers  of  different  cultures —  only 
one  of  them  being  the  carrier  of  the  real  Culture, 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        111 

the  Culture  par  excellence,  which  is  destined  to 
rule  (and  redeem)  the  world. 

Before  leaving  this  fascinating  subject  it  should 
be  noted  that  in  the  terminology  of  Imperialism 
purely  intellectual  achievements  are  classed  with 
the  external  or  material  things,  and  not  with  the 
spiritual ;  are  therefore  part  of  "civilization"  and 
not  of  "culture".  Just  what  culture  in  the  new 
sense  is,  has  never  been  denned;  and  it  is  con- 
sidered to  be  something  really  indefinable.  It  is  a 
mystical  quality  inborn  in  a  race  or  nation,  con- 
stituting its  essence;  a  sort  of  metaphysical  entity, 
like  the  Kantian  "Ding  an  sich",  which  can  only  be 
described  negatively,  but  which  has,  nevertheless, 
very  positive  and  serious  results.  Its  principal 
sphere  of  operations  is  History.  It  is  here  that  it 
makes  itself  felt,  and  it  is  here  that  its  character- 
istics may  be  observed  and  studied. 

Perhaps  the  most  important  conclusion  drawn 
by  the  Imperialists  themselves  from  these  con- 
siderations, is  that  a  nation's  institutions  are  not 
part  of  its  "civilization"  but  of  its  "culture".  The 
point  is  very  important,  as  it  is  determinative  of 
the  "home  politics"  of  this  movement.  It  may 
perhaps  best  be  evaluated  when  compared  with 
the  old  "liberal"  ideas  on  the  subject.  According 
to    the    "liberal"    theory    the    development    of 


112  Socialism  and  War 

humanity  towards  a  higher  civilization  develops, 
as  part  of  this  "civilizing"  process,  a  higher  form 
of  political  institutions — republican-democratic — 
which  all  nations  are  bound  to  adopt  when  they 
reach  the  high  level  of  civilization  for  which  these 
institutions  are  appropriate.  In  fact,  these  in- 
stitutions are  themselves  powerful  engines  of 
civilization,  and  whenever  and  wherever  adopted 
aid  materially  the  further  course  of  development. 
This  the  new  philosophy  denies;  and  it  insists 
that  political  institutions  are  not  part  of  the  com- 
mon "civilization"  of  mankind,  but  of  its  separate 
and  distinct  "cultures".  Republican  and  demo- 
cratic institutions  are  not  part  and  parcel  of,  nor 
do  they  correspond  to,  any  higher  degree  of  civil- 
ization than  aristocratic  or  monarchical  ones.  Ner 
are  republican  and  democratic  institutions  better 
per  se  than  aristocratic  or  monarchical  ones.  On 
the  contrary,  a  nation  whose  "culture"  is  not 
republican  or  democratic  and  whose  "genius"  has 
not  evolved  any  such  institutions,  would  be  going 
backwards  and  betray  its  own  "spirit"  if  it  were 
to  adopt  such  institutions.  In  fact,  when  history 
is  consulted  it  will  be  found  that  republican  and 
democratic  institutions  in  any  nation  with  a 
"culture"  fit  to  survive,  may,  on  the  whole,  be 
considered  a  mark  of  inferiority,  unless  they  be 


V 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        113 

merely  the  manifestations  of  a  temporary 
"liberal"  aberration,  of  an  ailment  whose  chief 
symptom  is  a  failure  to  appreciate  "the  true  mean- 
ing of  empire." 

The  truly  Chosen  People  has  therefore  either 
never  adopted  such  institutions,  or  will  soon  dis- 
card them  as  "incompatible"  with  its  destiny  of 
World-Empire.  The  Chosen  People  is  a  Superman 
among  nations,  and  must  strive  to  dominate  the 
world.  But  a  nation  cannot  successfully  play  the 
Superman  among  nations,  while  it  is  governed  on 
the  principle  of  the  equality  of  all  men.  Im- 
perialism must  begin  at  home.  But  it  is  a  world- 
philosophy  which  knows  no  basic  distinctions  be- 
tween "at  home"  and  "abroad".  The  entire  world 
and  its  destinies  are  encompassed  within  its 
vision.    And  it  dreams  no  mean  dreams. 

It  rejects  wholly,  as  mean  and  petty,  the  ideas 
of  the  "liberal-utilitarians"  about  "the  greatest 
good  to  the  greatest  number."  This  world  was 
not  created  for  the  low  and  petty  bourgeois  idea  of 
insuring  good,  middle-class  living  conditions  for  a 
"level"  mass  of  humanity.  The  real  purpose  of 
creation  was  to  carry  out  the  esthetically  beauti- 
ful idea  of  developing  a  giant  race  of  Supermen 
as  its  crowning  glory.  This  race  of  Supermen, 
which  shall  possess  the  most  remarkable  Spirit, 


114  Socialism  and  War 

endowed  with  rare  and  indescribable  qualities, 
shall  develop  a  Culture  which  shall  be  the  greatest 
testimonial  to  the  wonderful  wisdom  and  power 
of  the  Creator. 

To  this  end  and  purpose  the  Creator  has  singled 
out  the  Chosen  People,  and  endowed  it,  as  a  race 
or  nation,  with  those  wonderful  qualities  which 
make  the  essence  of  its  Spirit.  Of  course,  it  is 
not  every  mean  individual  member  thereof 
that  possesses  these  great  qualities,  but  the 
Race  or  Nation  as  such,  in  its  collective  capacity. 
For  the  time  being  these  qualities  are  in- 
carnated in  the  Supermen  within  the  Nation, 
its  great  geniuses  who  are  especially  destined  to 
carry  out  the  purpose  of  the  Creator  by  "leading" 
the  Chosen  People  on  its  historical  course  of 
destiny,  gloriously  superior  to  the  vulgar  consider- 
ations of  the  mere  material  well-being  of  the 
masses  of  the  people. 

For  the  Destiny  of  The  Nation  is  to  diffuse  its 
"Culture"  among  the  nations,  exterminating  the 
cultures  which  it  may  find  opposing  its  own,  so  as 
to  bring  dominion  to  the  only  true  Culture,  for 
the  greater  glory  of  God.  In  order  to  accomplish 
its  mission — from  which  it  is  mortal  offense  to 
shrink — the  Chosen  People  must  seek  to  subdue 
the  entire  world  politically  and  dominate  it  econo- 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        115 

mically.  For  experience  has  shown  that  "Culture" 
follows  the  flag.  History  teaches  us  this  lesson: 
that  inferior  races  or  nations,  whether  white  or 
colored,  fail  to  appreciate  the  beauties  of  a  higher 
culture,  and  are  utterly  unable  to  acquire  it  even 
passively,  unless  and  until  they  have  been  forcibly 
placed  under  the  political  tutelage  and  economic 
domination  of  the  superior  race  whose  culture 
is  to  be  extended.  In  this  connection  it  must  be 
remembered  that  its  language  is  a  nation's  most 
characteristically  national  means  of  expression. 
In  fact  it  is  part  of  its  own  flesh  and  blood,  and 
possesses  some  of  those  very  mystic  qualities 
which  constitute  the  essence  of  the  national 
character  and  the  basis  of  its  special  Culture.  The 
most  potent  means,  therefore,  of  spreading  the 
culture  of  any  given  nation  among  alien  peoples 
is  to  make  them  use  the  language  of  that  nation. 
But  that  can  only  be  done  when  the  nation  of  the 
higher  Culture  politically  dominates  the  peoples 
among  whom  this  culture  is  to  be  spread.  And  in 
this  material  world  of  ours  political  dominion  is 
inseparable  from  economic  dominion.  Hence,  the 
cultural  mission  of  the  Nation  becomes  of  neces- 
sity a  striving  to  dominate  the  entire  world  econo- 
mically and  politically — a  striving  for  World- 
Empire. 


116  Socialism  and  War 

In  this  struggle  for  "the  higher  good",  the 
nation  cannot  brook  any  opposition,  and  it  must 
use  all  means  at  its  command.  If  it  falters  in  its 
course,  if  it  does  not  dare  to  use  any  available 
means,  out  of  cowardice  or  considerations  of  petty 
bourgeois  "morality",  it  is  doomed;  for  it  has 
thereby  proven  that  it  lacks  real  superiority,  that 
it  is  not  a  Superman  among  nations.  It  is  the 
essential  characteristic  of  a  Superman  among  in- 
dividuals that  he  is  superior  to  the  considerations 
of  common  morality.  He  has  his  own  morality,  the 
pivotal  consideration  of  which  is  success.  Every- 
thing that  furthers  his  cause,  brings  him  success, 
is  moral.  For  he  is  but  an  instrument  of  Destiny 
working  out  the  Higher  Will,  which  cannot  be 
obtained  by  merely  human  morality.  The  same  is 
true  of  Nations.  The  Superman  among  nations  not 
only  has  the  right,  but  is  commanded,  to  disregard 
ordinary  morality.  Whatever  furthers  its  course 
is  moral.  Whatever  or  whoever  obstructs  its 
course  obstructs  the  progress  of  humanity  to  its 
ultimate  goal,  and  is  therefore  immoral  or  crim- 
inal. 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  present  war  many 
good  people  woke  up  with  a  start  to  find  very 
responsible  German  scientists,  men  of  letters,  and 
statesmen,  declaring,  in  effect,  that  the  German 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        117 

people  were  superior  to  every  other  people  on 
earth,  and  that  warlike  aggression  on  the  part  of 
Germany  against  its  neighbors  is  justified  by  the 
mission  of  the  German    people    to    spread    its 
"Culture"  among  the  other  and  inferior  nations. 
Good  people  usually  wake  up  with  a  start,  for  the 
reason  that  "good  people"  usually  do  not  wake 
up  until  very  late  and  until  something  very  start- 
ling (to  them)  happens  to  wake  them  up.  That  is 
what  makes  them  "good",  by  definition.     Those 
who  wake  up  early  are  classed  among  "dreamers", 
"visionaries",  "Utopians",  etc.    As   a  matter   of 
fact,  there  was  nothing  startling  about  these  dec- 
larations;    except,     perhaps,     their     extremely 
brusque    form.      Their    substance  had  been  an- 
nounced to  the  world  time  and  again  in  quite  un- 
mistakable, if  more  polite,  language. 

And  it  should  be  noted  here,  "for  the  record", 
that  these  announcements  have  been  received  with 
an  ever-increasing  amount  of  respect  and  favor. 
In  fact,  the  basic  ideas  underlying  these  declar- 
ations were  already  becoming  quite  popular.  So 
much  so,  that  to  those  who  have  followed  the  rise 
and  progress  of  these  ideas  it  must  seem  quite 
amazing  how  the  same  "good  people"  who  ac- 
claimed these  very  announcements— when  made  in 
polite  language  and  with  the  learned  apparatus 


118  Socialism  and  War 

of  a  pseudo-science — as  the  last  word  in  science, 
should  be  so  startled  and  show  so  much  resent- 
ment when  they  were  made  with  directness  and 
brusqueness,  which  the  extraordinary  situation 
should  certainly  excuse  if  not  fully  justify. 

It  must  also  be  added  here  that,  while  Germany 
was  in  the  lead  in  developing  this  new  philosophy 
or  creed,  and  perhaps  far  ahead  of  the  other 
nations  in  popularizing  it,  she  was  not  alone 
in  this  good  work.  Much  has  been  said  since  the 
beginning  of  this  war  about  Treitschke,  Nietzsche, 
and  other  German  apostles  of  the  new  creed ;  and 
the  impression  has  been  created  that  their  Im- 
perialistic philosophy  is  an  exclusively  German 
product  and  has  its  adherents  only  among  the 
citizens  of  the  Fatherland.  This  is  unfair  to  Ger- 
many as  well  as  to  the  Imperialistic  philosophy. 
The  philosophy  of  Imperialism  is  a  general  pheno- 
menon of  the  highly  developed  capitalistic 
countries,  and  has  had  its  apostles  and  propa- 
gandists in  France  and  England  as  well  as  in  Ger- 
many. It  may  be  noted  here  as  significant  in  this 
connection,  that  Houston  Stewart  Chamberlain, 
one  of  its  great  "scientific"  exponents,  is  a  born 
Englishman,  although  a  German  by  adoption ;  and 
that  while  he  wrote  his  great  treatise  expounding 
this  theory,  in  his  adopted  German  tongue,  and  it 


The  Ideologic  Causes  of  the  War        119 

was  in  Germany  that  it  achieved  its  greatest 
popularity,  it  was  translated  into  his  native 
English  under  high  auspices  and  achieved  con- 
siderable popularity  in  England  also. 

This  is  true  not  only  of  this  philosophy  in 
general,  but  practically  of  all  of  its  details.  It  may 
strike  us,  for  instance,  as  rather  strange  that  a 
scientist  like  Prof.  Miinsterberg  should  assert  that 
Germany  would  be  taking  a  step  backward  if  she 
were  to  exchange  her  semi-autocratic  and  semi- 
feudal  monarchical  form  of  government  for  a 
more  democratic  and  republican  form.  And  we 
are  likely  to  assume  that  this  is  a  purely  German 
mode  of  thought,  due  to  the  teachings  of  that  same 
Treitschke  and  those  other  awful  Germans  whom 
the  war  has  brought  to  our  notice.  A  study  of  the 
intellectual  development  of  Europe  during  the 
last  half,  and  particularly  during  the  last  quarter 
century,  will  disclose,  however,  that  the  apostasy 
from  republicanism  is  quite  a  genral  phe- 
nomenon among  the  up-to-date  intellectuals  of 
that  quarter  of  the  globe,  and  that  the  monarch- 
ical and  aristocratic  principles  have  been  growing 
steadily  in  favor.  Furthermore,  if  we  scrutinize 
carefully  American  intellectual  development  for  a 
generation  past,  we  shall  find  that  the  intellectual 
current  away  from  democracy  and  republicanism 


120  Socialism  and  War 

and  towards  aristocracy  and  monarchy,  has  been 
wafted  across  the  Atlantic  and  has  made  visible 
inroads  upon  our  own  political  ideas. 


IV. 

THE  IMMEDIATE  CAUSES  OF  THE 

WAR  AND  THE   STAKES 

INVOLVED. 

IN  the  preceding  two  lectures  I  endeavored  to 
show  that  the  present  war  was  the  result  of 
general  causes,  causes  rooted  deeply  in  the  latest 
phase  of  capitalist  economy  and  the  moral  and 
intellectual  ideas  produced  thereby.  In  my  last 
lecture,  in  discussing  the  ideologic  causes  of  the 
war,  I  stated,  however,  that  Germany  was  lead- 
ing the  rest  of  the  so-called  civilized  world  in  the 
development  of  this  modern  Imperialistic  —  that 
is,  warlike  —  philosophy  or  creed,  and  leading 
far  in  advance  of  its  competitors.  It  is  this  leader- 
ship in  a  general  movement  that  has  made  Ger- 
many the  aggressor  in  this  war.  Of  the  fact  of 
German  aggression  in  this  war,  there  can  be  no 
doubt.  In  fact,  it  is  hardly  denied.  Or  rather, 
the  denials,  if  any,  are  of  a  purely  formal 
character,  and  do  not  touch  the  substance  of  the 


122  Socialism  and  War 

issue.  But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  think,  as  some 
evidently  do,  that  Germany  fell  on  peaceful 
Europe  like  a  hungry  wolf  on  a  flock  of  sheep. 
Without  any  desire  to  minimize  the  guilt  of  Ger- 
many— and  I  may  say  right  here  that  in  my 
opinion  the  guilt  of  Germany  cries  out  to  heaven 
—  there  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  the  other  civil- 
zed  nations  share  in  her  guilt.  Germany  does  not 
stand  in  this  respect  in  a  class  by  herself,  but  is 
merely  "a  leader  of  men",  primus  inter  pares. 

And  there  is  a  reason  for  this  leadership.  But 
this  reason  has  absolutely  nothing  to  do  with  any 
racial  or  national  characteristics  of  the  German 
people.  It  might  seem  to  be  "just  retribution" 
that  Germany's  undoubted  guilt  as  the  aggressor 
in  this  terrible  war  should  be  put  to  the  credit  of 
the  German  national  character,  in  accordance  with 
those  race-theories  which  she  herself  has  so  as- 
siduously been  developing  for  a  generation  past. 
But  however  "poetic"  such  justice  might  be,  it 
would  not  be  historic  justice  —  which  is  the  only 
justice.  The  fact  is  that  Germany's  leadership  in 
Imperialism,  and  her  consequent  aggression  in  this 
war,  is  due  to  the  same  economic  factor  which  has 
produced  the  general  phenomenon  of  which  it  is 
part  and  parcel.  The  most  striking  fact  in  the 
history  of  our  own  times  is  undoubtedly  the  truly 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        123 

marvellous  economic  development  of  Germany. 
But  when  you  analyze  the  economic  development 
of  Germany  into  its  constituent  elements,  you  will 
find  that  she  excels  particularly  in  those  indus- 
tries which  have  given  our  era  its  warlike  char- 
acter. 

Of  course,  this  war,  like  all  great  historic  occur- 
rences, is  the  result  of  a  concurrence  of  many  con- 
tributing causes.  But  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that 
the  most  important  cause — that  cause  which 
gives  it  its  character  and  which  may  therefore 
be  regarded,  speaking  generally,  as  the  true  cause 
of  the  war — is  the  fact  that  since  the  beginning 
of  this  century  Germany  has  become  the  largest 
producer  of  iron  and  steel  in  the  world;  and  that 
she  has  been  making  such  rapid  strides  in  that  par- 
ticular industry  that  in  1910  she  produced  twice 
as  much  iron  and  steel  as  England,  her  nearest 
competitor.  Just  look  at  the  table  showing  the  pro- 
duction of  iron  and  steel  by  the  leading  countries 
of  the  world  in  that  particular  field,  outside  of  the 
United  States,  since  1850.  It  is  illuminating: 


w 

dcT 


> 

pa 
*i 

H 

S3 

0? 


c 

CO 

CO 


o 

CD 


et"   CD 


Cn 

to 


to 

cn 

o 

to 

© 

o 

o 

cn 

en 

O 
Cn 

© 

en 
co 


to 

CO 

o 

o 

© 

o 
o 


CO 

en 
© 
o 
o 
o 


oo 
en 
o 


-3 

CO 
00 

en 


00 

to 


00 

to 
1° 

00 

to 


CD   CD 

o  to 


© 

00 

en 


en 
© 


CD 
CO 


00 
CO 


-q 

Id 

o 

lo 


-q 
to 


en 


en 

CO 

00 
00 


00 
00 
CD 

00 
CD 


to  to 

~CD 

CD 

to 


o 
en 
oo 


© 

© 

CD 

"cD 

© 


CO 
~CD 

00 


o 

© 

I— I 

© 

CD 
00 


en 
oo 

00 
00 

to 


M   H*   t0   tO   00   C 


00 

CO 
00 


CO 

CO 


en 
cn 
p 

en 
o 

CD 


00 
CD 

o 


CD 
O 

O 


o 


/-s  O 

§ 

§ 

a 

o 


o 
gq 

to 
to 

o 


W   M   W   rf^   ^  f 


o 

o 

en 

-q 

en 

CO 

to 

© 

h-i 

00 

00 

00 

CO 

CO 

o 

© 

CD 

~q 

to 

to 

^ 

CO 

lo 

M 

o 

~q 

CO 

^ 

© 

CO 

00 

M 

o 

en 

^ 

o 

CO 

M 

o 

CO 

o 

CD 

CD 
00 


00 

o 

© 
CO 


00 

© 
CO 
00 


00 

00 
CO 
CD 


to 


en 
o 

© 
00 


en 
oo 
© 
en 
to 


CD 


CD 

I-1 

to 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        125 

You  will  notice  that  in  1850  Germany  produced 
only  about  15  per  cent.,  considerably  less  than  one- 
sixth  of  the  amount  of  iron  and  steel  then  pro- 
duced by  England.    In  half  a  century  Germany 
increased  her  production  of  iron  and  steel  to  such 
an  extent  that  she  ran  England  a  neck-and-neck 
race  for  the  world-championship  in  that  line  of 
production.     And  only  twelve  years  later  her 
production  of  iron  and  steel  was  fully  twice  that 
of  England.    And  those  of  you  who  have  followed 
the  development  of  international  relations  during 
the  last  quarter-century  will  undoubtedly  have 
noticed  that  the  crucial  point  in  the  change  from 
a  peaceful  to  a  warlike  attitude  came  towards  the 
end  of  the  last  century;  that  is  about  the  time 
when  Germany  was  catching  up  with  England  In 
the  production  of  iron  and  steel.  Since  then  Ger- 
many has  been  far  in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the 
world  in  the  production  of  iron  and  steel,  and  sim- 
ultaneously the  war-spirit   which   has   been  de- 
veloping throughout  the  world  has  been  making 
particularly  rapid  strides  in  Germany. 

But  in  order  that  you  may  not  get  a  one-sided 
view  of  this  war,  I  intend  to  go  into  some  detail  as 
to  its  immediate  causes;  touching,  incidentally, 
upon  some  contributing  causes  to  which  I  pre- 
viously alluded.    And  first  of  all,  it  is  well  to  re- 


126  Socialism  and  War 

member  that  the  present  European  conflict  is 
really  two  wars  rolled  into  one.  We  all  know  that 
there  are  two  theatres  of  war,  an  eastern  and  a 
western  one,  with  Germany-Austria  between 
them.  But  this  division  of  the  conflict  is  not  merely 
geographical ;  it  is  also  historical.  It  is  not  merely 
that  there  are  two  fields  of  operations,  but 
actually  two  separate  wars,  each  having  its  own 
separate  cause  and  its  own  character,  historically 
considered.  The  war  of  Russia  and  Servia  against 
Austria  and  Germany  in  the  East  belongs  to  an 
entirely  different  historical  epoch,  when  con- 
sidered from  the  point  of  view  of  the  development 
of  capitalism,  than  the  war  of  Germany  against 
France  and  England  in  the  West.  And  so  it 
happens  that  Germany  is  not  only  the  geograph- 
ical connecting  link  between  the  two  theatres  of 
the  war,  but  also  the  historical  connecting  link 
between  the  two  wars  and  their  different  char- 
acters. 

You  will  doubtless  recall  what  I  said  about  the 
two  warlike  epochs  of  capitalism,  separated  by  an 
era  of  peace.  Now,  the  two  wars  being  waged  in 
Europe  may  be  distingushed,  generally  speaking, 
by  a  reference  to  the  characteristics  of  the  wars 
of  those  two  epochs  of  capitalism.  The  war  now 
being  waged  in  the  east  of  Europe  belongs  to  the 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War       127 

first  warlike  period  of  capitalism,  the  purely 
Natonalistic  period,  at  least  as  far  as  Germany's 
opponents  are  concerned;  while  the  war  waging 
on  the  western  war-theatre  belongs  to  the  second, 
Imperialistic,  period  of  capitalist  development. 

The  principle  characteristic  of  the  wars  of  the 
first  hstorical  epoch  here  in  question,  is,  as  I  have 
already  stated,  that  it  is  part  of  an  attempt  to  get 
to  the  sea,— the  march  to  the  sea,  as  I  called  it. 
Now,  most  European  countries  reached  the  sea 
early.  Those  are  the  countries  in  which  the  modern 
national  states  were  rounded  out  early,  and  which 
attained  very  early  a  comparatively  high  degree 
of  commercial  or  industrial  development.     Such 
were  England,  Spain,  France.  These  are  countries 
either    entirely     surrounded     by     sea,  or    hav- 
ing natural  boundaries  on   the   landside,   in   the 
shape  of  huge  mountain  chains,  separating  them 
from  their  neighbors.    But  there  was  the  great 
plain  of  central  and  eastern  Europe,  inhabited  by 
Germanic  and  Slavonic  tribes,  with  admixtures  of 
such    foreign    elements  as  the  Hungarians,  and 
Finns,    and    Turks,    wherein    there    were    no 
mountain  chains  to  delimit  the  places  of  habitation 
of  the  different  races  and  to  give  each  a  well- 
defined  course    towards  the  sea.    The  result  was 
great  confusion.    A  sort  of  modern  migration  of 


128  Socialism  and  War 

the  nations.  A  migration  in  which  "the  nations"  in 
the  primary  sense,  that  is  the  peoples  themselves, 
did  not,  indeed,  move  about  very  much,  but  in 
which  "the  nations"  in  the  political  sense  did  con- 
siderable stretching  and  moving  of  their  limbs  in 
an  effort  to  reach  the  sea. 

This  was  particularly  true  of  Russia,  which 
was  originally  entirely  cut  off  from  the  sea.  A 
primitive  pastoral  or  agricultural  country  can 
very  well  be  satisfied  to  remain  an  entirely  inland 
state.  Not  so  a  country  which  has  started  on  the 
road  of  commercial  and  industrial  development,  or 
one  which  intends  to  do  so.  The  entire  history  of 
Russia  during  the  past  two  hundred  years  is 
therefore  nothing  but  one  great  struggle  to  get  to 
the  sea.  It  was  Peter  the  Great  who  turned 
Russia's  face  towards  the  West  and  Capitalism  — 
or  at  least  he  symbolizes  that  turning  point  in 
Russian  history  —  and  it  was  the  same  Peter  the 
Great  who  started  Russia  definitely  on  her  march 
to  the  sea.  She  is  still  on  that  march ;  for  she  has 
had  a  long  road  to  travel,  and  many  battles  to  fight 
before  she  could  get  there.  She  is  therefore  still 
in  the  first  warlike  period  of  capitalism,  trying  to 
establish  herself  as  a  rounded  out,  self-sufficient 
economic  unit  with  free  access  to  the  outside  world 
for  an  exchange  of  products.  And  until  she  gets 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        129 

there  her  economic  development  along  capitalistic 
lines  will  be  thwarted  and  her  growth  stunted,  so 
that  no  matter  what  her  extent  of  territory  and 
military  power,  she  will  remain  virtually  a  colony 
of  her  western  neighbors,  an  object  of  economic 
exploitation. 

Now,  when  Peter  the  Great  decided  to  start 
Russia  on  the  road  of  capitalistic  development  he 
cast  about  him  for  an  opening  into  the  wide  world 
for  his  "lines  of  communication",  and  he  saw  the 
Caspian  and  the  Black  Seas  to  the  South  and  the 
Baltic  to  the  North.  He  started  on  the  move  in 
both  directions;  and  his  successors  have  kept  to 
the  warpath  ever  since,  with  the  result  that 
Russia  now  completely  controls  the  Caspian,  con- 
trols a  very  large  part  of  the  Black  Sea,  and  has  a 
firm  footing  on  the  Baltic.  But  the  Caspian  is 
nothing  but  a  big  inland  lake.  It  is  important  for 
some  parts  of  the  Asiatic  trade;  but  it  does  not 
lead  into  the  wide  open  world.  The  same  is  true  of 
the  Black  and  Baltic  Seas.  With  this  all-impor- 
tant modification,  however:  while  they  are  both 
practically  inland  seas,  each  has  an  outlet  into  the 
open  sea;  from  the  Baltic  there  is  a  road  leading 
into  the  North  Sea,  while  from  the  Black  Sea  there 
is  a  passage  into  the  Mediterranean.  But  both  of 
those  avenues  into  the  open  sea  are  controlled  by 


130  Socialism  and  War 

others:  the  road  from  the  Baltic  is  practically 
controlled  by  Germany;  while  the  door  which 
leads  from  the  Black  Sea  into  the  Mediterranean 
is  kept  shut  tight  by  the  Turk,  who  guards,  like 
Cerberus  of  old,  the  Bosporus  and  the  Dardanelles, 
so  that  Russia  may  not  get  through. 

Of  late  you  have  been  told  a  good  deal  about 
Russia's  ardent  and  long-cherished  ambition  to 
possess  Constantinople.  And  you  have  no  doubt 
been  told  a  great  deal  about  the  reasons  for  it: 
its  being  the  imperial  city  of  the  Byzantine  Em- 
perors, to  whose  Empire  the  Russian  Czars  are 
supposed  to  have  succeeded;  and  the  mother-city 
of  the  Greek  Catholic  Church,  the  official  Russian 
Church,  of  which  the  Czar  is  the  official  head ;  of 
the  religious  traditions  connected  with  St.  Sophia ; 
and  a  lot  of  similar  stuff.  All  of  which  is  good- 
enough  filigree ;  the  substance  which  it  covers  be- 
ing, that  Constantinople  is  the  lock  on  the  door 
opening  from  the  Black  Sea  into  the  Mediterran- 
ean, and  the  great  Ocean  beyond.  For  the  posses- 
sion of  this  lock,  Russia  has  fought  a  century-long 
fight  with  the  Turk,  a  fight  that  cannot  cease  until 
the  lock  is  in  her  possession  or  until  it  is  removed 
and  the  door  left  open.  The  peculiar  thing  about 
the  struggle  for  Constantinople  is  that  Russia 
would  have  been  in  possession  of  that  historic 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        131 

city  long  ago,  the  Turk  being  entirely  too  in- 
adequate as  a  guard  of  this  all-important  point,  if 
it  were  not  for  the  fact  that  other  and  more 
powerful  opponents  of  Russia  kept  the  "Sick  Man 
of  Europe"  in  his  place,  in  order  to  keep  Russia 
out. 

Considerable  has  been  written  by  those  who 
deal  in  destinies,  about  Russia's  alleged  "destiny" 
in  the  Far  East,  that  is,  Eastern  Asia.  These  wise- 
acres were  particularly  loquacious  immediately 
before  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  when  it  seemed 
as  if  Russia  had  all  but  forgotten  about  the  Near 
East  (which,  by  the  way,  means  the  West  to 
Russia,  to  embark  upon  great  schemes  in  the  Far 
East.  According  to  these  dispensers  of  "destinies" 
Russia  was  really  an  Asiatic  State,  and  her 
future  lay  in  her  Eastern  interests.  In  short,  the 
"destiny"  of  the  Russian  people  required  them  to 
face  East. 

The  truth  is  that  Russia's  policy  in  Asia — 
aside  from  the  general  characteristic  of  acquisi- 
tiveness, which  she  shares  with  all  other  capital- 
istic countries  in  her  stage  of  development — has 
been  dictated  by  her  general  desire  to  get  to  the 
sea,  as  modified  by  the  policy  of  her  western  neigh- 
bors to  keep  the  western  passages  barred  before 
her.  Finding  the  way  into  the  North  Sea  and  into 


132  Socialism  and  War 

the  Mediterranean  barred,  the  Russian  statesmen 
have  hit  upon  the  idea  of  reaching  the  Ocean  by 
pushing  eastward  instead  of  westward.  Russia  has 
attempted  to  do  what  Columbus  set  out  to  do, 
only  reversing  the  direction :  Columbus  wanted  to 
reach  the  East  by  sailing  west;  while  Russia 
wanted  to  reach  the  West  by  going  east.  Colum- 
bus would  have  got  there  had  he  not  found 
America  lying  in  his  way.  Columbus  was  obliged 
to  turn  back ;  the  way  to  the  East  had  to  be  found 
by  sailing  south ;  and  only  now,  after  four  hundred 
years  has  Columbus'  original  design  been 
accomplished  through  the  cutting  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  Russia  would  have  accomplished  her 
purpose  had  she  not  found  the  Jap  lying  in  her 
way.  Japan  barred  Russia's  way  as  effectively  as 
did  America  that  of  Columbus.  The  Russo-Jap- 
anese War  put  an  end,  for  the  time  being  at  least, 
to  Russia's  attempts  to  get  to  the  West  by  way  of 
the  East. 

This  reopened  and  made  acute  the  Near  Eastern 
—  that  is,  the  Balkan  —  question.  Having  been 
foiled  in  the  East,  Russia  was  bound  to  try  the 
West  again;  steering,  like  Columbus's  succes- 
sors, a  southern  course.  The  Balkan  question  has 
two  aspects :  the  relation  of  the  Christian  popula- 
tion of  the  Balkan    Peninsula    to    their    former 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        133 

overlord,  the  Turk,  and  the  conflicts  between  the 
different  groups  into  which  this  population  is 
broken  up,  on  the  one  hand ;  and,  on  the  other,  the 
relation  betwen  Russia  and  Austria,  both  of  whom 
want  to  fish  in  troubled  waters.  Latterly,  the  latter 
aspects  of  the  Balkan  question  have  become  com- 
plicated by  Germany's  design  upon  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  as  part  of  her  imperialistic  or  Pan-Ger- 
manistic  schemes. 

In  order  to  understand  the  different  interests 
and  antagonisms  which  enter  into  the  Balkan 
question,  as  well  as  their  bearing  on  the  larger 
political  interests  and  antagonisms  engendered  by 
Modern  Imperialsm,  it  will  repay  us  to  examine 
the  geographical  and  economico-historical  bear- 
ings of  the  Balkans  a  little  more  in  detail. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  in  some 
respects  the  Balkan  peninsula  resembles  the 
Spanish  peninsula.  Each  forms  by  its  southern 
extremity  a  passage-way  into  the  Mediterranean 
Sea,  separating  Europe  from  other  parts  of  the 
world.  The  Strait  of  Gibraltar,  which  forms  the 
gateway  from  the  Western  Ocean  into  the  Medi- 
terranean Sea  separates  Europe  from  Africa; 
while  the  Bosporus  and  Dardanelles,  forming  the 
passage-way  from  the  Black  Sea  into  the  Medi- 
terranean, divide  Europe  from  Asia.  The  import- 


134  Socialism  and  War 

ance  of  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar  from  a  commercial, 
and  therefore,  from  a  strategic  point  of  view  is 
universally  recognized  as  of  the  first  magni- 
tude. The  Bosporus  and  Dardanelles  may  not 
be  quite  as  important  in  one  way,  as  they  do 
not  connect  with  the  ocean.  But  in  other  ways 
their  importance  may  even  surpass  that  of  Gib- 
raltar. 

In  the  first  place  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar  is  not 
easily  controlled.  Notwithstanding  the  natural 
strength  of  Gibraltar,  no  power  could  effectually 
control  the  Strait  by  land  fortifications  alone, 
against  a  strong  naval  power ;  while  the  Bosporus 
and  the  Dardanelles  can  be  controlled  against  the 
greatest  odds,  owing  to  the  extreme  narrowness  of 
these  channels.  The  Bosporus  is,  in  this  respect, 
the  most  remarkable  channel  in  the  world.  In  its 
narrowest  part  it  is  hardly  half  a  mile  wide.  The 
Dardanelles  channel  is  not  much  wider.  And  the 
two  together,  with  the  Sea  of  Marmora  between 
them,  permit  of  such  a  combination  of  land  and 
sea  defenses  as  to  make  it  absolutely  impregnable 
under  ordinary  circumstances.  But  the  Bosporus 
is  even  more  important  for  peaceful  pursuits  than 
as  a  military  stronghold.  The  Strait  of  Gibraltar 
separates  Europe  from  Africa,  and  separates 
them  most  effectively.    This  gulf  cannot  possibly 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        135 

be  bridged.  At  least  not  in  the  present  state  of 
science.  But  the  Bosporus  can  be  bridged  as 
easily  as  any  ordinary  river  or  rivulet,  and 
trains  can  be  sent  across  it  from  Europe  to  Asia 
without  any  difficulty  whatsoever.  While  it  forms 
a  passage-way  uniting  the  East  with  the  West  by 
water,  it  also  forms  a  passage-way  running  North 
and  South  on  land  uniting  Europe  with  Asia  in 
a  most  effective  and  most  convenient  manner. 

Another  important  feature  of  Balkan 
geography  must  be  noted.  Unlike  its  Western 
counterpart,  the  Balkan  peninsula  turns  its 
widest  side  towards  the  continent,  and  has  no 
mountain-range  frontier  forming  a  barrier  be- 
tween itself  and  the  continent,  such  as  the  Pyre- 
nees. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  itself  broken  up 
into  several  divisions  by  mountain-chains  running 
across  it.  The  result  was  that  while  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  always  formed  one  of  the  most  coveted 
corners  of  the  earth,  it  was  naturally  in  a  very  un- 
favorable position  for  the  formation  of  a  big  Bal- 
kan Nation.  To  this  should  be  added,  that  about 
the  time  when  the  development  of  capitalism  was 
forming  strong  consolidated  nations  in  the  west 
of  Europe,  the  Balkan  Peninsula  was  the  principal 
seat  of  power  of  the  Turkish  invader  of  Europe, 


136  Socialism  and  War 

lying  prostrate  in  his  iron  grasp  for  several  cen- 
turies. 

We  are  often  told  that  the  Balkans  are  in- 
habited by  a  mixture  of  nations  forming  no  racial 
unit,  thus  accounting  for  the  continued  strife 
among  the  different  elements  of  the  population  of 
that  peninsula.  To  my  mind  that  is  merely  an- 
other way  of  saying  that  the  Balkan  Peninsula  is 
still  in  a  primitive  stage  of  development.  A  close 
examination  into  historical  facts  would  probably 
show  that  the  ethnic  elements  on  the  Balkan  Pen- 
insula are  not  more  diversified  than  those  which 
went  into  the  composition  of  many  a  great  nation 
which  is  now  looked  upon  as  a  racial  and  national 
unit.  The  "diversity  of  races"  on  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  is  not  an  ethnographical,  but  a 
historico-geo graphical  fact.  Whether  the  geo- 
graphical or  the  purely  historical  element  has  con- 
tributed more  to  this  result  is  now  hard  to  tell.  But 
it  may  be  asserted  without  fear  of  contradiction 
that  the  historic  process  of  economic  development 
has  surmounted  greater  heights  than  the  Balkan 
Mountains,  and  that  these  mountain  ranges  can- 
not stand  permanently  in  the  way  of  the  organ- 
ization of  one  Balkan  Nation,  if  the  historico-eco- 
nomical  process  should  favor  the  formation  of 
such  an  entity. 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        137 

For  the  present,  the  Balkan  territory  is  broken 
up  into  a  group  of  struggling,  wriggling  national- 
ities, with  Turkey  in  possession  of  its  southern 
base  and  in  control  of  the  all-important  Bosporus- 
Dardanelles  passage.  This  gives  color  and 
direction  to  the  Balkan  Question.  The  "Question" 
is  two-fold:  On  the  one  hand  it  is  the  question 
of  "How  long  shall  the  Unspeakable  Turk  be  per- 
mitted to  remain  in  Europe?"  And  on  the  other  it 
reads :  "Who  shall  inherit  the  Kingdom  of  Turkey 
in  Europe  when  the  Turk  shall  have  been  driven 
therefrom?"  And  the  latter  question  has  itself  a 
double  aspect.  It  may  mean :  How  shall  the  terri- 
tory of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  be  divided  among 
the  different  "nationalities"  now  inhabiting  it? 
And  it  may  also  mean :  What  outside  Power  shall 
succeed  to  the  political  influence  over  the  Balkans 
which  was  once  the  Turk's? 

Of  the  great  European  Powers  there  are  two 
that  come  into  consideration  directly  in  con- 
nection with  the  last  query:  Russia  and  Austria. 
Both  of  these  Empires  abut  in  territory  on  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  and  they  have  for  a  long  time 
been  in  almost  continual  struggle  for  influence 
therein. 

Russia's  interest  in  the  Balkans  is  plain.  It  is 
part    of    her    March    to  the    Sea.      She    needs 


138  Socialism  and  War 

Constantinople,  and  has  been  trying  to  get  it  for 
more  than  two  centuries.  But  she  couldn't  get 
there  except  by  marching  her  armies  south 
through  the  Peninsula,  expelling  the  Turk  from 
Europe  on  the  way.  Politically  this  has  assumed 
the  form  of  a  policy  of  "liberation"  towards  the 
Balkan  Slavs.  Russia  asserted  a  right  and  duty 
of  protecting  her  "younger  brothers",  the 
Southern  Slavs,  against  oppression  by  other 
nations,  and  of  "liberating"  them  from  the 
"foreign  yoke"  whenever  that  was  deemed 
necessary  by  her  to  save  them  from  oppression. 
And  she  has  "liberated"  the  Balkan  Slavs  to  a 
very  large  extent.  The  existence  of  the  present 
kingdoms  of  Roumania,  Bulgaria,  Servia,  and 
Montenegro,  is  largely  due  to  her  efforts.  But  as 
the  "liberation"  of  the  Slavs  was  merely  a  means 
to  an  end,  and  that  end  —  the  possession 
of  Constantinople  —  has  not  been  achieved,  she 
could  not  rest  on  her  "liberation"  laurels  and  leave 
the  Balkans  to  the  Balkan  nations.  In  fact,  this 
end  made  Russia's  work  of  "liberation"  in  the 
Balkans  of  a  peculiar  kind.  She  wanted  the 
Balkan  Slavs  freed  from  the  Turk,  but  she  did 
not  want  them  united  and  strong.  A  strong 
Balkan  nation  or  federation  of  nations  might 
form  just  as  strong  an  obstacle  to  her  acquisition 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        139 

of  Constantinople  as  the  Turk  himself, — or  even 
a  stronger.  For  Turkey  is  in  a  process  of  decay, 
while  a  united  Balkan  nation  would  be  likely 
to  constantly  grow  in  power. 

In  this  effort  to  keep  the  Balkan  Nations 
weak  and  dependent  on  their  neighbors,  Russia 
had  the  full  sympathy  and  co-operation  of  her 
great  rival  on  the  Peninsula,  Austria-Hungary. 
The  Dual  Empire  has  reached  the  sea;  but  her 
position  on  the  sea  is  a  very  precarious  one.  Her 
two  sea-ports,  Trieste  and  Fiume,  are  both 
practically  Italian  cities,  and  her  loss  of  both  may 
be  only  a  question  of  time.  But  even  with  both 
of  these  ports,  she  considers  her  position  on  the 
sea  unfavorable  so  long  as  she  is  confined  to  the 
upper  corner  of  the  Adriatic,  and  other  powers 
are  in  control  of  the  outlet  from  the  Adriatic  into 
the  Mediterranean.  She  has  therefore  been  cast- 
ing very  longing  glances  upon  the  western  coast 
line  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  as  well  as  upon  the 
northern  coast-line  of  the  Aegean. 

In  addition  to  this,  and  quite  independent  of 
her  appetite  for  additional  coast  line,  Austria  is 
very  anxious  that  the  western  coast  line  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  should  not  fall  to  Servia,  who 
is  very  anxious  to  get  it,  and  to  whom  it  would 
naturally  belong  if  the  Balkan  nations  were  per- 


140  Socialism  and  War 

mitted  to  develop  independently.  As  Servia  is 
situated  to-day,  without  an  outlet  on  the  sea,  she 
is  to  all  intents  and  purposes  an  Austrian  colony, 
being  economically  subject  to  Austria,  through 
whose  territory  alone  her  exports  can  reach  the 
outside  world.  This  is  particularly  unfortunate 
for  Servia,  because  her  exports  come  in  direct 
competition  with  the  exports  of  the  Hungarian 
agrarians,  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  tariff  policy 
is  naturally  shaped  so  as  to  put  her  at  a  dis- 
advantage. The  impulse  to  march  to  the  sea  which 
is  ever-present  in  countries  with  a  capitalistic 
development  is,  therefore,  particularly  keen  in 
Servia  just  now.  But  Austria,  naturally,  does  not 
care  to  lose  such  an  object  of  trade  exploitation 
I  as  Servia  in  her  present  condition  presents  to  her. 
There  are,  also,  purely  political  reasons  why 
Austria  does  not  want  Servia  to  come  into 
possession  of  the  western  coast  line  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula,  or  of  any  part  of  it.  Servia  with  an 
outlet  to  the  sea  means  a  strong  and  prosperous 
Servia.  Such  a  Servia  would  naturally  present  a 
centre  of  attraction  to  the  many  millions  of  Serbs 
dwelling  within  the  Dual  Empire,  and  to  all  the 
other  Slavs  who  are  suffering  under  Magyar  dom- 
ination in  the  Hungarian  part  of  the  Empire.  This 
might  tend  to  break  up  the  entire  Empire.     For 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        141 

the  great  love  which  the  Magyars  now  bear  the 
Dual  Empire  —  in  such  striking  contrast  to  their 
P^  separatist  tendencies  of  two  generations  ago  — 
is  due  entirely  to  the  fact  that  the  Empire  permits 
them  to  keep  their  Slav  population  under 
subjection.  Hence  Austria's  general  policy  of 
keeping  the  Balkan  nations  from  forming  an  in- 
dependent confederation  strong  enough  to  expel 
the  Turk  and  withstand  all  outside  influences. 

The  result  of  this  sympathetic  bond  of  common 
interest  between  Russia  and  Austria  to  keep  the 
Balkan  nations  from  controlling  the  Balkan 
country  has  been  the  seething  caldron  of 
jealousies,  animosities,  and  armed  conflicts  which 
make  up  the  recent  history  of  the  Balkan  Pen- 
insula. Each  of  these  two  powers  has  sought  by 
intrigue  to  accomplish  the  double  purpose  of  keep- 
ing the  Balkan  peoples  disunited,  and  of  increasing 
her  own  influence  at  the  expense  of  the  other,  so 
as  to  be  in  direct  line  of  succession  to  the  Turk, 
when  "The  Sick  Man  of  Europe"  finally  breathes 
his  last. 

Such  was  the  Balkan  situation  when  Germany 
discovered  that  she,  too,  had  an  interest  in  that 
part  of  Europe.  But  here  we  must  pause  a 
little  to  examine  Germany's  situation  generally. 
Germany    occupies    a    very    anomalous  position 


142  Socialism  and  War 

among  the  great  national  states.  The  Germans 
have  not  yet  accomplished  the  task  which  the 
other  great  peoples  of  Europe  have  accomplished 
—  that  of  forming  a  national  state.  The  German 
Empire  is  not  such  a  state.  On  the  one  hand  it 
includes  many  elements  that  are  not  German,  and 
on  the  other  hand  is  does  not  include  many  im- 
portant portions  of  Germany  proper.  Let  me 
illustrate.  If  you  go  to  any  part  of  France  you 
may  be  sure  that  French  is  spoken  there.  The 
,r  -  same  is  true  of  England.  But  not  of  Germany : 
There  are  many  parts  of  Germany  where  the  Ger- 
man language  is  a  foreign  tongue,  and  where  the 
population    must    be    coerced   into  speaking  it 

against  their  will.  Again,  if  you  want  to  look  for 
■ 

the  centre  of  English  culture,  you  will  naturally 

look  to  London,   and   for   the   centre   of  French 

culture  to  Paris.    But  if  you  want  to  look  for  the 

centre  of  German  culture  you  might  look  either 

to  Berlin  or  to  Vienna,  although  the  latter  is  not 

part  of  official  Germany.    And  the  fact  that  there 

may  be  large  centres  of  English  culture  outside  of 

England   proper   —   using    "England"    here    as 

synonymous  with  the  United  Kingdom  —  does 

not  alter  the  situation.     New  York  or  Boston 

might  be  centres  of  English  culture.     But  their 

position  is  utterly  different  from  that  of  Vienna. 


c 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        143 

They  are  offshoots  of  the  old  trunk;  parts  of  a 
colony  in  the  Greek  sense  of  the  word.  A  child 
begotten  of  the  mother-country,  but  big  enough 
to  lead  an  independent  existence,  and  actually 
leading  an  independent  existence  notwithstand- 
ing sameness  of  language  and  affinity  of  culture. 
Not  so  with  Vienna.  It  is  not  an  offshot  of  Ger- 
many. It  is  not  part  of  a  German  country  at  all. 
It  is  the  capital  of  an  Empire  mostly  Slav  and 
predominantly  non-German.  This  incongruity 
of  Vienna  being  non-German  is  enhanced  by  the 
fact  that  it  is  nothing  else.  It  is  not  "Austrian" 
in  the  national  sense  —  as  Boston  is  American, 
for  instance,  notwithstanding  its  English  speech 
—  because  there  is  no  such  nationality,  Austria 
being  merely  a  politico-geographical  designation. 
The  truth  is  that  from  a  national  point  of  view 
Germany  is  not  yet. 

The  same  is  true  of  Germany  when  viewed  from 
an  economic  point  of  view.  It  is  true  that  Ger- 
many has  reached  the  sea.  But  it  has  reached 
it  only  partly.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show 
that  from  any  national-economic  point  of  view 
Holland  belongs  with  Germany,  and  the  Dutch 
sea-coast  is  the  natural  western  boundary  of  the 
German  Empire;  and  the  same  is  true  to  some 
extent  at  least  of  Belgium. 


144  Socialism  and  War 

Germany  is,  therefore,  still  in  the  first  warlike 
period  of  capitalism,  —  the  formative  period,  the 
period  when  great  national  states  are  forming  by 
absorbing  all  kindred  groups  and  marching  to  the 
sea.  As  such  it  should  be  Germany's  natural  and 
legitimate  ambition  to  include  German-Austria 
within  her  boundaries;  and  it  may  be  equally 
natural  for  her,  though  not  as  legitimate,  to 
desire  to  absorb  Holland  too  and  part  of  Belgium, 
and  to  make  them  part  of  the  German  Empire. 
And  there  is  no  doubt  that  until  recently  such 
was  the  ambition  of  all  good  German  patriots. 

A  united  Germany  was  the  ideal,  also,  of  all 
revolutionary  and  radical  Germans.  It  is  well- 
known  that  the  best  men  in  Germany  con- 
sidered Bismarck's  policy,  which  excluded  Ger- 
man-Austria from  the  German  Empire,  little 
short  of  criminal;  and  they  fervently  hoped 
for  the  day  when  this  crime  would  be  atoned  for 
by  the  organization  of  a  German  Republic  which 
should  include  all  German  lands.  Those  who  had 
an  eye  more  to  the  economic  than  the  cultural 
questions  involved,  undoubtedly  hoped  that  Hol- 
land, which  is  racially  near  kin  to  the  people  of 
Germany,  would  be  glad  to  come  in  of  her  own 
free  will  in  such  an  efficient  and  highly  cultural 
state  as  a  United  German  Republic  would  un- 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        145 

doubtedly  be.  The  organization  of  such  a  state 
pre-supposes,  of  course,  the  break-up  of  the 
j*  Austrian  Empire.  But  what  good  German  cared 
for  the  existence  of  that  Empire, — that  "political 
monstrosity",  that  crazy-quilt  of  a  state,  the 
creation  of  outworn  political  ideas,  political  in- 
l_  trigue,  and  the  political  crimes  of  a  by-gone  age? 
Then  came  the  new  spirit, — the  spirit  of  the  Era 
of  Imperialism,  and  all  this  changed.  The  dream 
of  a  United  Germany  was  forgotten  before  it  was 
realized.  And  Germans  suddenly  discovered  that 
they  had  a  vital  interest  in  the  continued  existence 
of  the  Austrian  Empire  which  makes  a  United 
Germany  impossible.  As  is  frequently  the  case 
with  countries  which  came  late  into  the  whirlpool 
of  capitalistic  development,  Germany's  economic 
development  during  the  last  half-century  or  so 
has  been  proceeding  hot-house  fashion.  With  the 
result  that  the  different  periods  of  capitalist 
development  —  which  in  older  countries  have 
lasted  through  many  generations,  and  therefore 
have  had  a  chance  fully  to  develop  their  special 
characteristics  —  here  crowd  one  another,  so  that 
these  characteristics  become  blurred  and  obli- 
terated or  do  not  develop  at  all.  So  the  textile- 
peace  period  has  been  "skipped"  by  Germany,  and 
she  walked  into  the  Imperialistic  era  before  she 


146  Socialism  and  War 

was  out  of  the  first,  the  formative,  warlike  era 
of  Capitalism.  And  the  place  of  honor  which 
United  Germany  for  a  while  occupied  in  German 
political  thought  is  now  occupied  by  Pan- 
Germanism. 

Pan-Germanism  is  the  political  expression  of 
Germany's  economic  aspirations.  And  here  it  is 
well  to  note  that  the  expression  is  somewhat  mis- 
leading. It  does  not  mean  what  its  etymology 
would  indicate.  It  does  not  mean  a  union  of  all 
German  peoples.  And  it  is,  therefore,  entirely 
different  from  Pan-Slavism,  for  instance,  which 
means  the  union  of  all  Slav  peoples.  As  an  ab- 
stract proposition  it  is  merely  another  expression 
for  the  sentiment  Deutschland  liber  alles  —  Ger- 
many (should  be  put)  above  every  other  country. 
It  is  the  dream  of  world-empire,  with  the  old 
Roman  Empire  as  a  model.  A  world-empire 
presided  over  and  ruled  by  Germany,  with  the 
assistance  of  its  legions,  as  Rome  ruled  her 
dominions.  It  is  for  this  hideous  dream  of  a  mili- 
tary world-empire  that  Germans  have  given  up 
their  cherished  hope  of  a  United  Germany.  It  is 
for  this  that  they  are  willing  to  let  some  fifteen 
millions  of  Germans  and  the  oldest  center  of 
German  culture  remain  outside  of  Germany.  For 


i* 


j, 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        147 

such  are  the  dictates  of  Pan-Germanism  when 
translated  into  practice. 

As  a  practical  proposition,  Pan-Germanism  — 
in  so  far  at  least  as  it  has  assumed  definite  prac- 
tical forms  as  a  political  project  —  means  the 
creation  of  a  world-empire  the  main  element  of 
which  shall  be  a  continuous  body  of  territory  con- 
taining the  principal  parts  of  the  mainland  of 
Europe  and  Asia  and  stretching  from  ocean  to 
ocean.  Roughly  outlined  this  body  of  territory 
would  begin  at  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  having  the 
coast  line  from  the  Strait  of  Dover  to  the  Scan- 
dinavian mainland  as  its  Northwestern  boundary ; 
it  would  then  run  in  a  general  Southeasterly 
direction,  and  include  Belgium  and  Holland,  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary,  the  Balkans,  Asia 
Minor,  Mesopotamia,  and  India,  reaching  the 
Pacific  at  the  Indian  Ocean,  which  would  form  its 
Southeasterly  boundary.  Of  course,  there  would 
be  trimmings  and  outlets  on  all  sides  and  in  all 
directions  as  befits  such  a  giant  body.  But 
above  all,  in  order  to  insure  its  being  an  economic 
entity  as  well  as  a  political  one,  it  would  be  welded 
together  with  an  iron  ring  of  railroad  lines  run- 
ning through  its  entire  length  and  having  the 
necessary  ramifications. 

Of  course,   this   requires   considerable   recon- 


148  Socialism  and  War 

struction  of  the  present  map  of  the  world.  It 
requires  the  snuffing  out  of  the  breath  of  life  of 
some  independent  states,  whose  people  may  be 
stupid  enough  to  prefer  independent  existence  in 
a  ridiculously  small  way  to  being  part  and  parcel 
of  such  a  wonderful  world-empire.  But  no  matter : 
we  have  our  professors  to  explain  to  them  the 
superior  beauties  of  German  Culture,  and  we  have 
our  bayonets  to  enforce  their  arguments  in  a  most 
convincing  manner.  On  the  other  hand,  we  shall 
have  to  keep  alive,  for  a  time  at  least,  some  mori- 
bund political  bodies  by  artificial  stimulants.  In 
this,  too,  our  great  scientists  and  our  great  army — 
the  most  wonderful  military  machine  the  world 
has  ever  seen  —  will  undoubtedly  succeed. 

That  we  have  a  right  to  do  all  this  goes  without 
saying.  The  very  fact  that  we  have  the  power  to 
do  it  shows  that  we  have  the  right  to  do  it.  In 
fact,  we  are  bidden  by  our  Destiny  to  do  it.  For 
we  must  have  it  done.  Otherwise,  we  shall  fail  in 
our  mission  of  making  Germany  dominate  the 
world,  and  having  German  Culture  obliterate  and 
take  the  place  of  every  other  form  of  civilization. 

Antwerp  and  Rotterdam  are  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  the  scheme.  Germany  wants  its  "natural" 
ocean  front,  which  includes  the  Belgian  and  Dutch 
coast  lines,  as  a  glance  at  the  map  will  show.    As 


r- 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        149 

it  is,  these  two  little  countries  levy  toll  on  German 
commerce.  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam  have  grown 
immensely  rich  because  of  it.  There  are  probably 
no  two  other  cities  in  the  world,  certainly  not  in 
Europe,  which  have  grown  so  rich  in  so  short  a 
time  as  have  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp  in  the  past 
fifty  years.  But  it  is  the  German  hinterland  that 
has  made  them  grow  so  fast.  Between  them  these 
two  cities  control  the  avenues  which  lead  from  the 
Rhineland  and  South  Germany  to  the  ocean  and 
into  the  wide  world.  It  is  the  height  of  absurdity 
that  a  great  empire  like  the  present  Germany 
should  permit  the  mouth  of  its  "national  river", 
the  river  which  not  only  bears  a  large  portion  of 
its  commerce,  but  most  of  its  legends  and  tradi- 
tions, to  be  controlled  by  a  handful  of  recalcitrant 
Germans  who  imagine  themselves  to  be  a  separate 
nation  and  refuse  to  come  into  the  Empire  out  of 
stupidity  or  greed.  With  this  empire  turned  into 
a  world-empire  this  anomalous  situation,  then  ab- 
solutely unbearable,  will  simply    have  to  cease. 

The  Balkans,  too,  are  indispensable  to  this 
scheme.  The  great  strategic  and  commercial 
importance  of  the  Bosporus-Dardanelles  has  al- 
ready been  explained.  Its  importance  is  decisive 
in  this  world-empire  scheme,  whose  chief  econo- 
mic weapon  is  to  be  the  creation  of  the  fastest 


150  Socialism  and  War 

route  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  tapping  the 
richest  Asiatic  countries  on  the  way.  The  Bal- 
kan Peninsula — through  which  the  road  which  is 
to  span  the  Bosporus  must  run — is  peopled  mostly 
by  Slavs.  Hence  the  necessity  of  keeping  alive  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  which  forms  the 
political  connecting  link  between  the  German  Em- 
pire and  the  Slavs  of  Southeastern  Europe. 
Hence,  also,  the  necessity  of  supporting  Austria 
in  her  Balkan  policy,  which  includes  two  points 
essential  to  the  success  of  the  Pan-Germanistic 
scheme:  Keep  Russia  from  Constantinople,  and 
keep  the  Slavic  principalities  on  the  peninsula 
weak  enough  so  that  they  can  not  offer  any  re- 
sistance to  the  German-Austrian  plans.  Austria 
is  simply  Germany's  outpost,  —  the  political 
means  by  which  the  German  Race  is  to  control  the 
Southeastern  Slavs. 

With  the  Balkans  dominated  by  Austria,  there 
is  practically  no  further  obstacle  to  the  carrying 
out  of  the  great  scheme  of  Pan-Germanism.  It  is 
true  that  Turkey  is  still  in  possesion  of  Constant- 
inople, and  of  Asia  Minor  and  Mesopotamia.  But 
"The  Sick  Man  of  Europe"  has  long  ago  been  con- 
vinced that  unless  he  casts  his  lot  with  Germany 
his  lease  of  life  is  likely  to  be  cut  very  short. 
There  is,  therefore,  very  little  difficulty  to  be  ap- 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        151 

prehended  from  Turkey, — if  the  Sultan  and  his 
advisers  were  permitted  to  follow  their  own  in- 
clinations. Unfortunately,  the  Sultan  is  not  mas- 
ter of  his  own  destinies.  He  is  not  strong  enough 
to  stand  on  his  own  legs.  And  the  question  is: 
Will  the  other  powers,  particularly  England, 
stand  by  and  permit  this  great  scheme  to  be  car- 
ried out  without  a  fight? 

The  realization  of  this  scheme  would  change  the 
commercial  routes  of  the  world ;  it  would  probably 
destroy  England's  carrier-trade  by  sea  and  de- 
prive her  of  India.  Incidentally,  it  would  make 
England  contribute  to  the  expense  of  building 
those  very  railways  whose  chief  object  is  to  put 
her  out  of  business.  England  must,  therefore, 
fight.  And  the  great  problem,  from  the  Pan- 
German  point  of  view,  is  to  make  her  fight  under 
circumstances  that  will  insure  her  defeat. 

This  can  be  accomplished  by  isolating  her.  A- 
lone  she  would,  of  course,  be  no  match  for  the 
Austro-German-Turkish  combination.  But  these 
very  schemes  compel  England  to  abandon  her  tra- 
tional  policy  of  "splendid  isolation",  and  join 
hands  with  her  traditional  enemy  across  the  chan- 
nel, and  even  with  her  great  rival  in  Asia,  the 
Russian  Bear.  Politics  make  strange  bedfellows  : 
this  applies  particularly  to  world-politics.    Eng- 


152  Socialism  and  War 

land  and  France  have  never  been  known  to  be 
great  friends.  The  Hundred  Years'  War  is,  of 
course,  a  matter  of  ancient  history.  The  wars  of 
the  Age  of  Louis  XIV  and  the  Seven  Years'  War 
which  culimated  in  the  cession  of  France's  Amer- 
ican possesions  to  England,  may,  perhaps,  also  be 
considered  too  ancient  to  be  a  living  influence. 
But  the  Napoleonic  wars  are  of  comparatively 
recent  date,  and  the  Fashoda  incident  happened 
but  yesterday.  English  and  Russian  rivalry  in 
Asia  is  not  only  century-old,  but  has  been  con- 
tinuous and  persistent.  England  has  been  chiefly 
responsible  for  the  thwarting  of  Russia's  designs 
on  Constantinople.  To-day  England  is  united  with 
France  and  Russia  in  the  so-called  Entente  Cor- 
diale,  and  the  ancient  enemies  are  fighting 
shoulder  to  shoulder  one  of  the  greatest  fights 
that  the  world  has  ever  witnessed. 

I  have  already  intimated  that  England  was 
forced  out  of  her  "splendid  isolation"  and  into  the 
Entente  Cordiale  by  the  schemes  of  Pan-German- 
ism which  threaten  her  present  position  as  an  in- 
dustrial and  commercial  nation.  I  may  add  here 
that  the  beginnings  of  the  Entente  Cordiale  can 
be  traced  directly  to  the  first  practical  step  in  the 
realization,  or  attempted  realization,  of  the  Pan- 
Germanistic  dream  —  the  Bagdad  Railway.    The 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        153 

Bagdad  Railway  was,  in  my  opinion,  such  an  im- 
portant factor  in  bringing  about  this  war,  and 
its  history  illustrates  so  well  what  I  have  said 
about  the  economic  causes  of  modern  imperialism, 
that  I  think  it  worth  while  to  give  it  a  few 
moments  of  our  time,  so  as  to  examine  it  in  outline 
at  least. 

Some  time  in  the  eighties  of  the  last  century, 
about  the  time  when  Germany  started  her  imperi- 
alistic carreer,  a  group  of  German  capitalists  and 
promoters  obtained  from  the  Sultan  a  concession 
to  build  a  railroad  which  was  to  extend,  ultimately, 
from  Constantinople,  through  Asia  Minor  and 
Mesopotamia,  to  Bagdad,  and  from  there  to  the 
Persian  Gulf.  Building  on  some  sections  of  this 
territory  began  not  long  afterwards;  but  very 
little  progress  was  made  until  well  into  this  cen- 
tury, owing  to  difficulties  of  a  financial  as  well  as 
of  a  political  nature. 

When  the  project  was  first  given  to  the  world  it 
was  hailed  as  one  of  the  greatest  cultural  under- 
takings as  well  as  one  of  the  most  promising  from 
an  economic  point  of  view.  This  railroad  would 
not  only  connect  the  Mediterranean  with  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  the  Pacific,  but  would  traverse 
regions  which  were  at  one  time  the  seats 
of    the    highest    civilizations    of    their    day, — 


154  Socialism  and  War 

regions  whose  natural  capacity  to  support 
a  busy  and  thriving  population  has  already  been 
demonstrated.  Some  of  the  territory  was  at  one 
time  accounted  among  the  most  fruitful  in  the 
world.  It  was  in  Mesopotamia,  now  to  be  tapped 
by  this  railroad,  that  the  Biblical  paradise  was 
located,  according  to  tradition.  It  is  true  that 
large  portions  of  this  territory  have  since  turned 
waste.  But  with  the  new  culture  that  the  rail- 
road was  to  bring  into  this  part  of  the  world,  its 
fruitfullness  and  great  economic  value  would  re- 
turn,— that  is,  after  a  time  and  after  the  expen- 
diture of  some  capital  for  irrigation  works  and 
similar  permanent  improvements. 

Nevertheless,  the  problem  of  building  the  rail- 
road was  not  a  simple  one,  even  from  the  purely 
financial  point  of  view.  You  certainly  cannot  lure 
capital  into  a  railway  enterprise  by  the  prospect 
of  "redeeming"  Nineveh  and  Babylon.  Nor  can 
you  get  the  necessary  capital  for  such  an  enter- 
prise when  the  prospect  of  large  dividends  which 
are  to  accompany  the  redeeming  of  old  cultures, 
or  the  propagation  of  new  ones,  is  too  distant  to  be 
comfortable.      Capital    is    proverbially    "timid". 

So  that,  notwithstanding  the  great  economic 
prospects  of  this  railroad  —  perhaps  the  finest  of 
their  kind  in  the  world  —  "capital"  wouldn't 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        155 

bite.  That  is  to  say,  on  the  strength  of  the 
"prospects"  alone.  But  capital,  or  at  least 
capitalists  were  very  anxious  to  bite,  if  the  road 
was  to  be  built  on  the  terms  which  I  have 
mentioned  in  a  preceding  lecture  as  the  proper 
terms  for  railroad  building  of  the  "redeeming" 
and  "civilizing"  kind.  The  German  Government, 
therefore,  bestirred  itself  on  behalf  of  its  culture- 
bearing  railroad-builders,  with  the  result  that  the 
Turkish  Government  agreed  to  subsidize  the  enter- 
prise to  such  an  extent  that,  as  far  as  the  German 
capitalists  were  concerned,  the  fruitfulness  of  the 
country  and  profitableness  of  the  enterprise  were 
to  become  immediate  and  assured. 

But  that  was  not  the  end  of  the  matter.  "The 
Sick  Man  of  Europe"  is  not  exactly  his  own 
master.  His  health  is  under  the  supervision  of  a 
committee  of  doctors  known  as  the  Great  Powers. 
Turkey  is  so  heavily  indebted  to  foreign  capital- 
ists that  her  revenues  were  many  years  ago 
placed  under  the  supervision  of  an  international 
commission  representing  the  great  European 
Powers,  who  see  to  it  that  no  part  of  these 
revenues  are  applied  to  other  purposes  than 
those  agreed  upon, — current  expenses  and  the 
payment  of  interest.  The  duties  which  Turkey 
can  levy   on   imports   is   prescribed   for   her   by 


156  Socialism  and  War 

the  same  Great  Powers,  and  she  has  no  right  to 
increase  her  revenues  by  increasing  these  duties, 
without  their  consent.  And  as  an  increase  of 
duties  on  imports  was  practically  the  only  source 
out  of  which  Turkey  could  pay  the  subsidy  to  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  the  financing  of  that  railway 
became  largely  a  matter  of  international  politics. 
The  increase  of  duties  on  imports  in  order  to 
provide  a  subsidy  for  the  Bagdad  Railway  was 
manifestly  to  the  disadvantage  of  those  powers 
who  were  not  directly  interested  in  that  enter- 
prise :  their  merchants  who  exported  to  Turkey 
would  actually  be  bearing  the  cost  of  the  building 
of  that  railway,  the  profits  of  which  would  be 
reaped  by  the  German  entrepreneurs.  And  as 
England  was  doing  the  largest  export  business  to 
Turkey,  England  vetoed  the  plan  of  paying  the 
subsidy  out  of  increased  import  duties,  and  there- 
by endangered  the  entire  enterprise. 

But  this  was  not  the  only  source  of  difficulty. 
At  first  Russia  and  then  England  had  other 
objections  to  the  Bagdad  Railway  scheme,  besides 
the  purely  financial  ones  just  mentioned.  Russia's 
objections  were  mostly  of  a  military-strategic 
nature,  and  they  were  obviated  by  shifting  some- 
what the  line  of  the  road.  England  was  at  first 
rather  favorable  to  the  plan,  and  even  helped  the 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War       157 

German  concessionaires  at  the  initial  stages  of 
the  enterprise  with  her  influence  at  the  Porte, 
which  was  then  very  strong.  This  was  at  the 
time  when  England  was  still  dreaming  pacific 
dreams,  and  was  making  Germany  gifts  of  such 
strategic  positions  as  Heligoland.  But  by  the  time 
the  project  began  to  be  realized  and  assume  its 
true  proportions,  England  was  herself  in  the 
throes  of  Imperialism,  and  she  assumed  an 
attitude  of  unalterable  hostility. 

This  hostility  led  to  what  is  known  as  the 
"Koweit  Incident".  As  I  have  already  stated,  the 
Bagdad  Railway  was  not  to  stop  at  Bagdad,  but 
was  to  run  on  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Its  terminus 
on  the  Gulf  was  to  be  Koweit,  the  very  best,  if  not 
the  only  possible  terminus  for  such  a  railroad. 
The  principal  objection  to  the  entire  scheme,  from 
the  English  point  of  view,  was  this  very  feature, 
—  its  terminating  on  the  Gulf,  which  also  made 
it  so  important  from  the  Pan-Germanistic  point 
of  view.  England  was  therefore  resolved  to  pre- 
vent this  at  all  costs.  And  she  did, — for  the 
time  being  at  least.  When  it  became  evident  that 
Germany  was  reaping  great  "diplomatic"  victories 
at  Stamboul,  and  that  the  Sultan  was  irrevocably 
committed  to  Germany's  plans,  England  dis- 
covered that  Turkey's  title  to  suzerainty  over  the 


158  Socialism  and  War 

Province  of  Koweit  was  of  doubtful  character, 
and  that  her  interests  demanded  that  she  take  a 
hand  in  the  quarrels  of  some  native  chieftains 
with  a  view  to  eliminating  the  Sultan  from  the 
situation.  One  fine  morning  an  English  man-of- 
war  appeared  in  the  harbor  of  Koweit,  and  Koweit 
was  declared  an  independent  principality,  care 
being  taken  that  its  "independent"  ruler  should 
look  upon  the  Bagdad  Railway  scheme  from  the 
English  point  of  view. 

The  Koweit  incident  stopped  the  progress  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway.  Work  continued  on  different 
sections  of  the  road,  but  it  was  quite  apparent 
that  the  original  scheme,  with  those  features  of  it 
which  were  so  important  from  the  "world-politics" 
point  of  view,  would  have  to  be  abandoned,  unless 
Germany  could  score  some  more  "diplomatic" 
victories  and  compel  England  to  abandon  her 
opposition.  But  after  many  vicissitudes  German 
diplomacy  was  decisively  defeated  by  the  rap- 
prochement between  France  and  England,  and  the 
"Entente  Cordiale"  which  followed  it.  This  defeat 
was  formally  acknowledged  by  Germany  in  the 
agreement  made  in  1911, — the  year,  it  will  be 
recalled,  of  the  Agadir  Incident,  in  which  Ger- 
many's diplomacy  suffered  another  signal  defeat 
at  the  hands  of  the  "Entente  Cordiale".    By  that 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        159 

agreement  Germany  practically  gave  up  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  end  of  the  enterprise,  in  return  for 
England's  formal  approval  of  the  remainder 
of  the  plan.  This  makes  the  road  end  nowhere, 
and  robs  it  of  its  great  importance  as  a  part  of 
the  "Ocean  to  Ocean"  world-empire  scheme. 

In  the  meantime  history  was  being  made  on 
another  part  of  the  great  field  of  operations  en- 
compassed in  the  Pan-Germanistic  scheme. 

As  we  have  already  seen  the  Balkans  form  an 
indispensable  link  in  the  same  scheme  of  Pan-Ger- 
manism, of  which  the  Bagdad  Railway  is  so  im- 
portant a  factor.  And  this  railway  itself  loses  its 
entire  importance,  as  a  part  of  the  Pan-German- 
istic scheme,  if  it  cannot  be  joined  to  a  trans-con- 
tinental European  railway  under  the  complete 
domination  of  Germany.  Such  a  railway  must, 
of  course,  run  through  the  Balkan  peninsula.  The 
fight  for  the  Bagdad  Railway  was  therefore 
carried  on  simultaneously  on  both  sides  of  the 
Bosporus.  And  it  was  the  fight  on  the  European 
side  that  first  led  to  a  resort  to  arms,  and  led 
directly  to  the  present  war.     It  may  be   said 

r  truthfully  that  the  present  war  was  declared  not 
on  August  1st,  1914,  but  on  October  7th,  1908, 
when  Austria  announced  that  she  had  annexed 


160  Socialism  and  War 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  two  Balkan  provinces 
populated  mainly  by  Serbs. 
»-—  In  1878,  after  the  Russo-Turkish  War  which 
led  to  a  re-arrangement  of  Balkan  affairs,  these 
two  provinces,  which  formed  part  of  Turkey  in 
Europe,  were  placed  under  Austrian  adminis- 
tration, although  they  nominally  remained  Turk- 
ish dependencies.  These  two  provinces,  together 
with  the  little  patch  of  land  known  as  the  Sanjak 
of  Novibazar,  immediately  adjoining  these  pro- 
vinces to  the  south,  and  similarly  placed  under 
Austrian  control  in  1878,  formed  the  chief  and  im- 
mediate bone  of  contention  between  Austria  and 
Servia;  a  contention  which  received  world-wide 
importance  through  the  Pan-Germanistic  scheme. 
We  shall,  therefore,  consider  these  Provinces  from 
their  local  as  well  as  their  general  aspects,  so  that 
we  may  form  an  opinion  of  their  role  in  the 
specifically  Balkan  complications  as  well  as  in  the 
war  which  is  now  waging. 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  have  a  population  of 
nearly  two  millions,  mainly  of  Servian  stock.  The 
Sanjak  of  Novibazar  has  a  population  of  less  than 
two  hundred  thousand,  about  three-fourths  of 
which  is  Serb.  The  first  two  provinces  are  im- 
portant in  themselves,  at  least  from  the  Servian 
point  of  view,  as  an  addition  to  the  present  King- 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        161 

dom  of  Servia  of  the  territory  of  these  two  pro- 
vinces with  nearly  two  million  population  would 
mean  a  great  increase  of  its  power.  The  im- 
portance of  Novibazar  is  chiefly  strategic.  And 
the  three  together  possess  particularly  great  value 
from  the  Pan-Germanistic  point  of  view. 

The  Sanjak  of  Novibazar  is  a  small,  and  in  it- 
self unimportant  territory.  Its  importance  lay 
in  the  fact  that  it  was  shoved  in  like  a  wedge 
between  Servia  and  Montenegro.  It  separated 
these  two  racially  related  Kingdoms,  and  kept  the 
more  important  of  them,  Servia,  from  the  sea- 
coast  which  it  would  get  by  a  union  of  the  two. 
On  the  other  hand  it  connected  the  Ausro-Hun- 
garian  Empire,  through  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  to 
the  North  of  it,  with  the  Turkish  Empire  to  the 
South.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  lie  immediately 
to  the  north  of  Novibazar,  bounded  by  Austria- 
Hungary,  Servia,  and  Montenegro,  except  at  the 
point  where  the  Sanjak  separated  these  two  King- 
doms, where  it  formed  the  boundary  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 

From  the  local,  or  Austro-Servian  point  of  view, 
the  importance  of  these  territories  lay  in  this: 
The  possession  of  the  Sanjak  of  Novibazar  by 
Servia  would  permit  the  union  of  Servia  and  Mon- 
tenegro,   uniting    their    divided    strength    and 


162  Socialism  and  War 

presenting  a  solid  front  against  Austria  in  case 
of  trouble.  The  possession  by  Servia  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  would  mean  an  enormous  accession 
of  power  for  Servia,  besides  tending  to  unite 
Servia  with  Montenegro,  and  the  creation  of  a 
great  Slavic  centre  immediately  to  the  South  of 
the  Dual  Empire,  a  centre  to  which  the  Slavs  of 
that  Empire,  and  particularly  the  Servians,  of 
whom  there  are  many  in  that  Empire,  would 
naturally  gravitate.  But  most  important  of  all, — 
the  possession  of  either  Bosnia-Herzegovina  or  the 
Sanjak  of  Novibazar  by  Servia  or  Servia-Mon- 
tenegro  would  form  an  impassible  barrier  be- 
tween Austria-Hungary  and  the  lower  Balkans. 
That  is,  it  would  exclude  the  Dual  Monarchy  from 
participation  in  the  division  of  the  Turkish 
Dominions  in  Europe  when  the  time  came  for 
such  division,  thereby  forever  checking  her 
designs  on  the  lower  Adriatic  and  the  Aegean 
Sea. 

From  the  larger,  Pan-Germanistic  point  of  view, 
the  possession  by  Servia  or  Servia-Montenegro  of 
either  Bosnia-Herzegovina  or  Novibazar  would 
stop  the  march  of  the  German  Empire  southward 
to  the  Bosporus,  and  would  break  the  great  Ger- 
man chain  which  is  to  unite  the  Atlantic  with  the 
Pacific  in  one  world-empire. 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        163 

In  1908  Germany  and  Austria  thought  the  time 
opportune  to  check  Servia's  ambitions  and  to 
approach  the  final  realization  of  the  Balkan 
end  of  the  World-empire  scheme  (and,  incident- 
ally, of  the  Bagdad  Railway  project) ,  by  formally 
annexing  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The  time  was 
deemed  opportune  because  Russia,  who  had  been 
weakened  by  the  Japanese  War,  was  too  weak  to 
offer  any  opposition  alone,  and  France,  her  only 
ally,  had  neither  sufficient  power  nor  sufficient  in- 
terest in  the  subject-matter  of  the  quarrel  to  risk 
a  war  with  Germany.  In  order  to  further  weaken 
Russia,  and  prevent  any  union  of  the  Balkan 
nations  in  opposition  to  the  grab,  Bulgaria  was 
won  over  to  the  plan,  her  remuneration  being 
complete  independence  from  Turkey,  who  up  to 
then  had  a  formal  suzerainty  over  the  principality. 
And  so,  on  October  7,  1908,  the  simultaneous 
announcements  were  made,  by  Austria,  that  she 
had  annexed  Bosnia-Herzegovina;  and  by  Bul- 
garia, that  she  no  longer  recognized  the  Sultan's 
overlordship,  and  that  Prince  Ferdinand  had 
assumed  the  title  of  Czar  of  Bulgaria. 

The  coup  succeeded.  Nobody  dared  do  anything 
in  opposition  to  the  German-Austrian  schemes, 
and  they  seemed  on  the  way  towards  complete 
realization.    But  there  followed  unlooked  for  con- 


164  Socialism  and  War 

sequences:  The  Dual  Alliance  between  Russia 
and  France  became  the  Triple  Entente,  with 
England  as  the  third  member;  the  two  Balkan 
Wars — the  second  practically  the  direct  result 
of  Austrian  intervention,  carrying  out  the  policy 
which  indicated  the  annexation — with  the  defeat 
of  Bulgaria  by  Servia ;  followed  by  a  strong  Serb 
national  movement  culminating  in  the  Serajevo 
shooting. 

Some  of  these  events  were  not  only  unlooked 
for,  but  almost  unbelievable.  That  England 
should  abandon  her  century-old  policy  of  oppo- 
sition to  Russia  was  amazing.  That  Servia  should 
defeat  Bulgaria  was  contrary  to  the  best  military 
opinion. 

The  net  result  of  these  events  was  a  distinct 
weakening  of  the  international  position  of  the 
Austro-German  combination,  particularly  with 
respect  to  its  Balkan  Peninsula-Bagdad  Rail- 
way interests;  at  least  as  viewed  from  the  Pan- 
German  view-point.  We  have  already  mentioned 
the  fact  that  in  1911  Germany  was  compelled  to 
accept  defeat  and  abandon  the  Bagdad-Persian 
Gulf  extension  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  in  so  far 
as  its  political  control  was  concerned.  The  same 
year  saw  the  German  diplomatic  defeat  in 
Morocco,    following    the  Agadir  Incident.    The 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        165 

situation  on  the  Balkan  peninsula  after  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Second  Balkan  War  was  anything 
but  satisfactory.  It  is  true  that  the  German 
powers  had  succeeded  in  arresting  Servia's  march 
to  the  sea  by  the  creation  of  the  Albanian  King- 
dom. But  the  new  Kingdom  was  evidently  still- 
born and  destined  to  fall  a  prey  to  Servia  or  a 
Serbo-Greek  combination.  Turkey  was  eliminated 
from  the  Balkan  situation,  except  at  the  Bosporus- 
Dardanelles  Strait.  But  most  important  of  all, 
the  Vienna-Constantinople-Bagdad  chain  was 
broken.  Unless,  therefore,  Servia  was  reduced  to 
an  Austrian  dependency,  she  would  interpose  an 
insurmountable  barrier  to  the  ambitions  of 
Austria,  and  the  abandonment  of  the  entire 
scheme  of  Pan-Germanism  seemed  only  a  matter 
of  time. 

Something  had  to  be  done,  and  done  at  once: 
Before  Servia  gathered  sufficient  strength  to  fight 
her  way  to  the  sea.  Before  Russia  completed  the 
reorganization  of  her  military  forces,  in  which  she 
was  busily  engaged.  Before  the  influence  of  the 
Triple  Entente,  which  was  evidently  growing,  had 
grown  much  further,  and  had  broken  the  awe  in 
which  Germany's  power  was  held.  While  the 
Triple  Alliance,  whose  bonds  were  perceptibly 
loosening,  owing  to  the  acuteness  of  the  Balkan 


166  Socialism  and  War 

situation  in  which  the  interests  of  Austria  and 
Italy  were  irreconcilable,  had  not  yet  completely 
broken  down.  While  Turkey — now  completely 
under  the  thumb  of  Germany,  but  whose  actions 
could  not  be  foretold  a  few  years  in  advance — still 
remained  dependable.  It  was  evident  that  if  Pan- 
Germanism  was  to  be  realized  it  had  to  be  fought 
for  with  arms, — as  diplomacy  had  completely 
failed.  And  it  was  equally  evident  that  if  it  was 
to  be  fought  for,  the  sooner  the  better.  Germany 
had  failed  diplomatically,  but  as  an  armed  force 
she  was  at  the  height  of  her  power,  while  her 
opponents  were  unready  and  as  yet  disorganized. 
At  this  juncture  came  the  Serajevo  shooting. 
This  made  the  crisis  inevitable.  Again  speaking 
from  the  Pan-Germanist  point  of  view:  On  the 
one  hand,  it  furnished  an  excuse  for  war  that 
could  perhaps  never  be  duplicated.  And  on  the 
other,  a  failure  to  act  now  would  be  such  a  diplo- 
matic defeat  as  would  make  all  future  attempts 
to  gain  anything  in  that  way  impossible,  and 
would  compel  the  definite  abandonment  of  all 
thoughts  of  world-dominion  for  a  considerable 
time  to  come  at  least,  if  not  forever.  It  meant  the 
abandonment  of  the  attempt  to  dominate  the  Bal- 
kans by  means  of  Austria,  and  with  it  the  beauti- 
ful vision  of  a  German  world-empire,  with  the 


k 


The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War        167 

unlimited  possibilities  of  railroad  building  in  the 
Balkans,  Asia  Minor,  Mesopotamia,  Arabia,  India ; 
not  to  mention  the  deflection  of  the  principle  trade 
route  to  the  East  from  the  Suez  Canal  and  into 
German-controlled  territory,  thus  driving  Eng- 
land out  of  the  world's  carrying  trade. 

So  the  blow  was  struck.  In  the  interest  of 
German  railroad  building,  ship  building,  and  of 
the  export  of  German  capital  generally  for  the 
permanent  improvement  of  "unimproved" 
countries;  under  the  stimulus  of  an  enormous 
production  of  iron  and  steel,  but  in  the  name  of 
German  Culture  and  of  Germany's  Destiny.  And 
the  blow  was  struck  back  in  the  name  of  liberty 
and  independence,  but  really  to  protect  the  great 
material  interests  which  the  different  nations  have 
at  stake.  England  and  France  have  their  own 
railroad  and  ship-builders  to  protect,  their  own 
iron  and  steel  to  sell ;  and  these  would  be  in  grave 
danger  if  Germany  were  permitted  to  carry  out 
her  world-empire  schemes.  And  not  only  would 
these  particular  interests  suffer,  but  owing  to  the 
development  of  modern  production  and  in  the 
inter-industrial  distribution  already  mentioned, 
their  entire  economic  life  might  be  endangered  if 
the  development  of  these  industries  were  arti- 
ficially interfered  with.  Russia  and  Servia,  on  the 


168  Socialism  and  War 

other  hand,  are  seeking  the  extension  of  their 
territory  in  an  effort  to  reach  the  sea,  which  is  an 
imperative  law  of  capitalistic  development  en- 
joined upon  all  countries  which  desire  to  develop 
an  absolutely  independent  capitalistic  economy. 
Belgium  wants  to  keep  for  her  own  capitalists  the 
lucrative  trade  of  Antwerp  which  Germany  would 
fain  transfer  to  German  capitalists. 


V. 
THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS 

In  the  preceding  lecture  I  have  attempted 
to  treat  the  present  war  as  a  scientific  prob- 
lem only,  as  a  question  of  cause  and  effect  pure 
and  simple.  This  is  in  accordance  with  what  I 
believe  to  be  the  spirit  not  only  of  true  scientific 
method,  but  also  of  Socialist  philosophy.  Now 
there  are  people  who  believe  that  because  a  phe- 
nomenon is  treated  scientifically,  as  a  problem 
of  cause  and  effect,  it  excludes  the  "human" 
element  so-called, — the  questions  of  judgment 
and  sympathy.  These  people  believe  that  when 
we  have  stated  that  a  certain  historical 
phenomenon  is  the  result  of  certain  economic  or 
social  forces,  we  have  thereby  foreclosed  ourselves 
of  all  right  to  approve  or  disapprove.  That  we 
have  thereby  eliminated  the  element  of  individual 
or  group  responsibility,  because  we  have  reduced 
the  humans  involved  therein  to  mere  automatons 
devoid  of  any  will-power  and  therefore  not 
morally  responsible  for  their  acts. 


170  Socialism  and  War 

The  question  of  the  relation  between  the  general 
forces,  social,  economic,  or  otherwise,  which 
determine  the  general  course  of  historic  events, 
and  the  human  beings  who  are  the  actors  in  those 
events  is  a  very  important  and  intensely  interest- 
ing philosophic  problem.  This  is  not,  however, 
either  the  time  or  the  place  to  enter  upon  a  dis- 
cussion of  that  problem.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that  we 
who  consider  ourselves  the  followers  of  the  philo- 
sophic teachings  of  Marx,  which  are  generally 
known  under  the  name  of  the  Materialistic  Con- 
ception of  History,  believe  in  the  moral  respon- 
sibility of  the  individual  for  his  actions  while  par- 
ticipating in  the  historic  process;  although  we 
believe  that  the  general  course  of  history  is  deter- 
mined by  social  and  economic  forces  beyond  the 
control  of  the  individual.  There  is,  therefore,  in 
our  way  of  looking  at  the  historical  process,  room 
not  only  for  the  scientific  investigation  of  cause 
and  effect,  but  also  room  for  our  sympathy  and 
the  passing  of  moral  judgment.  And  since  the 
human  beings  who  are  "making  history"  are 
not  mere  automatons  but  may  profoundly  in- 
fluence the  process,  there  is  also  the  possibility  of 
"learning  a  lesson".  It  is  with  these  latter 
"human"  and  "practical"  aspects  of  our  problem 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  171 

that  we  shall  concern  ourselves  in  this  and  the 
next  lecture. 

The  first  question  that  presents  itself  to  us 
when  we  come  to  consider  the  war  as  the  result 
of  human  conduct,  instead  of  that  of  blind  econo- 
mic forces,  is:  Was  the  war  justifiable?  And 
the  answer  that  naturally  suggests  itself  to  us,  in 
view  of  the  awful  carnage  and  devastation,  the 
incalculable  waste  of  human  life  and  treasure,  is 
that  it  was  not.  Nothing,  it  seems,  could  justify 
the  killing  and  maiming  of  hundreds  of  thousands, 
nay,  millions,  of  human  beings,  the  flower  of  the 
human  race  intellectually  as  well  as  physically. 
Nor,  it  seems,  could  any  possible  advantage  to  be 
gained  by  war  be  sufficient  to  recompense  for  the 
enormous  waste  of  property,  the  accumulations 
of  the  toil,  the  industry,  and  the  intellectual 
genius  and  artistic  inspiration  of  the  race  during 
many  generations  past. 

I  said  this  answer  naturally  suggests  itself  to 
us.  Because  it  is  only  natural  that  we  who  are 
look  at  it  from  the  purely  humanitarian  point 
of  view.  This  point  of  view  is  particularly 
not  directly  interested  in  the  conflict,  whose 
passions  have  not  been  inflamed  thereby,  should 
natural  to  us  Socialists  who  profess  to  be  lovers 


'.. 


172  Socialism  and  War 

of  peace,  and  claim  to  be  the  only  real  social  force 
making  for  peace. 

And  yet,  I  must  state  at  the  outset  that  this  is 
not  my  point  of  view.  I  do  not  deprecate  the 
humanitarian  point  of  view.  In  fact  I  recognize 
its  legitimacy  when  viewed  purely  as  a  psycholog- 
ical phenomenon.  But  I  cannot  recognize  its 
cogency  as  a  guide  to  action.  Now,  I  do  not  want 
to  be  misunderstood;  and  I  therefore  want  to 
differentiate  my  point  of  view  not  only  from  the 
purely  humanitarian  but  also  from  that  of  the 
militarists.  The  militarists'  point  of  view  is  best 
exemplified  by  that  oft-quoted  saying  attributed 
to  Von  Moltke:  "Perpetual  peace  is  a  dream,  and 
not  even  a  beautiful  dream  at  that."  To  the  mili- 
tarist war  is  therefore  beautiful  in  itself,  "the 
finest  expression  of  human  personality",  —  as  one 
of  our  own  militarists  recently  put  it.  In  absolute 
contrast  to  this  stands  the  purely  humanitarian 
point  of  view  which  sees  in  war  nothing  but 
hideous  butchery  and  criminal  waste. 

As  distinguished  from  both  of  these  points  of 
view  I  hold  to  the  belief  that  war,  while  abhorrent 
in  itself,  may  nevertheless  become  an  engine  of 
human  progress.  In  fact,  in  the  past  it  frequently 
has  been  so.  Whether  or  not  it  can  still  be  so  is 
a  matter    to    be    carefully    inquired    into.     The 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  173 

present  war  is  therefore  not  merely  a  matter  to 
be  abhorred,  but  also  one  to  be  studied  and  under- 
stood. And  studied  and  understood  not  merely 
as  a  scientific  problem,  but  as  a  matter  throbbing 
with  the  interest  of  a  life-problem  awaiting 
solution  at  our  hands.  To  my  mind  this  world  is 
not  a  place  to  play  in,  but  a  place  to  work  in.  And 
it  is  so  peculiarly  arranged  that  we  can  only 
work  to  a  purpose  by  making  great  sacrifices. 
Whether  or  not  the  time  will  ever  come  when  we 
can  work  without  sacrifices  is  a  matter  that  can- 
not be  inquired  into  here.  One  thing  is  certain : 
that  time  is  not  here  yet.  We  cannot  therefore 
give  up  the  work  that  we  may  deem  our  task  here 
because  it  may  involve  some  sacrifice,  even  if  that 
sacrifice  be  that  of  human  life  and  individual 
human  happiness. 

I  am  not  a  believer  in  the  theory  that  human 
progress  is  possible  only  at  the  expense  of  the 
lives  or  welfare  of  millions  of  people,  either  in 
peace  or  war.  But  it  is  undeniable  that  in  the 
past  at  least  some  progress  has  come  through 
wars.  The  point  of  view  that  this  war, 
like  other  wars,  might  be  a  necessary  engine  of 
human  progress  is,  therefore,  at  least  a 
permissible  point  of  view.  In  fact  it  is  the  proper 
point  of  view  as  long  as  it  retains  the  "might"  in 


174  Socialism  and  War 

it.  And  you  cannot  dispose  of  it  by  the  purely 
humanitarian  argument  of  the  awfulness  of  war. 
You  might  as  well  argue  against  the  continued 
existence  of  the  race  because  of  the  awful  pains 
of  childbirth.  We  must  therefore  put  our  human- 
itarian sentiments  aside,  and  try  to  grasp  the 
meaning  of  this  great  historic  event  as  a  factor 
of  social  progress  or  reaction.  Sentiment  has  of 
course  its  place  in  our  life,  but  it  should  not  be 
permitted  to  run  away  with  our  judgment. 

And  when  you  have  put  aside  your  sentiment, 
and  try  to  examine  the  question  dispassionately, 
you  will  find  that  the  question  of  the  justifiability 
of  the  war  is  not  easily  answered.  In  fact,  the 
answer  will  depend  entirely  on  the  views  you  hold 
with  respect  to  the  question  of  races  and  national- 
ities and  their  function  as  agents  of  human 
progress.  That  is,  it  will  depend  on  whether  or 
not  you  accept  the  ordinary  Nationalist  and 
Modern  Imperialist  position  as  to  the  historical 
progress  of  the  Race  and  the  Nation. 

Once  you  have  accepted  the  Nationalist  point 
of  view  that  a  nation  is  an  entity  used  in  the  his- 
torical process  as  a  medium  of  progress,  neces- 
sarily having  interests  separate  from  other  nations 
but  common  to  all  of  its  members,  his  position  be- 
comes impregnable.     You  may  still  argue  with 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  175 

him  as  to  what  is  the  wisest  policy  for  a  certain 
nation  to  pursue  under  certain  given  con- 
ditions in  order  to  preserve  or  advance  its  nation- 
al interests.  But  you  must  admit  that  whenever 
war  becomes  necessary  in  order  to  preserve  or 
advance  these  interests,  war  should  be  resorted  to. 
The  question  of  war  then  ceases  to  be  a  question 
of  principle,  and  becomes  a  question  of  policy. 
War  ceases  to  be  a  wrong  per  se.  Each  war  must 
then  be  judged  on  its  own  merits.  And  in  judging 
it  you  cannot  be  guided  by  purely  humanitarian 
considerations;  nor  by  considerations  of  abstract 
principles  of  justice  which  are  applicable  to  inter- 
national relations,  no  more  than  there  are  any 
abstract  principles  of  justice  between  the  different 
cpecies  of  animals  or  between  the  animal  and  the 
vegetable  kingdoms.  The  most  just  of  men  and 
the  most  kind — men  who  scrupulously  refrain 
from  doing  an  injustice  to  their  neighbors  and 
who  wouldn't  "hurt  a  fly" — think  nothing  of  kill- 
ing inoffensive  animals  in  order  to  obtain  the  food 
that  they  think  is  good  for  themselves  or  which 
may  simply  serve  to  tickle  their  palates.  We  think 
nothing  of  killing,  maiming,  enslaving  or  tortur- 
ing those  belonging  to  a  "foreign"  species  of  ani- 
mals whenever  such  a  course  is  necessary  for  the 
"progress"  of  the  human  race,  which  we  identify 


176  Socialism  and  War 

with  the  "progress"  of  the  world.  The  struggle 
between  species,  we  say,  is  the  law  of  ani- 
mal existence  —  the  law  by  which  the  animal 
world  "progresses". 

Similarly,  struggle  between  races  and  nations  is 
the  law  of  existence  —  the  law  of  "progress"  — 
within  the  human  world,  according  to  the  nation- 
alist point  of  view.  A  nation's  duty  is  only  to- 
wards itself.  It  has  no  duties  towards  other  na- 
tions; except  such  as  it  voluntarily  assumes  in 
order  to  further  its  own  interests,  and  which  cease 
to  have  any  meaning  when  that  interest  ceases, 
'  which  is  the  case  in  war.  Hence  the  old  maxim  : 
inter  arma  silent  leges.  At  most  there  may  be  a 
self-imposed  duty  not  to  commit  wanton,  that  is 
unnecessary  and  unprofitable,  waste ;  a  duty  which 
may  be  enforced  by  a  nationalistic  Society  for  the 
Prevention  of  Cruelty  to  Humans.  The  rest  is 
mere  matter  of  policy.  As  to  the  so-called  inferior 
races  which  cannot  offer  any  effective  resistance 
and  are  therefore  at  our  mercy,  it  may  be  good 
economy  to  follow  a  wise  conservation  policy,  to 
have  "closed  seasons"  when  hunting  is  forbidden, 
and  generally  to  avoid  what  Germans  call  "raub- 
wirtschaf t"  —  that  is,  that  excessive  greediness 
which  kills  the  goose  that  lays  the  golden  eggs. 
A  war  may  therefore  be  wise  or  unwise,  but  never 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  177 

right  or  wrong;  never  "criminal",  except  in  the 
sense  that  an  action  may  be  "criminally  foolish", 
—  the  "crime"  being  against  your  own  national 
interest,  not  against  the  other  nation.  In  other 
words,  a  war  is  "wrong"  when  it  leads  to  failure, 
does  not  justify  the  expense  in  life  and  treasure 
necessitated  by  it;  it  is  "criminally  wrong"  or 
"foolish" — these  being  convertible  terms — 
when  it  not  only  fails  of  its  object  but  reacts  in  a 
disastrous  way.  Success  is  the  supreme  and  only 
test  of  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  war.  If  you  are 
an  "enlightened"  Nationalist  and  not  an  ordinary 
jingo,  then  you  will  use  the  term  "success"  in  the 
broadest  sense,  taking  a  "long  view"  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  counting  the  cost  as  well  as  the  results 
achieved.  But  the  question  is  still  one  of  success. 
These  considerations  lead  to  a  certain  corollary : 
We  all  know  that  hindsight  is  easier  than  fore- 
sight. It  is  easy  to  tell  after  the  event  what  wars 
were  wise  and  what  unwise.  But  some  of  these 
wars,  even  some  which  may  after  the  event  seem 
"criminally  foolish",  presented  quite  difficult  prob- 
lems before  the  event, — problems  with  many 
unknown  factors  and  therefore  difficult  of  solution 
in  advance.  The  "statesmen"  who  guide  the  "des- 
tinies of  nations"  must  solve  these  problems  in 
advance  of  the  event.     Risks  must  therefore  be 


178  Socialism  and  War 

taken.  Of  course,  a  wise  statesman  will  not  take 
any  unnecessary  risks,  nor  any  big  risks  when  the 
object  to  be  achieved  is  of  small  consequence. 
But  great  objects — "great"  from  the  national- 
istic point  of  view,  which  means  the  achievement 
by  the  nation  of  great  advantages  over  other  na- 
tions— justify  great  risks.  War  is  therefore 
justifiable  not  only  as  a  means  to  be  resorted  to  in 
exceptional  cases  but  as  a  policy. 

Take  the  present  war  as  an  instance.  And  first 
the  eastern  end  of  it.  Look  at  it  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  Russian  or  Servian  nationalist.  The 
march  to  the  sea  is,  as  I  have  already  explained, 
the  necessary  concomitant  of  the  fight  for  inde- 
pendent economic  existence  on  the  part  of  both 
Russia  and  Servia,  particularly  the  latter,  in  a 
capitalistic  world.  But  independent  economic 
existence  is  indispensable  to  independent  national 
life  generally  There  can  be  no  political  indepen- 
dence without  economic  independence.  Nor  can 
there  be  any  independent  intellectual  and  spiritual 
life  without  independent  economic  existence.  This 
is  apparent  in  the  case  of  Servia.  But  it  is  also 
true  of  Russia,  though  the  idea  of  Russian  depen- 
dence, particularly  political  dependence,  may 
strike  us  as  rather  strange  on  first  presentation. 
Russian  inefficiency,  the  "feet  of  clay"  of  the  great 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  179 

giant,  even  in  military  matters,  is  simply  one  of 
the  expressions  of  Russia's  economic  backward- 
ness, a  backwardness  which  she  cannot  overcome 
as  long  as  she  is  not  complete  master  of  her  own 
economic  destinies, — that  is  as  long  as  she  has  no 
free  and  adequate  access  to  the  open  sea  and  the 
world  beyond.  To  put  it  in  the  phraseology  of 
Russo-Serbian  nationalistic  idealogy  :  The  free 
and  untrammelled  development  of  Russian  and 
Serbian  "Nationality" — with  all  that  that  implies 
in  the  way  of  national  "genius",  national  "cul- 
ture", etc. — requires  "freedom  from  foreign  dom- 
ination." Is  it  not  clear  that  a  war  which  would  be 
the  means  of  achieving  such  an  object  is  perfectly 
justifiable,  and  that  engaging  in  a  war  which 
makes  the  achievement  of  such  a  great  national 
object  possible  is  taking  a  "legitimate  risk"? 

Again,  look  at  this  war  from  the  Pan-Germanist 
point  of  view,  and  you  will  find  that  not  only  the 
war  as  such  is  perfectly  justifiable,  but  that  every- 
thing Germany  has  done  and  would  like  to  do  in 
this  war  is  justified  by  the  "higher  morality" 
which  must  guide  the  conduct  of  nations, — the 
law  of  self-interest.  In  justifying  the  invasion  of 
Belgium,  which  must  be  admitted  to  be  "wrong" 
—  that  is,  without  provocation  on  the  part  of 
Belgium  —  the    Imperial    Chancellor    said    that 


180  Socialism  and  War 

"necessity  knows  no  law",  and  this  was  considered 
as  covering  the  case  by  all  good  German  national- 
ists. And  a  German  Socialist  editor  in  comment- 
ing upon  the  same  incident  said:  "The  violation 
of  Belgium's  internationally  guaranteed  neutral- 
ity was  an  invasion  of  a  legal  right,  but  morally 
it  was  justifiable" — the  justification  being  that 
Germany  needed  it. 

This  may  sound  cynical  to  us.  But  the  Socialist 
writer  in  question  deliberately  waived  all  attempts 
to  find  cheap  excuses  for  this  action  in  the  alleged 
actions  of  other  nations,  designed  to  cover  the 
naked  truth  so  that  it  should  not  shock  the  Mrs. 
Grundies  of  international  law  and  morality.  He 
proclaims  boldly  that  the  entire  scheme  of  inter- 
national law  and  international  regulations  is  non- 
sensical, for  the  only  law  which  a  nation  can  rec- 
ognize is  the  higher  law  of  its  own  sense  of  duty, 
—  which  is,  of  course,  to  fulfil  its  mission,  march 
boldly  on  the  road  of  its  manifest  destiny,  and  so 
forth.  That  this  man  means  what  he  says,  and 
believes  that  Germany  did  what  was  unquestion- 
ably right,  is  beyond  doubt.  The  argument  from 
the  Belgian  or  neutral  point  of  view  sounds  to  him 
as  ridiculous  as  the  argument  of  the  anti-vivisec- 
tionist  sounds  to  the  scientific  worker  who  believes 
he  has  a  mission  and  is  working  for  "progress". 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  181 

To  the  "humanitarian"  scientist,  working  for  the 
amelioration  of  the  condition  of  his  kind,  the  inci- 
dental sufferings  of  the  poor  "brutes"  on  whom  he 
experiments  is  at  most  a  disagreeable  detail. 

Most  people  will  agree  with  the  scientist.  And 
all  nationalists  must  agree  with  our  Pan-German- 
ist.  For,  once  you  admit  that  the  progress  of 
humanity  is  effected  by  means  of  the  development 
of  different  nations,  having  different,  individual 
and  independent  cultures;  each  nation  represent- 
ing a  certain  individual  culture  which  has  a  char- 
acter of  its  own  and  is  not  merely  a  part  of  a  com- 
mon or  general  civilization;  that  each  nation  has 
the  task  and  duty  of  protecting  and  developing  its 
culture ;  —  then  you  must  admit  that  the  protec- 
tion of  your  culture  can  not  possibly  be  left  to  in- 
ternational law,  a  code  formulated,  at  best,  by 
peoples  alien  to  the  spirit  and  real  meaning  of 
your  national  culture,  and  at  worst,  by  its  deadly 
enemies.  This  is  exactly  the  meaning  of  the  old 
maxim  that  questions  of  sovereignty  cannot  be 
arbitrated.  And  when  you  take  the  logical  step 
from  the  basic  nationalist  position  to  that  of  the 
modern  Imperialist  position,  and  assume  that  your 
culture  is  the  culture  par  excellence,  and  that  it  is 
therefore  the  mission  of  your  nation  to  spread 
its  culture  everywhere  in  order  to  help  it  to  the 


182  Socialism  and  War 

dominance  of  the  world,  —  you  will  find  that  it  is 
perfectly  justifiable  for  you  to  do  it  by  all  means 
possible,  for  you  would  really  be  working  for  the 
improvement  of  the  entire  human  race,  the  per- 
fection of  the  world  at  large,  and  the  realization 
of  the  designs  of  the  Creator. 

To  the  mind  of  the  honest  German  Imperialist 
of  the  idealistic  turn  of  mind  this  is  exactly  what 
Germany  is  engaged  in  doing  in  this  war.  Can 
any  work  be  more  noble  ?  And  can  any  such  petty 
considerations  as  the  breach  of  a  man-made 
paper-treaty  about  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  or 
even  the  complete  destruction  of  the  nondescript 
Belgian  "nation"  —  a  country  and  a  people  mani- 
festly of  no  "historic  destiny"  whatsoever  —  be 
permitted  to  stand  in  the  way  of  its  accomplish- 
ment? 

And  if  this  reasoning  somehow  fails  to  convince 
us,  if  we  still  feel  that  the  invasion  of  Belgium  was 
an  outrage,  and  the  prospective  greatness  of  Ger- 
man culture  leaves  us  unmoved,  it  can  only  be  due 
to  the  fact  that  we  do  not  accept  the  Pan-Ger- 
man's premise,  and  not  because  there  is  any  flaw 
in  his  reasoning.  Now,  our  non-acceptance  of  the 
German  nationalistic  premise  may  be  due  to  one 
of  two  reasons  :  Either  we  reject  the  entire 
Race-National  theory;  or  we  simply  deny  the  as- 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  183 

sertion  that  the  German  race  or  nation  is  the 
chosen  one.  The  latter  is  the  position  of  the  non- 
German  nationalists.  Their  reasoning  is  exactly 
that  of  the  German  nationalists,  except  that  where 
the  latter  says  "German"  they  say  "French"  or 
"English"  or  some  other  national  name.  Of 
course,  viewed  from  the  outside  it  seems  utterly 
absurd  for  one  set  of  nationalists  to  complain  of 
the  "utter  disregard  of  the  rights  of  other  na- 
tions" by  another  set  of  nationalists,  since  dis- 
regard of  the  rights  of  other  nations  is  of 
the  essence  of  nationalism;  and  the  complain- 
ing nationalists  would  unhesitatingly  approve  of 
the  acts  complained  of  if  they  were  committed  by 
or  in  the  interests  of  their  own  nation.  But  it  is 
of  the  very  essence  of  nationalism  that  its  de- 
votees cannot  look  at  things  from  any  outside,  or 
extra-national  point  of  view.  As  a  German  writer 
recently  put  it  :  Nationalism  is  a  disease,  the 
principle  symptom  of  which  is  the  inability  to  see 
the  other  man's  point  of  view. 

The  position  of  the  Socialists  is  totally  different 
from  the  position  of  the  nationalists.  We  reject 
entirely  the  nationalist  ideas  with  respect  to  the 
role  of  races  and  nations  in  the  development  of  the 
human  species  and  its  civilization  and  culture. 
But  before  proceeding  to  discuss  what  I  consider 


184  Socialism  and  War 

to  be  the  Socialist  view  of  the  subject,  we  must 
dwell  a  while  longer  on  the  nationalist  point  of 
view, — which  I  believe  to  be  the  general  bour- 
geois point  of  view. 

In  trying  to  get  at  the  point  of  view  of  those 
engaged  in  the  present  war,  I  presented  what  I 
believe  to  be  the  extreme  expression  of  militant 
nationalism,  the  point  of  view  of  the  Pan-German- 
ist,  which  is,  however,  merely  typical  of  the  point 
of  view  of  modern  Imperialism.  This  is  the  atti- 
tude of  aggressive  nationalism.  But  not  all  na- 
tionalists are  aggressive.  Some  of  them  are 
peace-loving,  and  abhor  war  and  its  horrors. 
That  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  peace-lov- 
ing nationalists  repudiate  the  basic  principles  of 
the  bellicose  nationalists  as  to  the  essential  unity 
of  interest  of  all  those  belonging  to  one  nation 
against  the  rest  of  the  world,  which  interest  is  to 
be  protected  at  all  hazards  and  by  all  means.  It 
simply  means  that  some  nationalists  differ  from 
others  as  to  what  are  the  best  means  of  preserv- 
ing or  promoting  the  national  interest,  which  both 
agree  to  be  paramount  to  any  other  consideration. 
When  an  English  pacifist  says  he  is  opposed  to  the 
present  war,  he  does  not  mean  to  intimate  that  he 
is  indifferent  to  England's  national  interests. 
What  he  says,  in  effect,  is  that  England's  interests 


v. 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  185 

would  have  been  better  preserved  if  she  had 
stayed  out  of  this  war ;  that  it  did  not  pay  her  to 
go  into  this  war.  Your  confirmed  pacifist  is 
nevertheless  a  good  patriot  and  wants  his  country 
to  win  whenever  it  does  engage  in  war,  as  it  could 
not  be  to  its  interest  to  lose  in  war.  The  task  of 
the  bourgeois  pacifist  is  therefore  simple:  As 
long  as  there  is  no  war  he  works  for  peace,  and 
after  the  war  has  broken  out  he  works  for  its 
speedy  termination.  But  so  long  as  the  war  con- 
tinues he  "does  his  duty  by  his  country"  by  rang- 
ing himself  on  the  side  of  his  nation  and  helping 
it  to  win.  And  even  while  working  for  the  term- 
ination of  the  war  he  does  his  work  with  a  view  to 
his  country's  interest,  and  with  a  view  to  help  it 
conclude  a  peace  wih  honor  and  profit 

The  question  of  justice  to  other  nations  —  not 
as  a  policy  that  pays,  but  as  a  right  —  is  no  more 
part  of  the  peace-  loving  patriot's  creed  than  it  is 
of  the  militarist's.  For  the  simple  reason  that 
according  to  good  nationalistic-patriotic  doctrine 
the  interests  of  one's  own  country  or  nation  are 
the  Supreme  Good,  and  therefore  the  highest  jus- 
tice. This  is  well  expressed  in  the  famous  dictum, 
which  is  taught  to  our  children  in  the  public 
schools  in  this  non-militarist  nation  as  the  highest 
expression  of  noble  sentiment  :     "My  country 


186  Socialism  and  War 

may  it  ever  be  right,  but  right   or   wrong,   my 
i    country  !" 

Now,  what  is  the  position  of  the  Socialists  on 
this  fundamental  question  of  nationalism-patriot- 
ism? I  said  a  while  ago  that  the  Socialists  reject 
the  nationalist's  point  of  view  in  toto.  I  must  say- 
now  that  that  was  an  over-statement,  if  taken 
literally  at  least.  What  I  meant  to  say  was  not 
that  they  actually,  in  point  of  fact  do  so,  but 
merely  that  they  ought  to  do  so  if  they  followed 
out  logically  and  to  the  uttermost  consequences 
what  I  beileve  to  be  the  true  fundamentals  of  the 
Socialist  philosophy.  And  I  may  add  that  until 
this  war  broke  out  many,  if  not  most,  people 
believed  that  what  I  consider  to  be  the  proper 
Socialist  position  was  their  actual  position.  It  is 
largely  due  to  this  belief,  equally  prevalent  among 
Socialists  and  non-Socialists,  that  there  was  a 
general  expectation  that  the  Socialists  would  pre- 
vent the  war  by  refusing  to  engage  in  it.  And  it 
is  largely  due  to  this  belief,  that  the  seeming  readi- 
ness with  which  the  European  Socialists  entered 
into  this  war  was  felt  to  be  a  base  betrayal  of 
principle. 

A  careful  examination,  however,  of  the  litera- 
ture of  the  subject  will  prove  conclusively  that 
whatever  may  be  the  offense  of  the  European 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  187 

r 

Socialists,  or  some  of  them,  in  failing  to  draw  the 
proper  conclusions  from  the  fundamental  ideas 
underlying  their  philosophy,  they  have  not  vio- 
lated any  prescribed  rules  of  conduct,  except  one 
which  will  be  discussed  further  below.  The  truth 
is  that  neither  on  the  subject  of  nationalism  nor 
on  that  of  war  and  peace  were  there  any  estab- 
lished doctrines  or  any  well-recognized  canons  of 
conduct.  The  views  of  many  of  the  leading 
Socialists  on  this  subject  are  utterly  irreconcila- 
ble. But  what  is  worse:  most  leading  Socialists 
never  clearly  defined  their  position  at  all,  and  no 
Socialist  congress  ever  attempted  to  deal  with  the 
I  subject  adequately. 

There  is,  indeed,  an  impression  current  that  ab- 
solute opposition  to  war,  at  all  times  and  under  all 
circumstances,  is  one  of  the  cardinal  principles  of 
Socialism.  And  it  must  be  conceded  that  "the 
man  in  the  street"  was  absolutely  justified  in  his 
assumption  that  absolute  pacifism  was  one  of  the 
chief  tenets  of  Socialism,  as  their  most  important 
leaders  were  untiring  workers  in  the  cause  of 
peace  and  their  popular  orators,  when  voicing 
their  opposition  to  war,  were  not  always  careful 
to  point  out  the  distinction  between  opposition  to 
war  under  certain  given  conditions  and  absolute 
opposition  to  it  under  all  and  any  circumstances. 


188  Socialism  and  War 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  the 
Socialists,  particularly  those  of  the  Marxian 
School,  the  predominant  school  among  present- 
day  Socialists,  are  not  absolute  pacifists.  Indeed, 
the  cast  of  mind  and  mode  of  thought  which  would 
lead  to  absolute  pacifism  is  utterly  alien  to  them. 
They  are  not  sentimentalists,  and  therefore  could 
not  be  opposed  to  war  on  purely  sentimental 
grounds.  And  they  are  rather  close  students  of 
history,  and  are  therefore  aware  of  the  important 
role  of  war  in  the  past,  a  part  which  they  could  not 
always  deprecate  in  view  of  the  revolutionary 
character  of  their  own  doctrine.  That  force  and 
bloodshed  are  not,  as  such,  repugnant  to  the  spirit 
of  their  teachings  is  well  known.  Marx  himself 
assigned  to  force  a  very  important  place  in  the 
historical  process.  And  most  Socialists  are  enthu- 
siastic admirers  of  the  French  Revolution  and  the 
Paris  Commune,  notwithstanding  their  bloodshed. 
It  is  also  well  known  that  these  sympathies  are 
not  limited  to  internal  "revolutions",  but  extend 
to  wars  proper  whenever  they  have  a  "revolu- 
tionary" or  progressive  character,  such  as  the 
wars  of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  American 
Civil  War.  In  fact  they  consider  war  a  legitimate 
and  sometimes  unavoidable  accompaniment  of  the 
revolution  which  they  preach  and  advocate. 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  189 

Furthermore,  their  approval  of  war  is  not  nec- 
essarily limited  to  revolutionary  wars  properly  so- 
called,  but  applies  to  all  wars  which  they  consider 
in  the  line  of  human  progress.  Marx  is  in  this  re- 
spect typical  of  the  revolutionary  Socialists  gener- 
ally. To  him  the  question  of  war  and  peace  was 
never  an  abstract  question  to  be  decided  on  ab- 
stract principles,  but  a  question  of  policy  to  be  de- 
cided according  to  the  circumstances  of  each  case. 
The  causes  which  brought  about  the  war,  the  pur- 
poses for  which  it  was  carried  on,  and  the  results 
which  were  likely  to  follow  from  it,  were  the  de- 
termining considerations  when  he  was  called  upon 
to  judge  of  any  war.  Was  the  war  making  for  hu- 
man progress  ?  If  so,  he  was  for  it ;  if  not,  he  was 
against  it.  And  he  not  only  approved  of  some 
wars  when  they  came,  but  actually  did  all  he  could 
to  bring  at  least  one  of  them  about. 

His  relation  to  the  Crimean  War  is  character- 
istic of  his  general  attitude  on  the  subject.  As  a 
result  of  the  general  political  situation  in  Europe 
at  that  time,  and  the  part  which  Russia  played  in 
the  suppression  of  the  revolts  of  1848,  Marx  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  a  war  against  Russia  and  a 
defeat  of  Russia  by  the  western  European  powers 
was  absolutely  necessary  in  the  interest  of  a  demo- 
cratic reorganization  of  Europe.     When,  there- 


190  Socialism  and  War 

fore,  Russia  picked  a  quarrel  with  Turkey  in  1853 
and  marched  her  troops  in  what  was  then  known 
as  the  Danube  Principalities,  now  Roumania,  he 
demanded  that  England  intervene  in  the  war. 
England  was  then  in  her  pacific  era.  Her  most 
representative  ideologist  in  the  political  arena  was 
John  Bright.  Like  the  true  representative  of  tex- 
tiles and  Manchesterism  that  he  was,  Mr.  John 
Bright  used  his  great  eloquence  for  the  propa- 
ganda of  peace  and  profits.  To  offset  the  influence 
of  Manchesterian  pacifism  Marx  endeavored  to 
arouse  the  English  working-men  to  a  support  of 
his  war-policy.  And  when  the  revolutionary 
working-men  of  England,  under  the  leadership  of 
the  old  Chartists,  responded  to  the  call,  he  ex- 
pressed his  exultation  in  a  letter  published  in  the 
New  York  Tribune  of  July  25,  1853,  in  which  he 
says  : 

"While  the  English  Queen  is,  at  this  moment, 
feasting  Russian  Princesses ;  while  an  enlightened 
English  aristocracy  and  bourgeoisie  lie  prostrate 
before  the  barbarian  Autocrat,  —  the  English 
proletariat  alone  protests  against  the  impotency 
and  degradation  of  the  ruling  classes.  On  the  7th 
of  July  the  Manchester  School  held  a  great  Peace 
meeting  in  the  Odd  Fellows'  Hall,  at  Halifax. 
Crossley,  M.  P.  for  Halifax,  and  all  the  other 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  191 

'great  men'  of  the  School  had  especially  flocked 
to  the  meeting  from  Town\  The  hall  was  crowd- 
ed and  many  thousands  could  obtain  no  admit- 
tance. Ernst  Jones  was  at  the  time  at  Durham. 
The  Chartists  of  Halifax  summoned  him  by  elec- 
tric telegraph,  and  he  appeared  just  in  time  for 
the  meeting.  Already  the  gentlemen  of  the  Man- 
chester School  believed  they  would  carry  their 
resolution,  and  would  be  able  to  bring  home  the 
support  of  the  manufacturing  districts  to  their 
good  Aberdeen,  when  Ernst  Jones  rose  and  put  in 
an  amendment  pledging  the  people  to  war,  and  de- 
claring that  before  liberty  was  established  peace 
luas  a  crime.  There  ensued  a  most  violent  dis- 
cussion, but  the  amendment  of  Ernst  Jones  was 
carried  by  an  immense  majority," 

Of  course,  Marx  did  not  expect  for  a  moment 
that  England  would,  if  she  went  to  war  with 
Russia,  carry  on  a  revolutionary  war,  in  the  So- 
cialist sense  of  the  word.  He  knew  full  well  that  if 
he  succeeded  in  getting  England  to  intervene  in 
this  war,  she  would  do  so  for  the  benefit  and  in 
the  interest  of  her  bourgeoisie.  Nevertheless,  he 
was  in  favor  of  that  war,  because  in  his  opinion,  it 
was  in  line  with  general  political  and  economic 
progress,  and  therefore  in  the  interest  of  the 
^working  class.     We  may  therefore  consider  as 


192  Socialism  and  War 

conclusively  established,  that,  far  from  being  ab- 
solute opponents  of  all  wars,  Socialists  are  in 
favor  of  all  revolutionary  wars,  and  also  of  those 
wars  whose  necessary  net  result  would  be  a 
strengthening  of  the  forces  making  for  progress, 
and,  therefore,  in  the  interests  of  the  working 
class.  At  least  that  was  the  position  of  Socialists 
fifty  or  sixty  years  ago. 

Since  then  the  position  of  Socialists  on  the  sub- 
ject of  war  has  undergone  a  great  change.  The 
vast  majority  of  Socialists  of  the  present  genera- 
tion have  completely  abandoned  the  bellicoseness 
of  Marx  even  against  Russia  and  have  become 
thorough  pacifists.  This  is  not  due  however  to 
any  change  of  opinion  on  the  matter  of  principle 
involved,  but  to  a  change  of  the  political  condi- 
tions of  Europe,  which  lead  the  Socialists  to  be- 
lieve that  the  interests  of  human  progress  gene- 
rally, and  of  the  fight  of  the  working  class  for  its 
emancipation  in  particular,  require  continued 
peace  as  a  policy.  The  change  of  conditions  which 
led  to  the  adoption  of  a  general  peace  policy  by  the 
Socialists  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 

At  the  time  Marx  summoned  Western  Europe 
to  a  crusade  against  Russia,  the  latter  was  still  a 
medieval  state,  whose  great  military  strength  and 
consequent    political    preponderance    in  Europe 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  193 

were  a  source  of  great  danger  to  the  bourgeois- 
democratic  development  of  Western  civilization. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  at  that  time  Russia 
had  neither  an  industrial  bourgeoisie  nor  a  mo- 
dern working  class.    Her  agrarian  economy  was 
based  on  a  polity  of  personal  servitude.     Her 
government,  which  was  sometime  afterward  de- 
scribed as  "a  despotism  tempered  by  assassina- 
tion" had  at  that  time  not  developed  as  yet  its 
"tempering"  element,  and  was  therefore  a  despot- 
ism pure   and    unalloyed.      Moreover,    it  was  a 
despotism  of  an  aggressive  kind,  supporting  by  its 
military  power  every  despot  in  Christendom.    In 
Western  Europe  the  bourgeoisie  was  then  just 
getting  on  its  feet,  so  to  say,  and  if  not  interfered 
with  from  without  was  likely  to  gain  the  upper 
hand    over    the    absolute-feudalist    combination 
which  opposed  it.    It  had  already  gotten  the  upper 
hand  in  England,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  in 
France.    The  fight  in  Germany  seemed  to  depend 
largely  on  whether  the  Western  powers  or  Russia 
would  lead  the  Concert  of  Europe.     The  bour- 
geoisie which  was  fighting  the  old  feudal-abso- 
lutist order  was  in  a  revolutionary  frame  of  mind, 
fighting  for  democratic  political  institutions.    The 
working  class  had  not  yet  achieved  its  majority, 
and  had  not,  as  yet,  developed  any  political  power 


194  Socialism  and  War 

of  its  own, — its  future,  for  the  moment  at  least, 
hanging  on  the  fortunes  of  the  bourgeoisie. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  seemed  the  imper- 
ative duty  of  the  hour  to  crush  the  reactionary 
power  in  the  East  of  Europe  in  order  to  permit 
the  orderly  development  of  Europe  towards  in- 
dustrialism and  political  democracy, — the  pre- 
requisite to  the  emancipation  of  the  working  class 
and  the  inauguration  of  economic  freedom  and 
equality.    Hence  Marx's  call  to  arms. 

But  during  the  half-century  that  has  elapsed 
between  the  Crimean  and  the  Russo-Japanese 
Wars  all  this  changed.  To  begin  with,  the  Russia 
of  the  Twentieth  Century  is  not  the  Russia  of  the 
middle  of  the  Nineteenth,  either  internally  or  as 
to  her  position  as  a  world-power.  The  oversha- 
dowing predominance  of  Russia  in  European  af- 
fairs which  followed  the  Napoleonic  Wars  was 
rudely  shaken  in  the  Crimean  War,  and  was  com- 
pletely destroyed  by  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
At  the  same  time  she  has  been  completely  revo- 
lutionized internally.  The  freeing  of  the  Serfs, 
which  was  one  of  the  results  of  the  defeat  which 
she  suffered  in  the  Crimean  War,  set  Russia  de- 
finitely and  irrevocably  on  the  high-road  of  cap- 
italist industrial  development  which  trans- 
formed the  stagnant  medieval  state  of  1853  into 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  195 

a  rapidly-developing  modern  state,  with  a  strong 
bourgeoisie  and  a  revolutionary  working  class. 
Not  only  was  the  "tempering"  influence  of  assas- 
sination introduced  into  her  political  system  dur- 
ing the  last  quarter  of  the  Nineteenth  Century, 
but  a  real  revolution  occurred  early  in  the  Twen- 
tieth. This  revolution,  although  it  failed  of  ac- 
complishing its  entire  purpose,  has  nevertheless 
proved  two  things:  First,  that  the  old  poli- 
tical order  is  as  dead  in  Russia  as  is  the  old  econ- 
omic order.  And  second,  that  the  Russian  people 
can  very  well  take  care  of  themselves  without  any 
outside  assistance.  Russia  not  only  ceased  to  be 
a  menace  to  the  democratic  development  of  the  rest 
of  Europe,  but  her  own  absolutism,  hard-pressed, 
is  in  need  of  outside  help ;  while  large  sections  of 
her  people  are  among  the  foremost  carriers  of 
democratic  ideals  and  disseminators  of  revo- 
lutionary principles  the  world  over. 

At  the  same  time  Western  Europe  has  been 
changing  too, — changing  in  the  opposite  direction. 
The  bourgeoisie  of  Western  Europe  has  succeeded 
in  the  years  following  the  Crimean  War  in  estab- 
lishing its  supremacy.  But  this  has  been  accom- 
panied by  a  complete  abandonment  of  its  revolu- 
tionary ideals,  and  a  willingness  to  betray  its  dem- 
ocratic principles  whenever  such  a  course  seemed 


196  Socialism  and  War 

necessary  in  order  to  achieve  or  maintain  that 
supremacy.  This  new  spirit  which  has  come  over 
the  bourgeosie  manifests  itself  particularly  in 
Germany,  which,  as  I  have  already  pointed  out, 
passed  from  one  warlike  period  into  another  with- 
out the  intervening  peaceful  period  under  the 
dominance  of  bourgeois-democratic  ideas.  The 
German  bourgeoisie,  coming  upon  the  historic 
stage  later  than  its  more  western  neighbors, 
shamefully  capitulated  before  autocracy  and  com- 
promised with  the  remnants  of  feudalism  in  order 
to  be  in  a  better  position  to  fight  its  capitalistic 
rivals  of  other  countries  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
working  class  of  its  own  country  on  the  other. 
The  time  when  the  bourgeoisie  could  go  to  war  for 
liberty  and  progress  is  past,  never  to  return. 

The  guardianship  of  democratic  ideas  and  ideals 
has  passed  to  the  working  class,  the  only  social 
class  which  seems  to  have  an  abiding  interest  in 
their  realization  and  preservation.  But  while  this 
class  has  grown  immensely  in  power  since  the 
days  of  the  Crimean  War,  it  is  still  very  far  from 
controlling  the  politics  of  any  country,  and  is 
therefore  not  in  any  position  to  impose  its  policies 
at  home  even,  where  it  is  stronger, — let  alone  im- 
posing them  on  any  foreign  nation.  Besides,  this 
class,  or  at  least  its  intellectual  leaders,  have 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  197 

heeded  the  lesson  of  history,  which  is  to  the  effect 
that  so-called  "wars  of  liberation"  are  a  snare  and 
a  delusion.  If  the  elements  of  progress  working 
for  the  reformation  of  a  people's  institutions  are 
absent  from  its  life,  all  attempts  to  reform  or  re- 
volutionize its  institutions  by  the  use  of  force 
from  without  will  prove  futile.  Each  people  must 
be  left  to  itself,  to  work  out  its  own  salvation  as 
best  it  can. 

The  conditions  for  a  war  in  the  interest  of 
progress  are  therefore  entirely  absent  from  our 
modern  life,  and  the  chances  of  their  ever  recur- 
ring are  so  remote  as  to  be  negligible.  Hence  the 
pacific  mood  of  the  present-day  Socialists. 

But  this  pacifism  evidently  does  not  exhaust  the 
subject.  Not  being  the  result  of  principle,  but 
merely  a  matter  of  policy,  dictated  by  conditions, 
it  leaves  open  a  number  of  very  important  quest- 
ions. To  begin  with,  the  changes  which  I  have 
described  as  having  taken  place  since  the  days 
when  Marx  called  for  a  crusade  against  Russia 
militate  only  against  any  aggressive  warlike  pol- 
icy on  the  part  of  Socialists.  They  should  not 
desire  any  war.  But  what  should  they  do  when 
they  are  confronted  with  the  actual  fact  of  war? 
Is  there  anything  in  their  principles  which  pro- 
hibits them   from    following   their   natural    im- 


198  Socialism  and  War 

pulses  and  fighting  for  their  nation?  Is  a  Socialist 
debarred  from  being  a  patriot?  And  if  so,  on 
what  principle?  This  question  becomes  even 
more  complicated  when  the  socialist  happens  to 
belong  to  a  nation  which  is  being  attacked  by  an- 
other nation.  In  such  a  case  the  requirements  of 
justice  seem  to  unite  with  the  natural  impulse  in 
urging  the  Socialist  to  a  defense  of  "home  and 
country".  How  should  a  Socialist  act  in  such  an 
emergency?  Are  there  any  distinctively  Socialist 
principles  covering  the  subject,  upon  which  a 
Socialist  rule  of  action  could  be  based? 

Of  all  these  perplexing  questions  only  one  can 
be  answered  definitely:  It  is  the  consensus  of 
opinion  of  all  Socialists,  or  at  least  was  until  the 
outbreak  of  the  present  war,  that  a  Socialist  could 
not  be  a  "patriot''  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
word,  that  he  could  not  subscribe  to  the  principle 
of  "my  country,  right  or  wrong".  The  opposition 
to  this  principle  proceeded,  however,  not  from  any 
radical  dissent  from  the  nationalist  position  on  the 
role  of  nationalities  as  a  cultural  factor,  but  from 
a  loftier  moral  sense  than  that  of  the  ordinary 
patriot.  It  simply  amounted  to  a  declaration  that 
a  Socialist  can  engage  only  in  a  "just  war", — 
"tempering  patriotism  with  justice",  so  to  say. 
But  what  is  a  just  war? 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  199 

Proceeding  upon  the  assumption  that  no  war 
could  now  be  carried  on  in  the  interests  of  prog- 
ress, and  thtat  the  engaging  in  war  aggressively 
is  therefore  necessarily  wrong,  August  Bebel,  the 
great  German  Socialist  leader,  announced  the  true 
rule  to  be  that  all  wars  of  aggression  are  unjust, 
while  all  defensive  wars  are  just.  Socialists 
should  refuse  to  join  in  the  first,  but  should  do 
their  duty  cheerfully  for  "home  and  country" 
whenever  these  are  attacked.  This  rule  of  conduct 
was  probably  the  most  generally  accepted  among 
Socialists  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war. 
But  it  by  no  means  received  their  unanimous  ap- 
probation. Among  those  who  were  opposed  to  it 
was  Karl  Kautsky,  the  leading  theoretical  writer 
of  the  international  Socialist  movement  of  the  pre- 
sent day.  At  the  Congress  of  the  German  Social- 
ist Party  held  at  Essen  in  1907,  Bebel  and  Kautsky 
debated  this  subject  at  some  length.  Kautsky's 
main  objection  to  the  rule  advocated  by  Bebel 
was  that  it  was  not  a  safe  guide  to  go  by,  in  prac- 
tice, as  a  government  could  easily  fool  its  socialists 
into  participating  in  a  war  of  aggression  by  mak- 
ing it  appear  to  be  a  purely  defensive  war.  To 
which  Bebel  retorted  that  if  the  working  class  and 
its  leaders  can  be  fooled  in  a  matter  like  that  no 
rule  could  save  them  from  error. 


200  Socialism  and  War 

The  events  of  August,  1914,  demonstrated  that 
Bebel's  neatly  turned  oratorial  phrase  was  no  ade- 
quate answer  to  Kautsky's  objection.  Although 
the  element  of  "fooling"  was  perhaps  unduly  em- 
phasized by  Kautsky.  The  real  trouble  lies  much 
deeper.  The  fact  is  that  it  is  very  often  really  im- 
possible to  tell,  even  with  the  knowledge  of  all  the 
facts,  and  with  perfect  good  faith,  as  to  who  is  the 
real  aggressor  in  a  given  war.  But  even  if  we 
should  always  be  able  unerringly,  and  at  the  very 
outbreak  of  the  war,  to  detect  the  aggressor,  the 
distinction  between  aggressive  and  defensive  wars 
is  entirely  too  technical  and  formal,  and  can- 
not be  relied  upon  always  to  conform  to  the  de- 
mands of  that  higher  morality  which  is  supposed 
to  distinguish  the  action  of  the  Socialist  from  that 
of  the  ordinary  patriot. 

Let  me  illustrate:  In  1911  Italy  declared  war 
on  Turkey  for  the  purpose  of  despoiling  her  of 
Tripoli.  Here  was  a  clear  case  of  aggression  — 
aggression  for  the  purpose  of  robbery.  Accord- 
ing to  the  rule  laid  down  by  Bebel  the  duty  of  the 
Socialists  in  the  two  countries  at  war  was  clear : 
The  Italian  Socialists  were  in  duty  bound  to  op- 
pose the  war,  while  the  Turkish  Socialists  were 
bound  to  defend  their  country  against  Italian  ag- 
gression. Now  suppose  that  a  year  or  two  after 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  201 

the  conclusion  of  the  war, — Italy  having  success- 
fully carried  off  the  prize  which  was  the  object  of 
the  war — a  turn  in  the  international  situation 
should  make  it  seem  likely  that  Turkey  could  re- 
gain the  lost  province  by  making  war  on  Italy,  and 
that  Turkey  should  grasp  at  the  opportunity. 
What  would  then  be  the  duty  of  the  Socialists?  If 
the  rule  were  strictly  adhered  to,  the  Italian  Socia- 
lists would  now  be  bound  to  go  to  war  in  order  to 
"defend"  their  country, — defend  it  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  ill-gotten  gains  of  the  war  which  only 
a  short  while  ago  it  was  their  duty  to  oppose.  Evi- 
dently the  fact  that  a  war  is  a  "defensive"  one  does 
not  necessarily  mean  that  it  is  a  just  one. 

It  would  seem  that  while  Bebel  permitted  just- 
ice to  "temper"  his  patriotism  when  his  country 
was  about  to  commit  an  act  of  injustice,  his  patri- 
otism got  the  better  of  his  sense  of  justice  when 
his  country's  misdeeds  brought  forth  the  inevit- 
able consequences  and  her  "safety"  was  threat- 
ened. 

The  reason  for  this  rather  contradictory  posi- 
tion with  respect  to  the  relation  of  justice  to  "pa- 
triotic duty"  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the 
basis  of  Bebel's  position,  the  point  of  departure 
from  which  the  train  of  his  thoughts  on  this  sub- 


202  Socialism  and  War 

ject  starts,  is  the  bourgeois  theory  of  nationality. 
In  common  with  the  ordinary  bourgeois  national- 
ists Bebel  believed  that  the  "nation"  was  not 
merely  an  incident  of  historical  evolution,  but  that 
each  nation  was  a  vessel  especially  designed  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  a  certain  brand  of  "cul- 
ture" necessary  for  human  progress,  which  cul- 
ture would  be  lost  to  humanity  if  the  nation  ceased 
to  exist  or  its  independence  were  destroyed.  He  re- 
jected the  modern  outgrowth  of  nationalist  theory 
according  to  which  each  nation  is  to  strive  for 
world-dominion,  but  he  believed  that  each  nation 
was  the  carrier  of  a  national  culture  and  repre- 
sented an  entity  which  must  be  preserved  under  all 
circumstances.  Granting  his  premises,  his  con- 
clusion is  perfectly  correct :  The  fact  that  a  nation 
may  be  wrong  in  a  certain  quarrel  with  another 
nation  is  certainly  no  adequate  reason  for  permit- 
ting such  an  important  factor  of  progress  to 
perish  or  even  its  influence  to  be  diminished. 

And  in  so  far  as  there  was  any  Socialist  theory 
at  all  on  the  subject  it  granted  the  nationalistic 
premises,  at  least  in  the  Bebel  formulation.  It  is 
true  that  there  were  heard  some  dissenting 
voices,  but  they  were  neither  numerous  nor  very 
authoritative ;  for  they  usually  lost  themselves  in 
generalities  —  and  negative  generalities  at  that — 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  203 

without  attempting  to  build  up  a  solid  theoretical 
structure  which  could  replace  the  well-constructed 
nationalist  theory.  That  does  not  mean  that 
no  work  whatever  had  been  done  towards  building 
up  such  a  theory.  On  the  contrary,  as  I  shall 
endeavor  to  prove  in  my  next  lecture,  the  found- 
ations for  such  a  theory  were  laid  long  ago  by  the 
founders  of  what  we  Socialists  are  pleased  to  call 
'  'Scientific  Socialism",  and  the  materials  for  the 
entire  structure  were  there,  but  they  were  in  frag- 
mentary form  scattered  throughout  the  length 
and  breadth  of  the  literature  of  Socialism,  and  had 
never  been  used  to  actually  build  the  edifice. 

In  the  debate  between  Bebel  and  Kautsky  at  the 
Essen  Congress  which  I  have  already  adverted  to, 
Kautsky  indicated  the  lines  along  which  such  a 
theory  is  to  be  constructed,  when  he  insisted  that 
the  needs  of  the  working  class  should  be  the  only 
guide  for  Socialists  to  follow  in  matters  of  war 
and  peace.  By  this  declaration  Kautsky  took  a 
position  squarely  in  opposition  to  all  nationalistic 
theories,  including  the  pacific  nationalism  of 
Bebel.  The  logical  implications  of  this  declara- 
tion were  that  the  interests  of  the  working  class 
may  sometimes,  at  least,  become  fundamentally 
antagonistic  to  those  of  the  "nation,"  and  that  in 
such  an  event  the  interests  of  the  working  class 


204  Socialism  and  War 

should  take  precedence.  In  other  words,  that  So- 
cialists are  bound  to  go  to  war,  if  at  all,  only  in 
defence  of  the  interests  of  the  working  class,  and 
not  in  the  interests  of  their  "nation." 

Unfortunately,  Kautsky  merely  indicated  but 
never  elaborated  his  Socialist  theory  of  peace  and 
war,  and  never  developed  a  Socialist  theory  on  the 
subject  of  race  and  nation,  which  is  the  only  basis 
upon  which  a  Socialist  theory  of  peace  and  war 
can  securely  rest. 

Another  attempt  to  lay  down  a  Socialist  rule 
of  action  on  the  subject  of  war  which  should  be 
fundamentally  different  from  the  nationalistic 
position  on  the  subject,  is  contained  in  the  con- 
cluding clause  of  the  resolution  adopted  by  the 
International  Socialist  Congress  at  Stuttgart 
(1907)  and  incorporated  in  the  resolutions  adop- 
ted at  the  International  Socialist  Congress  at 
Copenhagen  (1910)  and  at  the  Extraordinary  In- 
ternational Socialist  Congress  at  Basle  (1912). 
This  clause  reads  as  follows : 

"In  the  event  that  war  should  break  notwith- 
standing the  efforts  of  the  Socialists  to  prevent  it, 
then  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  Socialists  to  work 
for  its  speedy  termination,  and  to  use  all  the  power 
at  their  command,  utilizing  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic crises  produced  by  the  war,  in  an  effort  to 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  205 

arouse  the  discontent  of  the  people  so  as  to  hasten 
the  abolition  of  the  rule  of  the  capitalist  class'* 

This  resolution  contains  the  same  unpatriotic 
implications  as  the  Kautsky  declaration,  which,  by 
the  way,  was  made  only  a  few  weeks  after  the 
adoption  of  this  resolution  at  the  Stuttgart  Con- 
gress. The  same  emphasis  on  the  working  class 
interest;  and  the  same  utter  disregard  for  the 
defence  of  nation  and  country.  Instead  of  being 
in  duty  bound  to  come  to  the  defence  of  his 
country,  it  is  made  the  paramount  duty  of  the 
Socialist  to  exert  himself  on  behalf  of  the  interests 
of  the  working  class  in  the  abolition  of  capitalist 
class  rule.  Instead  of  uniting  with  the  other  classes 
of  his  nation  in  defence  of  his  country,  he  is  to 
arouse  the  discontent  of  the  people,  presumably 
irrespective  of  what  the  consequences  might  be 
as  to  the  "defence".  This  resolution  has  the  ad- 
vantage over  the  Kautsky  declaration  in  that  it 
prescribes  a  definite  course  of  action,  instead  of 
merely  laying  down  a  principle  the  application  of 
which  might  depend  upon  the  interpretation  of 
what  is  meant  by  "the  interest  of  the  working 
class."  But  it  shares  with  the  Kautsky  declaration 
the  unfortunate  situation  of  not  having  any  solid, 
well-recognized  theoretical  position  on  the  under- 
lying subject  of  race  and  nationality.    Not  being 


206  Socialism  and  War 

founded  on  any  such  fully  elaborated  and  well- 
recognized  theory,  and  having  among  its  sponsors 
such  men  as  Bebel,  who  stood  firmly  on  the  basic 
nationalistic  principle,  it  was  liable  either  to  be 
misinterpreted  or  to  be  regarded  merely  as 
a  sop  thrown  out  to  Gustave  Herve  and  other 
anti-patriots,  as  a  compromise,  and  having  really 
no  organic  connection  with  the  general  position 
of  the  Socialists  on  the  subject. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  Socialist  theory  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  great  European  conflict.  Now  let 
us  turn  for  a  moment  to  the  practice.  A  survey 
of  the  actions  of  the  European  Socialists  immedi- 
ately prior  to  and  since  the  beginning  of  the  war 
will  show  conclusively  that  with  few  exceptions, 
they  have  all  acted  on  the  principle  of  nationalism, 
—  a  pacific  nationalism,  but  nationalism  neverthe- 
less. By  this  I  do  not  mean  to  intimate  that  I  dis- 
approve equally  of  all  the  Socialists  who  went  into 
this  war.  I  will  anticipate  my  next  lecture  here 
sufficiently  to  say  that  the  action  of  some  of  the 
Socialists  who  went  into  this  war  might  be 
justified  on  correct  Socialist  principle.  Only  it 
is  my  belief  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  were  not 
guided  in  so  doing  by  correct  Socialist  principle, 
but  by  ordinary  bourgeois-nationalistic  consider- 
ations. 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  207 

Let  me  illustrate  what  I  mean,  and  at  the  same 
time  offer  proof  of  my  assertion.  In  my  opinion 
the  positions  of  the  Socialists  in  Germany  and  Bel- 
gium, respectively,  were  fundamentally  different 
from  one  another,  so  that  while  the  action  of  the 
German  Socialists  was  utterly  indefensible  from 
what  I  consider  to  be  the  Socialist  point  of  view, 
the  action  of  the  Belgian  Socialists  in  coming  to 
the  defense  of  their  country  was  perfectly  consist- 
ent with  Socialist  principle.  And  yet,  I  cannot 
acquit  the  Belgian  Socialists,  or  at  least  some  of 
them,  of  the  charge  of  having  acted  on  non-Social- 
ist principles  in  what  they  did.  And  for  the  fol- 
lowing reason:  During  his  stay  in  this  country 
Vandervelde  was  asked  what  he  thought  of  the 
conduct  of  the  German  Socialists.  To  which  he 
replied  substantially  as  follows :  We  (that  is  the 
Belgian  Socialists)  have  no  complaints  to  make 
against  the  German  socialists.  Until  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  they  did  all  they  could  to  prevent  the 
war;  and  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  they 
were  in  a  very  difficult  position,  with  Republican 
France  on  one  front  and  the  Czar  of  Russia  on  the 
other,  and  had  we  been  in  their  position  we  would 
have  in  all  probability  acted  the  way  they  did.  As 
we  have  no  right  to  assume  that  Vandervelde 
would  have  made  so  serious  a  statement  merely 


208  Socialism  and  War 

out  of  international  courtesy,  we  must  adjudge 
him  to  be  particeps  criminis  with  the  German 
Socialists  in  whatever  they  did,  as  an  eccessory 
after  the  fact, — which  can  only  be  due  to  a  com- 
munity of  views. 

And  here  I  must  tarry  a  while  in  order  to 
dispose  of  a  disturbing  element  in  the  situation — 
the  Russian  Czar.  You  will  have  noticed  that 
Vandervelde  refers  to  the  Russian  Czar  as  the  jus- 
tification or  excuse  for  the  German  Socialists'  con- 
duct in  supporting  the  German  Government  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  German  Socialists 
themselves  asserted  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  that  the  Czar  was  the  real  reason  for  their 
conduct  with  respect  to  the  war,  and  they  have 
called  upon  the  shades  of  Marx  and  Engels  to 
justify  their  action.  I  must  say  frankly  that  this 
attempt  to  make  the  poor  Czar  the  scapegoat  for 
the  sins  of  the  German  Socialists  is  extremely  dis- 
ingenuous and  not  in  accord  with  the  known  facts 
of  the  case;  and  the  appeal  to  Marx  and  Engels 
smacks  somewhat  of  the  hypocritical,  at  least  in 
the  mouth  of  some  of  those  making  it. 

I  have  already  pointed  out  that  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  Marx  called  upon  West- 
ern Europe  to  war  on  Russia  were  entirely  dif- 
ferent from  those  which  prevailed  at  the  outbreak 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  209 

of  the  present  war.    I  may  add  here  that  these  dif- 
ferences had  been  repeatedly  pointed  out  long  be- 
fore the  present  crisis  arose  and  were  well-known 
to  all  Socialists,  particularly  to  German  Socialists. 
Those  German  Socialists,  therefore,  who  had  al- 
ways been   upholders   of  the  Marxian  theories, 
doctrines,  and  policies  refused  to  be  caught  by  this 
bait  thrown  out  by  the  German  Government  and 
warned  their  comrades  against  it.     So  the  Vor- 
waerts,  the  central  organ  of  the  German  Socialist 
Party  and  for  years  the  rallying  point  of  what 
might  be  considered  the  simon-pure  Marxists  in 
Germany,  published  a  leading  article  on  August 
3rd,  only  one  day  before  the  fateful  session  of  the 
Reichstag  when  the  Socialist  Parliamentary  group 
joined    in    voting    the    war    credits,    protesting 
most  emphatically  against  the  attempt  to  use  the 
Czar  as  an  excuse  for  drawing  the  German  work- 
ing class  into  this  war.  As  a  result,  we  were  there- 
fore confronted  with  the  curious  spectacle  of  the 
alleged  authority  of  Marx  and  Engels  in  favor  of 
the  war  being  invoked  by  that  portion  of  the  So- 
cialist movement  in  Germany  which  ordinarily 
cared  least  about  the  opinions  and  example  of  the 
"revolutionary  fathers",  and  being  denied  by  the 
most  revolutionary  and  consistently  Marxist  por- 
tion of  that  movement.    This  alone  should  be  suf- 


210  Socialism  and  War 

ficient  to  prove  the  vulnerability  of  the  Czar  as  a 
shield  for  Socialist  warlike  operations. 

But  there  is  more  direct  proof  of  the  fact 
that  the  Czar  had  practically  nothing  to  do  with 
the  conduct  of  the  German  Socialists  in  the  present 
war.  The  proof  of  the  pudding  is  in  the  eating. 
Had  the  German  Socialists  gone  into  this  war 
because  it  was,  or  they  thought  that  it  was,  a  war 
against  Czarism,  they  would  have  stayed  in  it 
only  as  long  as  the  idea  that  this  was  a  war  pri- 
marily against  Russian  Czarism  was  actually 
entertained  by  them.  Their  support  of  the  govern- 
ment would  of  necessity  have  been  with- 
drawn the  moment  it  became  evident  that  this 
war  was  directed  primarily  against  the  Western 
Powers.  But  the  pretense  that  this  was  a  war 
mainly  against  Russia  did  not  last  longer  than 
Jonah's  leaf.  Not  only  in  the  purely  military 
operations,  but  in  the  avowed  purposes  of  the  war 
the  German  Government  and  the  German  Press, 
as  well  as  all  other  organs  of  public  opinion,  set 
their  face  westward  practically  from  the  second 
week  of  the  war.  And  yet  the  Socialists  stayed  on. 
After  the  first  excitement  was  over,  the  entire 
bourgeois  and  governmental  press  declared  in  one 
voice  that  England  was  the  enemy.  Russia  was 
practically  forgotten.    And  yet  the  Socialists  not 


The  War  and  the  Socialists  211 

only  stayed  on,  but  actually  joined  the  chorus  of 
execration  against  England  and  announced  their 
intention  of  staying  in  the  war  until  this  mortal 
enemy  was  completely  vanquished. 

It  is  therefore  clear  beyond  peradventure  of  a 
doubt  that  the  Russian  Czar  was  not  a  determin- 
ing factor  in  the  support  which  the  German  Social- 
ists have  given  to  this  war.  By  this  I  do  not  mean 
to  say  that  a  few  individuals  may  not  have  gone  in- 
to this  war  solely  on  account  of  the  Russian  Czar. 
But  such  individuals  must  have  been  very  few, 
and  they  must  have  pulled  out  as  soon  as  the  true 
character  of  the  war  became  apparent.  Nor  do  I 
mean  to  say  that  the  vast  majority  of  German 
Socialists  who  stayed  on,  warring  as  enthusiast- 
ically against  England  as  they  did  against  Russia, 
were  necessarily  hypocrites  when  they  declared,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  that  the  Czar  was  the 
cause  of  their  patriotism.  That  there  were  some 
hypocrites  at  work  may  be — probably  is — the 
fact.  But  the  great  bulk  of  them  were  certainly 
sincere  in  their  belief,  as  great  masses  always  are. 
The  explanation  is  simple  enough, — although  ex- 
tremely interesting  to  the  investigator  of  the  re- 
lations existing  between  economics,  psychology, 
and  ideology:  They  went  into  this  war  for  the 
same  reason  that  other  Germans  went  into  it,  just 


212  Socialism  and  War 

because  they  felt  and  thought  like  Germans.  Being 
also  Socialists  in  their  secondary  character  they 
honestly  tried  to  square  their  Nationalism  with 
their  Socialism,  and  for  a  while  at  least  were  able 
to  do  so,  thanks  to  the  Czar.  Some  may  still  cling 
to  him  in  a  desperate  effort  to  save  their  Socialist 
conscience.  When  this  becomes  impossible  by  the 
trend  of  events,  which  accentuate  with  ever-grow- 
ing decisiveness  the  Imperialistic  and  anti-English 
character  of  the  war,  they  will  begin  to  revise 
their  Socialism  so  as  to  bring  it  into  grater  con- 
formity with  their  Nationalism.  The  process  has 
already  begun;  when  and  where  it  will  end  it  is 
difficult  now  to  foretell. 


VI. 

SOCIALIST  VS.  BOURGEOIS 

THEORIES. 

I  stated  in  my  last  lecture  that,  rightly  under- 
stood, the  basic  theories  of  Socialism  contain 
within  themselves  a  theory  of  race  and  national- 
ity, and  therefore  a  theory  of  peace  and  war, 
which  is  totally  different  from  and  opposed  to  the 
current  bourgeois  or  nationalistic  theories  on  the 
same  subject.  And  at  the  same  time  I  stated  that 
such  theory  had  never  been  clearly  elaborated,  nor 
any  definite  rules  of  conduct  based  thereon  estab- 
lished, and  that  when  the  war  came  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  Socialists  acted  not  on  any  Socialist  the- 
ory but  on  the  current  nationalistic  theory  just  as 
if  there  had  been  no  Socialist  theory.  It  would 
seem,  on  the  one  hand,  somewhat  presumptuous  in 
one  man  to  assert  that  he  is  in  possession  of  the 
true  interpretation  of  the  principles  of  Socialism, 
which  escaped  the  notice  of  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  Socialists  and  their  intellectual  leaders. 


214  Socialism  and  War 

even  if  he  should  admit  a  few  other  individuals 
into  a  sort  of  qualified  partnership  with  himself 
in  the  possession  of  this  precious  truth.  On  the 
other  hand,  such  a  truth  would  of  necessity  seem 
to  be  of  rather  doubtful  character :  a  truth  that  is 
neither  clearly  understood  nor  acted  upon  is  cer- 
tainly far  from  being  a  living  truth,  the  kind  of 
truth  worthy  of  the  name. 

In  answer  to  the  first  objection  to  the  acceptance 
of  what  I  have  stated  I  will  say  that  truth  and  the 
knowledge  of  truth — which  is  really  one  and  the 
same  thing,  as  truth  only  lives  by  its  recognition 
and  has  no  existence  outside  of  it — grow  as  part 
of  the  general  development  of  the  human  species 
and  their  growth  depends  entirely  on  the  circum- 
stances and  conditions  of  that  development.  Not 
only  are  new  ideas,  new  modes  of  thought — what 
we  call  new  truths — the  result  of  new  social  de- 
velopments; but  all  the  implications  of  radically 
new  modes  of  thought  only  come  to  the  surface,  at 
least  so  as  to  become  generally  cognizable,  with 
the  development  of  particular  conditions  and  the 
occurence  of  the  particular  facts  of  life  to  which 
they  are  to  be  applied  and  which  serve  to  accen- 
tuate them.  The  Socialist  theories  of  race  and 
nationality,  war  and  peace,  very  naturally  only 
developed  slowly  as  the  conditions  of  life  called  for 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         215 

their  application,  except  perhaps  in  the  minds  of 
some  theoreticians  and  there  only  fragmentarily. 
The  full  scope  and  import  of  these  theories  can 
only  be  studied  and  understood  now,  under  the 
enlightening  influence  of  the  present  war.  And 
there  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  the  present  war 
will  bring  forth  an  enormous  amount  of  Socialist 
literature  which  will  serve  to  bring  this  phase  of 
Socialist  theory  into  clear  relief, — these  lectures 
being  part  of  a  general  effort  now  undoubtedly 
making  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 

As  to  the  second  objection,  I  may  say  that  I  can 
safely  take  my  appeal  from  formal  statements  and 
resolutions  to  the  general,  I  might  almost  say 
instinctive  belief,  current  everywhere  before  the 
war,  among  Socialists  and  non-Socialists  alike, 
that  the  Socialists  would  somehow  or  other  prevent 
the  war,  or  at  least  would  not  willingly  participate 
in  it.  This  almost  universal  expectation — and  the 
feeling  of  surprise,  disappointment  and  indigna- 
tion which  followed  its  failure  of  realization — 
must  have  had  some  basis  of  fact,  some  uncon- 
scious or  half -conscious  evaluation  of  the  Socialist 
movement  and  its  theory  which  was  dimly  present 
in  the  minds  of  all,  even  though  it  never  reached 
the  stage  of  full  articulation.  There  must  have 
been  something  which  made  the  world  put  a  dif- 


216  Socialism  and  War 

ferent  valuation  on  the  Socialist  declarations  in 
favor  of  peace,  from  the  valuation  it  placed  on 
similar  declarations  emanating  from  the  bourgeois 
pacifists.  It  is  this  which  gives  point  to  the  sneers 
levelled  at  the  Socialists  shooting  at  their  "com- 
rades" while  no  one  would  think  of  sneering  at  the 
Christians  for  shooting  at  their  "brothers  in 
Christ"  and  getting  "infidels"  to  help  them  in  the 
shooting.  By  an  almost  universal  consensus  of 
opinion  the  Socialists'  professions  of  peace  were 
regarded  as  something  more  than  a  mere  pious 
wish  or  an  outward  coat  of  veneer,  meant  only  for 
dress-parade  and  of  no  account  in  the  actual  "busi- 
ness of  life."  They  were  supposed  to  mean  real 
business,  to  be  an  integral  part  of  the  actuality  of 
the  Socialist  labor  movement. 

The  basis  of  this  universal  belief  in  the  sincerity 
and  the  actuality-quality  of  the  Socialist  peace  pro- 
gram is  to  be  found  in  the  Class  Struggle  which  is 
both  the  theory  and  the  practice  of  the  modern 
labor  movement.  The  theory  of  the  class  struggle 
is  in  absolute  and  irreconcilable  opposition  to  the 
nationalistic  theory  of  patriotism, — while  its 
practice  makes  the  practice  of  the  patriotic  virtues 
utterly  impossible. 

The  theory  of  the  Class  Struggle  is  not  merely 
a  statement  of  fact  as  to  the  division  of  our  pre- 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         217 

sent  society  into  hostile  classes  struggling  with 
one  another  for  the  good  things  in  life  and  for  the 
control  of  the  institutions  of  organized  society 
which  control  the  distribution  of  these  things.  It 
is  primarily  a  historical  theory,  an  attempt  to 
explain  the  progress  of  mankind  and  the 
means  whereby  this  progress  is  brought  about. 
As  such  it  denies  the  role  ascribed  to  race  and  na- 
tionality as  factors  of  human  progress  by  the  na- 
tionalistic theory,  and  considers  these  entities 
mere  incidents  in  the  evolution  of  mankind, 
brought  forth  at  a  certain  stage  of  this  evolution 
bound  to  disappear  with  it. 

Briefly  stated,  the  position  of  those  who  believe 
in  the  Class-struggle  theory  of  progress— which 
is  my  position,  and,  I  believe,  the  position  of  all 
true  Socialists— is  this:  In  the  first  place,  there 
is  no  such  a  thing  as  a  Superior  or  an  Inferior 
race.  All  races  are  alike,  with  respect  to  their 
essential  qualities, —  that  is  in  their  capability  to 
develop  along  those  lines  that  we  call  civilization. 
Different  races  may  at  any  given  time  be  at  dif- 
ferent stages  of  this  development,  but  they  are  all 
equally  capable  of  achieving  the  highest  point  of 
this  process  of  evolution.  In  other  words  the  dif- 
ferences between  them  are  of  the  degree  of 
development  and  not  those  of  essential  kind  or 


218  Socialism  and  War 

substantive  quality,  so  to  say.  It  follows  logically 
from  this,  (although  this  logical  correlation  has 
^  not  always  been  recognized),  that  there  are  no 
separate  national  cultures,  but  only  one  human 
Civilization;  that  the  so-called  differences  of  na- 
tional culture  among  nations  at  the  same  stage  of 
civilization,  are  mere  differences  of  local  color, 
unessential  and  unenduring  in  character,  and 
bound  to  disappear  with  the  disappearance  of  the 
particular  mode  of  life  which  has  produced  them. 
This  position  is  not  exactly  novel.  It  is  in  fact 
a  further  development  and  consolidation  (to  use 
an  expression  that  has  become  familiar  since  the 
beginning  of  this  war)  of  the  theoretical  position 
achieved  during  the  peaceful  epoch  of  capitalism 
of  which  I  spoke  in  one  of  the  earlier  lectures.  This 
is  one  of  the  instances  when  we  Socialists  stand 
for  the  achievements  of  bourgeois-capitalist  civil- 
ization— achievements  of  the  vigorous  "classic" 
age  of  that  order  of  things  and  accompanying 
ideology — as  against  the  reactionary  tendencies 
of  its  own  later  and  more  decrepit  age.  But  we 
Socialists  are  never  stand-patters.  And  so  we  do 
not  simply  stand  pat  on  the  achievements  of  ca- 
pitalist civilization  at  its  best,  but  are  ready  to 
develop  them  further  to  their  logical  conclusions 
and  in  consonance  with  the  general  trend  of  evo- 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         219 

lution.  We  do  not,  therefore,  merely  take  our 
stand  on  the  essential  equality  of  all  races  and 
nations,  and  the  absence  of  any  distinctive  cul- 
tures; different  in  kind  and  therefore  liable  to 
differ  in  quality.  We  go  a  step  further  and  say 
that  while  civilization  is  common  to  all  mankind, 
this  civilization  is  improving  in  qualty  and  reaches 
hgher  levels  as  mankind  surmounts  the  inherited 
difficulties  of  historic  differences  and  approaches 
a  common  type  superior  to  all  localisms.  Our 
goal  is,  therefore,  not  cosmopolitanism,  a  state 
when  different  cultures  merely  dwell  side  by  side, 
but  true  internationalism,  when  all  national  cul- 
tural differences  will  be  merged  in  a  higher,  pan- 
human,  culture. 

Now,  I  realize  that  I  am  treading  here  on  ex- 
tremely dangerous  ground,  for  I  am  now  bucking 
up  not  only  against  the  nationalistic  prejudice  but 
also  against  the  dread  of  many  good  souls  in  our 
midst  against  so-called  "levelling".  It  is  curious 
how  even  people  who  can  see  the  utter  absurdity 
of  the  "levelling"  charge  when  brought  against  the 
economic  and  social  aspects  of  Socialism,  will  still 
consider  it  a  valid  objection  to  a  common,  non- 
local, and  non-national,  culture.  Somehow  they 
cannot  divest  themselves  of  the  absurd  notion  that 
a  common,   non-national,   culture,  means  a  less 


220  Socialism  and  War 

varied,  monotonous,  poor  kind  of  culture,  at  least 
from  the  artistic  point  of  view.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  such  fears  are  utterly  groundless,  and  we  need 
not  resort  to  hypothetical  speculations  as  to  a 
future  state  in  order  to  convince  ourselves  of  this. 
It  is  sufficient  to  examine  intelligently  the  well- 
authenticated  facts  of  the  historic  past.  And  we 
need  not  delve  far  into  history  either;  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  study  the  epoch  of  European  history 
which  closed  but  yesterday. 

As  I  pointed  out  in  an  earlier  lecture,  the  face  of 
Europe  was  not  so  very  long  ago  covered  by  a  mul- 
titude of  tribes,  each  having  its  own  character- 
istics of  speech,  dress,  and  manner,  which  marked 
it  off  and  set  it  apart  from  all  other  tribes.  These 
tribes  have  now  disappeared  and  their  place  has 
been  taken  by  a  few  great  nations.  Will  any  one 
say  that  European  culture,  its  literature,  its  art, 
have  become  poorer  on  that  account  ? 

Or,  perhaps  your  fancy  cannot  carry  you  so  far 
back  so  as  to  make  the  comparison.  Take,  then, 
the  Germany  of  yesterday  as  an  illustration.  After 
emerging  from  the  tribal  state  Germany  still  con- 
tinued broken  up  into  a  number  of  fragments: 
Prussians,  Bavarians,  Saxons,  Hessians,  Hanover- 
ians, etc.,  etc.,  and  not  merely  in  the  sense  that 
politically    these    sub-divisions    of  the   German 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         221 

people  were  independent  of  each  other,  but  in  the 
sense  that  there  existed  many  particular  patriot- 
isms as  a  concomitant  of  these  separate  political 
entities.  This  condition  continued  until  within 
the  memory  of  living  men.  And  their  consolidation 
was  opposed  much  on  the  same  grounds,  as  the 
consolidation  of  all  nations  into  a  common, 
nation-less,  humanity  is  being  opposed  now,  that 
is  to  say,  for  "cultural"  reasons.  The  Bavarian 
and  the  Saxon,  the  Swab  and  the  Hessian,  and  the 
rest,  were  afraid  that  the  culture  of  the  world 
would  grow  poorer  by  the  disappearance  of  the 
distinctive  individuality  of  the  three  dozen 
different  Germanic  "cultures"  and  their  merger 
into  one  "levelling"  German  culture. 

Have  these  fears  been  justified?  Has  German 
culture  grown  poorer,  or  has  the  world  at  large 
lost  any  valuable  cultural  element  by  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  duodez  cultures  of  Hanover 
and  Saxe-Coburg-Gotha,  or  even  of  the  largest 
unit  of  them  all  ?  Ask  the  world  of  art  and  letters. 
Nay,  ask  these  same  former  duodez  particular- 
ists.  Ask  any  one  of  the  present  day  shouters  for 
German  Kultur,  whether  Germany  has  lost  in 
culture  since  the  particular  culture  of  the 
shouter's  fatherland  of  fifty  years  ago,  be  it 
Prussia,    Saxony,    Bavaria,   or   Saxe-Meiningen, 


222  Socialism  and  War 

has  been  merged  in  the  general  culture  of  Ger- 
many. 

These  examples  prove  two  things :  First,  that  it 
is  utterly  absurd  to  assume  an  intimate  relation 
between  certain  political  boundaries,  which  may 
be  the  result  of  historic  accident,  even  if  they 
coincide  with  some  particular  twist  of  the  tongue, 
and  human  culture.  Second,  that  the  amalga- 
mation of  smaller  units  into  larger  ones  is  a 
means  of  progress  and  does  not  in  any  way  retard 
or  otherwise  injuriously  affect  human  culture. 
That,  on  the  contrary,  such  amalgamations  tend  to 
broaden  the  vision  and  quicken  the  intellect,  which 
of  necessity  results  in  a  richer  life  and  therefore 
in  a  richer  culture. 

To  that  extent  nations  have  been  the  means  of 
advancing  culture.  But  to  that  extent  only.  Having 
reached  the  nation-stage,  to  insist  on  remaining  at 
it  is  not  merely  to  refuse  to  go  forward  but  it  in- 
evitably means  an  attempt  to  go  backward. 
Nationalism  is  as  reactionary  now,  even  from  a 
purely  cultural  point  of  view,  as  was  German  par- 
ticularism two  generations  ago. 

But  Socialist  theory  does  not  stop  merely 
denying  the  nationalistic  theory  of  progress.  We 
have  a  theory  of  progress  of  our  own,  which  we 
substitute    for    the    national    theory.     The  sub- 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         223 

stance  of  our  theory — which  is  a  part  of  the  theory 
of  the  class-struggle — consists  in  the  claim  that 
social  classes  and  the  struggle  between  them  are 
a  means  of  furthering  the  general  progress  of 
humanity.  We  believe  that  the  fundamental  di- 
vision of  the  human  species  is  not  along  racial  or 
national  lines,  but  along  class  lines,  and  that  the 
great  struggles  which  led  to  those  social  trans- 
formations which  we  call  human  progress  were 
struggles  along  the  class  line  of  division.  There  is 
such  wide-spread  misconception  of  the  Class 
Struggle  theory  that  I  think  it  worth  while  to 
spend  a  few  minutes  in  giving  you  a  general  out- 
line of  this  theory,  as  a  clear  understanding  of 
this  theory  is  necessary  to  an  understanding  of 
what  I  believe  to  be  the  true  Socialist  position  on 
the  problem  of  peace  and  war. 

As  commonly  understood  the  theory  of  the 
Class  Struggle  "teaches"  that  Society  is  divided 
into  two  classes — the  capitalist  class  and  the 
working  class — and  that  these  two  classes  are, 
or  should  be,  in  a  life-and-death  struggle  with 
each  other.  This  notion  of  the  Class  Struggle 
theory  may  be  considered  a  fairly  correct 
approximation  of  one  element  in  that  theory.  But 
it  does  not  exhaust  its  meaning  by  far.  Indeed,  as 
so  stated,  it  leaves  out  its  most  essential  feature. 


224  Socialism  and  War 

For  this  theory  is  not  merely  a  statement  of 
things  as  they  are  in  our  society,  but  a  general- 
ization of  all  past  history,  a  theory  of  historical 
progress,  a  philosophy  of  history.  This  philosophy 
may  be  thus  summarized: 

Ever  since  human  society  has  been  based  on 
private  property,  which  means  practically  ever 
since  there  has  been  any  written  history  recording 
the  progress  of  mankind,  this  society  has  been 
divided  into  classes,  the  upper  classes  always  re- 
presenting a  certain  social  economy,  and  being  in 
control  of  the  principal  instruments  of  production 
and  distribution  of  that  economy.  These  different 
social  classes  are  in  an  continual  struggle  among 
themselves ;  not  merely  the  upper  classes  with  the 
lower,  but  the  upper  classes  among  themselves, 
each  one  of  them  struggling  to  make  its  economy 
the  dominant  economy  of  the  community  or  nation 
and  make  every  other  economy  subservient  to  it. 
In  this  struggle  for  economic  supremacy  each 
class  endeavors  to  gain  control  of  the  political 
power  of  the  community  in  order  to  use  the  en- 
tire collective  power  of  the  social  organism  to  fur- 
ther its  own  cause.  More  than  that :  each  class  tries 
to  give  the  social  organism  such  an  organization 
stitutions — as  best  suits  the  economic  order 
—  that  is,  it  tries  to  establish  such  political  in- 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         225 

which  it  represents.  Each  class  therefore  repre- 
sents a  distinct  economic  and  political  order  of 
things,  which  implies  also  a  distinct  moral  and 
intellectual  outlook  upon  the  world.  In  other 
words,  —  a  distinct  phase  of  civilization  or 
culture. 

The  important  classes,  representing  as  they  do, 
different  social  economies,  appear  on  the  historical 
arena  successively.  The  appearance  of  a  new 
class  upon  the  arena  of  human  history  therefore 
means  not  only  a  new  struggle  but  the  beginning 
of  a  new  epoch,  a  new  advance,  in  our  civilization. 

At  first  blush  there  seems  to  be  a  striking 
analogy  between  this  theory  and  the  nationalistic 
theory.  The  same  idea  of  advance  by  struggle  be- 
tween different  cultures  or  phases  of  civilization. 
The  same  idea  of  a  certain  part  of  the  human 
species  being  the  carrier  of  a  certain  culture  or 
phase  of  civilization,  and  the  necessity  of  that  par- 
ticular portion  of  mankind  obtaining  political 
dominion  over  the  rest  of  mankind  in  order  to 
permit  the  entire  human  race  to  take  a  step 
further  on  the  road  of  progress  by  giving  this 
particular  culture  or  form  of  civilization  the 
upper  hand  in  the  struggle  of  ideas  and  points  of 
view.  It  would  seem  in  fact  that  all  that  we 
Socialists  did,  in  our  boasted  advance  upon  the 


226  Socialism  and  War 

)  nationalistic  point  of  view,  was  to  substitute  the 
class  for  the  nation.  But  upon  a  closer  examin- 
ation of  the  subject  we  shall  find  that  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  class  for  the  nation  as  the  carrier 
of  progress  involves  a  fundamental  change  of  view 
in  the  outlook  upon  the  world  and  its  meaning, 
and  has  a  most  far-reaching  effect  upon  the 
decision  of  all  practical  problems  with  which  we 
are  confronted  in  our  daily  life,  both  as  individuals 
and  as  members  of  an  organized  community,  in- 
cluding the  great  problem  just  now  engrossing 
the  attention  of  the  entire  civilized  world,  —  the 
problem  of  peace  and  war. 

In  the  first  place,  the  nationalist  theory  is  a 
conservative  one,  if  not  actually  reactionary; 
while  the  Class  Struggle  theory  is  evolutionary 
and  progressive.  The  Nationalist  looks  upon  the 
world  through  the  naive  eyes  of  the  author  of  the 
Book  of  Genesis,  as  the  same  was  understood 
before  any  attempts  were  made  to  square  its  story 
of  Creation  with  the  results  of  modern  science: 
The  Creator,  in  his  wisdom,  created  a  number  of 
nationalities,  and  endowed  each  of  them  with  cer- 
tain characteristics  and  capabilities;  some  were 
intended  to  serve  and  others  to  rule;  the  ruling 
nationalities  were  each  made  the  carrier  of  a  cer- 
tain brand  of  culture ;  and  these  nationalities  are 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         227 

therefore  by  the  law  of  their  creation  and  exist- 
ence to  carry  on  a  struggle  for  the  supremacy  of 
particular  cultures. 

The  Class  Struggle  theory  does  not  look  to 
Genesis  but  to  Darwin  and  Science  for  an  ex- 
planation of  the  existence  of  races  and  nations 
and  their  different  endowments  and  character- 
istics. It  believes  in  the  theory  of  evolution  and 
applies  it  to  social  phenomena.  Races  are  the 
result  of  the  natural  conditions  of  the  existence 
of  the  human  race  in  different  natural  environ- 
ments, and  nations  are  the  result  of  these 
"natural"  conditions  plus  the  social  conditions 
under  which  the  different  groups  of  the  human 
family  live  and  work.  Neither  is  a  permanent 
entity.  Both  are  subject  to  change  and  trans- 
formation when  the  conditions  of  their  existence 
change.  And  these  conditions,  particularly  the 
social  conditions,  do  constantly  change.  But  not 
only  are  race  and  nation  changeable  entities,  the 
class,  likewise,  is  a  changing  entity;  its  existence 
being  the  result  of  social  evolution  and  its 
character  constantly  undergoing  a  process  of  evo- 
lution. 

This  difference  in  the  point  of  view  as  to  the 
origin  and  character  of  the  divisions  existing  in 
the  human  family  has  a  direct  bearing  upon  the 


228  Socialism  and  War 

subject  which  is  uppermost  in  our  minds  to-day: 
the  nationalist  theory  is  warlike,  while  the  Class 
Struggle  theory  is  peaceful. 

We  have  seen  that  the  basic  idea  of  nationalism 
is  that  the  Creator  has  created  different  nation- 
alities, carriers  of  different  cultures,  and  set  them 
to  fight  each  other.  The  idea  of  one  Chosen  People, 
the  carrier  of  the  Culture,  is  not  only  the  logical 
corollary  of  this  basic  idea,  but  is  practically  in- 
separable from  it.  And  the  idea  of  a  Chosen 
People  is  inseparable  from  the  ideas  of  war,  con- 
quest, dominion.  The  Chosen  People  of  Genesis 
and  what  follows  it  are  a  warlike,  ferocious,  con- 
quering, exterminating,  people.  Their  God  is  the 
conquering  Lord  of  Hosts, — the  cruel,  ruthless 
War  Lord.  And  properly  so :  The  Culture  can  be 
established  only  on  the  ruins  of  the  inferior  cul- 
tures contesting  its  supremacy.  It  must  exter- 
minate them  root  and  branch.  What  matters  it,  if 
in  the  process  some,  or  even  many,  human  lives 
are  destroyed?  Destruction  is  the  law  of  life,  and 
the  progress  of  the  species  is  worth  any  sacrifice. 
Particularly  if  the  sacrifice  is  of  inferior  human 
beings  and  it  rebounds  to  the  welfare  of  the 
superior  race,  the  Chosen  People.  And  the  modern 
adepts  of  the  Chosen  People  idea,  with  its  cultural 
mission,  have  shown  in  theory  and  practice  the 


L 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories        229 

acceptance  of  the  idea  that  the  War  Lord  and  his 
ways  are  still  the  proper,  if  not  the  only,  means 
of  carrying  out  this  cultural  mission. 

The  Class  Struggle  theory  stands  in  absolute 
contrast  to  this.  Not  only  are  there  no  inferior 
races  or  nations :  there  are  no  inherently  inferior 
classes.  The  class  representing  the  old  and  anti- 
quated order  of  things,  the  class  against  whom  the 
new  and  progressive  class  is  fighting,  does  not 
consist  of  inferior  individuals,  individuals  in 
themselves  less  useful  or  less  worthy  members  of 
the  social  organism.  It  is  only  their  social 
position  within  a  certain  social  order  that  makes 
the  rising  class  fight  them.  The  fight  can,  there* 
fore,  never  be  directed  against  them  as  individuals, 
there  can  be  no  personal  hatred  against  them, 
and  therefore  no  desire  to  encompass  their 
destruction.  The  fight  is  merely  against  their 
social  position ;  and  that  not  with  a  view  of  sup- 
planting them,  but  for  the  purpose  of  abolishing 
that  position  itself  and  place  them  in  a  position 
of  equality  with  the  members  of  the  attacking 
class.  The  class  struggle  is,  therefore,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  attacking  force,  not  a  fight 
for  superiority  but  for  equality. 

Furthermore,  even  as  a  class  the  class  attacked 
is  not  supposed  to  be  an  inferior  class,  in  the  eyes 


230  Socialism  and  War 

of  the  attacking  class ; —  but  merely  a  super- 
annuated class,  a  class  that  has  outlived  its  use- 
fulness. As  was  already  pointed  out,  the  Class 
Struggle  theory,  when  rightly  understood, 
ascribes  to  each  class  an  important  historical  part, 
a  cultural  mission.  And  while  each  succeeding 
class  represents  a  higher  phase  of  civilization,  it 
does  not  mean  that  the  earlier  one  was  of  less 
importance  in  the  general  development  of  human 
civilization.  Its  domination  is  to  be  abolished, 
but  it  is  to  be  neither  hated  nor  despised. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  most  important 
difference  between  the  national  and  the  class  point 
of  view  with  respect  to  the  "enemy  culture".  We 
have  already  seen  that  the  nationalist  superior 
culture  fights  to  destroy  its  opponents.  That  is 
perfectly  proper  from  its  point  of  view,  because 
the  enemy  culture  is  an  utterly  alien  and 
antagonistic  entity.  Not  so  with  class  culture. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Class  Struggle 
theory,  the  new  culture,  represented  by  the  rising 
class  is  not  something  utterly  alien  to  nor  some- 
thing entirely  independent  of,  the  culture  of  the 
class  which  it  is  fighting.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
intimately  connected  with  it,  being  merely  a 
further  step  in  the  same  process  of  development. 
With  all  its  enmity  to  the  order  to  be  abolished, 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         231 

is  does  not  mean  to  destroy  it  entirely,  only  certain 
of  its  attributes.  The  good  that  it  has  brought, 
the  real  cultural  advances  that  it  has  made  are  to 
be  retained  and  made  permanent. 

The  enemy  class  is  to  be  fought  and  its  social 
dominion  abolished,  but  its  cultural  work  is  not 
to  be  destroyed. 

In  fact  its  cultural  mission  is  to  be  helped  along, 
whenever  it  needs  our  assistance  in  order  to 
accomplish  this  task.  And  whenever  the  enemy 
class  should  prove  false  to  its  own  ideals  and  cul- 
tural mission,  and  abandon  its  historical  task  in 
the  advancement  of  civilization,  it  becomes  our 
mission  to  accomplish  this  task  and  finish  the  work 
thus  left  undone. 

But  there  is  another  important  distinction 
between  the  historico-cultural  conceptions  of 
Nationalism  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Class- 
Struggle  theory,  adopted  by  Socialism,  on  the 
other.  A  distinction  which  colors  the  entire  out- 
look upon  the  world  and  its  doings,  and  therefore 
of  the  greatest  practical  importance.  It  is  this : 

According  to  the  Nationalist-Imperialist  idea  of 
historical  progress,  races  and  nations  have  not 
only  always  existed,  but  will  always  exist.  This  is 
the  only  possible  modus  vivendi  of  the  human 
species.    The  nations  were  put  there  not  merely  to 


232  Socialism  and  War 

fight  for  supremacy,  but  also  to  preserve  their 
identity.  And  this  applies  to  superior  and  inferior 
races  alike,  to  conquering  as  well  as  vanquished 
nations.  The  super-race  or  super-nation  is  to  im- 
pose its  will  and  culture  upon  the  other  races  and 
nations,  but  it  must  not  assimilate  them,  absorb 
them  into  its  own  body,  on  pain  of  itself  degene- 
rating and  losing  that  position  in  the  world  for 
which  it  was  intended  by  the  act  of  Creation.  I 
have  already  mentioned  the  fact  that  according  to 
the  nationalistic  theory  the  chosen  race  or  nation 
is  the  only  carrier  of  its  particular  culture.  The  in- 
ferior races  and  nations  may  accept  it  by  submit- 
ting to  it  and  live  under  its  beneficient  rule,  but 
they  can  never  become  its  living  carriers  and  pro- 
pagators. Purity  of  race  is  itself  a  sign  of  super- 
iority, while  "mongrel"  races  are  necessarily  in- 
ferior. The  maintenance  of  the  chosen  race  or 
nation  in  its  pristine  purity  is  therefore  the  first 
commandment  in  the  nationalist  code. 

The  practical  ideal  of  the  nationalist  philosophy 
is  the  perpetuation  of  races  and  nationalities  with 
their  existing  divisions  into  superior  and  inferior, 
ruling  and  servile;  the  perpetuation  of  strife 
among  them  in  its  double  aspect  of  an  attempt  by 
all  the  so-called  superior  nations  to  enslave  the 
inferior  ones,  and  of  the  struggle  of  the  alleged 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories        233 

superior  nations  among  themselves  for  first  place, 
for  domination  of  the  entire  world.  In  other  words 
—  the  perpetuation  of  war. 

Not  so  the  Socialist  theory  of  the  Class  Struggle. 
The  class  is  not  an  essential  and  immutable  ele- 
ment of  progress  in  this  theory  in  the  same  sense 
that  the  Nation  is  in  the  nationalist  theory.  I  have 
already  pointed  out  the  fact  that  according  to  our 
theory  classes  are  not  eternal,  but  that  each  class 
is  destined  to  occupy  the  historical  arena  only  for 
a  given  time,  accomplishing  its  historical  mission, 
which  is  only  a  temporary  phase  of  the  evolution 
of  the  entire  species,  and  then  disappearing  with- 
in the  bowels  of  the  human  race  which  gave  it 
birth.  I  must  now  call  your  attention  to  another 
|  important  feature  of  our  theory :  Not  only  is  each 
class  merely  a  passing  phenomenon  of  human  evo- 
lution, but  progress-by-means-of-the-class-strug- 
gle  is  itself  only  a  phase  of  human  evolution,  the 
class  struggle  being  the  means  of  human  progress 
only  during  a  certain  epoch  of  the  history  of  the 
species, — the  epoch  in  which  private  property  is 
the  basis  of  the  social-economic  order.  There  were 
epochs  of  human  history  when  society  was  not 
divided  into  classes,  and  when  human  progress 
was  therefore  effected  without  the  intervention  of 
the  class  struggle.    And  we  are  looking  forward 


234  Socialism  and  War 

to  a  time  when  classes  will  again  disappear,  and 
when  human  progress  will  be  effected  by  other  and 
more  peaceful  means  than  the  struggle  of  the  clas- 
ses. Instead  of  preaching  or  teaching  a  perpetual 
struggle  of  the  classes,  the  most  essential  feature, 
the  cardinal  doctrine,  of  the  Class-Struggle  theory- 
is  the  abolition  of  classes  and  of  the  class  struggle. 

Applying  these  theoretical  distinctions  to  prac- 
tical problems  we  find  the  following  differences  of 
policy  between  the  Nationalists  and  the  Socialists : 

The  Nationalist  is  a  reactionary  or  conservative, 
while  the  Socialist  is  a  progressive.  The  Nation- 
alist does  not  merely  look  backward  for  the  pur- 
pose of  discovering  the  origin  of  races  and  nations 
in  the  act  of  Creation,  but  also  to  discover  his 
ideal  of  the  future.  His  futwe  lies  in  the  past. 
It  is  in  the  past  that  the  race  or  nation  existed  in 
unquestioned  purity.  It  was  then  that  its  true 
characteristics,  its  essential  qualities,  its  true 
spirit,  manifested  themselves — in  its  old  and  time- 
honored  institutions.  It  is  therefore  his  manifest 
duty  to  strive  to  preserve  these  institutions;  and 
the  older  the  institution  the  greater  the  duty  of 
'  preservation.  To  conserve  the  past,  with  its  out- 
lived and  outworn  institutions,  is  the  practical 
program  of  Nationalism.  And  wherever  the  old 
and  hoary  institutions  have  been  encroached  upon 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         235 

and  their  efficiency  impaired  by  recent  in- 
novations, this  program  includes  not  merely  con- 
servation of  what  is,  but  also  a  retracing  of  steps 
in  order  to  regain  what  was.  Conservatism  is  fol- 
lowed logically  by  reaction. 

A  glance  at  the  world  around  us,  and  a  look  into 
the  history  of  the  past  fifty  years,  will  prove  the 
correctness  of  this  assertion.  I  stated  in  one  of 
the  preceding  lectures  that  the  republican-demo- 
cratic form  of  government  was  an  essential  ele- 
ment of  bourgeois-capitalistic  philosophy  during 
its  peaceful-cosmopolitan  epoch,  when  that  philo- 
sophy reached  its  highest  cultural  level.  During 
the  fifty  years  or  so  that  have  passed  since,  there 
has  been  considerable  filling  and  backing,  and 
considerable  retracing  of  steps  in  that  particular. 
Instead  of  forging  forward  towards  a  realization 
of  its  ideals,  the  bourgeoisie,  under  the  influence 
of  the  Imperialistic  trend,  has  entirely 
abandoned  its  demand  for  a  republican  form  of 
government,  not  only  as  a  practical  program 
but  as  an  ideal.  At  no  time  within  the  past 
century  and  a  half  were  monarchical  institutions 
so  popular  among  the  "educated  classes"  as  at  the 
present  time.  This  is  particularly  true  of  those 
parts  of  Western  Europe  where  republicanism 
was  strongest  half-a-century  ago. 


236  Socialism  and  War 

Some  of  us  old-fashioned  Americans  who  have 
failed  to  read  the  signs  of  the  times  may  have  been 
rather  surprised  to  hear  Prof.  Munsterberg  of 
Harvard  tell  us  soon  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  war  that  in  Germany  they  considered  a 
republic  "reactionary";  that  not  only  did  they 
(that  is,  the  German  educated  classes)  not  aspire 
towards  a  republic,  but  that  they  would  consider 
the  introduction  of  the  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment as  a  relapse  into  a  lower  cultural  level.  Per- 
haps some  of  us  even  jumped  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  learned  Professor  was  libelling  his 
countrymen.  But  to  those  who  are  familiar  with 
the  latest  fruits  and  flowers  of  Imperialistic 
culture,  there  was  nothing  new  or  startling  in  the 
gentleman's  declaration.  His  was  the  true  voice 
of  the  new  trend.  A  new  trend  which  is  not 
peculiar  to  Germany,  but  is  common  to  all  up-to- 
date  Europe.  And  while  this  trend  is  stronger  in 
Germany  than  elsewhere,  the  difference  is  merely 
one  of  degree  and  not  of  kind.  As  the  foremost 
representative  of  the  modern  Imperialistic  spirit, 
as  the  principal  expounder  of  the  race-national- 
istic theories  which  form  its  base,  Germany 
naturally  leads  in  this  march  backwards.  But  the 
others  follow,  and  not  so  very  far  behind  either. 

The  only  ones  that  have  refused  to  follow  were 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories        237 

those  portions  of  the  working  class  who,  following 
the  leadership  of  the  Socialist  theorists,  accepted 
the  doctrines  of  the  Class  Struggle  philosophy  and 
the  practical  program  dictated  thereby.  Facing 
forward,  they  care  very  little  for  the  cast-off 
clothes  of  the  past ;  nor  have  they  any  particular 
attachment  for  present-day  institutions  either  be- 
cause of  their  age  or  supposed  connection  with  a 
particular  national  spirit  or  so-called  genius  of  the 
race.  Furthermore,  believing  in  a  steady  forward 
march  of  the  human  race  as  a  whole,  they  do  be- 
lieve in  the  achievements  of  the  entire  human  race, 
including  certain  forms  of  social  and  economic 
life,  which  we  ought  to  maintain  and  develop  fur- 
ther. Among  these  are  republican  and  democra- 
tic forms  of  government.  The  Socialist  part  of  the 
working  class  therefore  considers  itself  in  duty 
bound  to  cherish  the  ideal  of,  and  carry  on  the 
struggle  for,  republicanism  and  democracy  wher- 
ever and  whenever  the  bourgeoisie,  the  class 
whose  mission  it  was  to  introduce  these  forms  of 
government  into  modern  society,  has  gone  back 
on  them. 

And  here  I  must  stop  for  a  moment  in  order  to 
explain  what,  according  to  the  Class  Struggle 
theory,  was  the  historic  mission  of  the  capitalist 
class — in  the  broader  meaning  of  those  words 


238  Socialism  and  War 

which  makes  them  co-terminous  with  the  word 
bourgeoisie — as  that  has  an  intimate  relation 
with  our  position  on  the  war  question  as  I  under- 
stand it. 

Briefly  speaking,  the  historic  mission  of  the 
capitalist  class  was  to  establish  political  liberty 
and  freedom  of  economic  intercourse.  I  do  not 
want  to  be  misunderstood :  I  do  not  use  the  word 
"mission"  in  the  same  sense  as  the  nationalistic 
theorists  use  that  word,  —  in  a  teleologic  sense. 
What  I  want  to  say  is  this:  In  order  to  fully 
develop  those  economic  forces  which  gave  birth 
to  and  attained  their  development  during  the 
epoch  known  as  the  capitalistic  era,  two  things 
were  necessary:  personal,  and  economic  freedom. 
The  capitalist  class  needed  these  two  things  in 
order  to  overthrow  the  political  rule  of  the  feudal 
class,  which  preceded  it  in  the  rulership  of  society, 
and  abolish  the  economic  order  known  as  feudal- 
ism. These  two  things  therefore  became  the 
essential  features  of  its  ideology, — its  way  of  look- 
ing upon  the  world.  Driven  by  its  economic 
interests,  and  its  ideals  born  of  those  interests,  it 
strove  to  accomplish  these  two  purposes,  which, 
when  accomplished,  constituted  an  absolute  and 
permanent  gain  for  human  civilization. 

By  "economic  freedom"  I  mean  here  freedom  of 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         239 

economic  intercourse,  which  must  be  reckoned 
among  the  great  achievements  of  capitalism, 
along  with  political  liberty.  For  freedom  of  eco- 
nomic intercourse,  both  within  the  nation  and 
between  nations,  is  absolutely  necessary  for  a  full 
and  rational  development  of  all  the  economic 
forces  latent  within  our  social  system.  Unfortun- 
ately, the  capitalist  class  fully  accomplished  these 
achievements  only  in  theory,  and  not  in  practice. 
For  a  short  time  and  in  a  limited  area  it  came 
near  accomplishing  it  fully,  when  it  suddenly 
halted  and  turned  back  upon  itself. 

The  working  class,  which  considers  itself  the 
heir  to  all  of  the  cultural  achievements  of  the  past, 
which  it  must  use  as  a  foundation  in  building  its 
own  cultural  edifice  in  the  future,  therefore  finds 
that  the  two  cultural  ideals  of  capitalism  have  been 
placed  by  fate  in  its  keeping.  Besides  doing  its 
own  work  proper  it  must  carry  to  a  finish  the  task 
left  unfinished  by  the  capitalist  class,  as  well  as 
protect  against  all  attack  whatever  has  already 
been  accomplished. 

Now,  what  is  the  application  of  the  theoretical 
positions  of  those  who  accept  the  Class-Struggle 
Theory  of  evolution  to  the  subject  of  war? 

It  is  self-evident  that  those  who  accept  the 
theory  of  the  Class  Struggle  cannot  possibly  be  for 


240  Socialism  and  War 

war  in  the  same  sense  and  for  the  same  reasons 
that  the  Nationalists  may  be,  and  usually  are,  for 
war.  War  is,  at  best,  carried  on  by  a  nation  for 
national  purposes.  Denying  as  the  Socialists  of 
that  school  do  the  importance  or  legitimacy  of  the 
national  purposes,  they  cannot,  of  course,  favor 
such  wars.  Whatever  valid  argument  the  Nation- 
alist may  advance  on  behalf  of  war,  applies,  from 
the  Class  Struggle  point  of  view,  only  to  "the  war 
of  the  classes",  but  not  to  war  among  nations. 
They  cannot,  therefore,  have  any  valid  reason  for 
the  awful  destruction  of  life  and  property  which 
war  occasions,  and  must  therefore  be  opposed  to 
war  for  purely  humanitarian  reasons.  The  human- 
itarian point  of  view  is  in  itself  a  perfectly  legiti- 
mate one,  and  is  the  only  one  naturally  taken  by 
us  when  there  are  no  reasons  sufficient  to  out- 
weigh it.  The  nationalistic  philosophy  presents 
such  outweighing  reasons  in  the  "national  in- 
terest". Take  away  the  validity  of  the  "national 
interest"  reason  from  our  feeling  and  our  judg- 
ment, and  we  are  thrown  back  on  our  common 
humanity,  supported  by  our  personal  interest 
which  is  nearly  always  against  war  because  of  the 
great  sacrifices  which  it  brings  with  it.  lam  speak- 
ing, of  course,  of  really  popular  wars,  in  which 
the  number  of  those  who  go  into  the  war  either 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         241 

because  of  an  excess  of  "fighting  blood"  or  because 
of  actual  pecuniary  interest  must  be  a  negligible 
quantity 

But  the  Socialists  who  accept  the  Class  Struggle 
theory  of  progress  must  be  opposed  to  war  for 
other  than  purely  humanitarian  reasons.  In  fact, 
all  the  valid  reasons  which  the  nationalist  ad- 
vances in  favor  of  war  are  to  the  Socialist  so 
many  reasons  why  he  should  be  opposed  to  it. 
Nay,  all  the  reasons  which  the  nationalist  can 
advance  in  favor  of  the  peaceful  acquisition  of 
power  by  his  nation,  whenever  peaceful  acqui- 
sition of  power  is  possible,  are  to  the  Socialist  so 
many  additional  reasons  why  he  should  be  opposed 
to  war. 

I  have  already  stated  that  whatever  valid 
reasons  the  nationalists  may  advance  in  favor  of 
war  apply,  from  the  Socialist  point  of  view,  only 
to  "the  war  of  the  classes".  It  goes  therefore 
without  saying  that  whatever  valid  ground  there 
may  be,  from  the  nationalistic  point  of  view,  for 
the  desire  to  increase  the  power  and  extend  the 
influence  of  one's  nation  by  "peacef  ul"  means,  that 
is  all  means  short  of  actual  wholesale  destruction 
of  lives  and  property,  are,  from  the  Socialist  point 
of  view,  so  many  grounds  for  the  desire  to  in- 
crease the  power  and  extend  the  influence  of  one's 


242  Socialism  and  War 

class.  From  the  Class  Struggle  point  of  view  the 
class  does  in  fact  occupy,  for  the  time  being,  that 
is  as  long  as  society  is  divided  into  classes,  the 
same  place  that  the  nation  does  in  the  most  ultra- 
nationalistic  philosophy.  The  welfare  of  his 
class  is  a  "good  citizen's"  chief  concern.  The  good 
class-patriot  will  therefore  labor  incessantly  for 
the  increase  of  the  power  and  the  extension  of 
the  influence  of  his  class.  Paraphrasing  the 
national-patriot  he  says :  "My  class  may  it  ever  be 
right,  but  right  or  wrong  my  class".  And  when  it 
comes  to  the  choice  of  means  in  order  to  further 
the  cause  of  his  class,  he  again  follows  the  lead  of 
the  good  national-patriot  and  says:  "I  shall  use 
peaceful  means  if  I  can,  but  any  means  that  will 
serve  the  purpose  if  I  must".  The  class-interest 
is  paramount  to  him  to  any  other  consideration, 
just  as  the  national  interest  is  paramount  to  any 
other  consideration  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
national  patriot. 

But  national  wars  are  always  opposed  to  the 
class-interests  of  those  engaged  in  the  class- 
struggle  from  below,  wherever  "the  war  of  the 
classes"  is  in  progress.  Just  as  the  class-war  is 
opposed  to  the  national  interest  when  a  national 
war  is  in  progress.  The  divisions  along  class  lines 
on  the  one  hand  and  national  lines  on  the  other  are 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         243 

fundamentally  antagonistic  to  each  other.  It  may- 
be stated  as  a  general  proposition,  to  which  only- 
few,  if  any,  exceptions  can  be  found,  that  their 
interests  are  in  deadly  antagonism,  in  the  sense 
that  whatever  intensifies  one  line  of  demarcation 
— strengthens  one  line  of  division — necessarily 
impairs  and  weakens  the  other  line  of  division. 
War  conducted  along  one  line  of  division  neces- 
sarily crosses,  and  therefore  impedes,  war  con- 
ducted along  the  other  line  of  division. 

When  the  present  war  broke  out,  the  national 
interests  which  dictated  and  directed  it  im- 
mediately demanded  a  cessation  of  the  class  war 
as  detrimental  to  the  prosecution  of  the  national 
war.  And  those  who  accepted  the  nationalistic 
point  of  view  in  this  war  agreed  to  suspend  the 
class-war,  as  a  subordinate  struggle,  in  view  of 
the  presence  of  the  national  war,  which  they  con- 
sider the  paramount  struggle.  And,  assuming  the 
paramountcy  of  the  division  along  national  lines 
over  the  division  along  class  lines,  and  therefore 
of  the  national  interest  over  the  class  interest, 
this  action  was  absolutely  correct.  The  "Burg- 
frieden",  as  the  suspension  of  hostilities  along 
class  lines  is  called  in  Germany,  is  an  official 
acknowledgment  of  two  things :  first,  that  the  two 
struggles — national  struggle    and    class   struggle 


244  Socialism  and  War 

— cross  each  other's  path,  interfere  with  each 
other,  are  inimical  one  to  another;  and,  second, 
that  the  national  struggle  is  recognized  as  of 
basic  importance,  besides  which  the  class  strug- 
gle is  a  mere  family  squabble. 

And  just  as  the  Burgfrieden — inter  class  peace 
— is  the  logical  position  for  those  who  believe  in 
the  paramountcy  of  the  national  struggle  and 
therefore  of  national  interests,  so  is  international 
peace  the  only  possible  position  of  those  who 
acknowledge  the  paramountcy  of  the  division 
along  class  lines,  and  therefore  of  the  class  strug- 
gle and  of  class  interests. 

Just  as  the  national  interest  demands  the  sus- 
pension of  the  class  struggle  in  order  to  effect  the 
unity  of  the  nation,  which  it  considers  not  only 
necessary  to  actual  success  in  the  national  war 
but  the  only  basis  for  a  real  national  war ;  so  the 
class  interest  demands  the  absolute  suspension  of 
all  national  hostilities,  the  unity  of  the  class  ir- 
respective of  conflicting  national  interests,  as  the 
only  basis  upon  which  the  class  struggle  can  be 
conducted  either  logically  or  successfully.  It  is 
because  of  this  that  the  call  "Workers  of  the 
World  Unite!"  has  become  the  battle-cry  of  the 
working  class  when  it  consciously  entered  upon 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories        245 

the  warpath  in  the  class  struggle  now  waging  in 
our  society. 

Active,  unrelentless  opposition  to  war,  irre- 
spective of  the  demands  of  so-called  "national  in- 
terests", is  therefore  the  "natural  state"  of  the 
Socialist  who  accepts  the  Class  Struggle  theory. 
Believing  as  he  does  that  the  basic  division  of 
mankind  is  along  class  lines,  and  that  it  is  that 
division  which  counts  principally  in  all  questions 
affecting  the  progress  of  humanity,  the  so-called 
"national  interests"  seem  to  him  a  snare  and  a 
delusion.  A  snare,  because  instead  of  promoting 
progress  the  division  which  is  the  foundation  of 
these  interests  lies  across  its  path  and  interferes 
with  the  prosecution  of  the  struggle  which  really 
does  promote  progress, — the  class  struggle.  And 
a  delusion,  because  there  is  in  reality  no  such  thing 
as  a  "national  interest",  in  the  sense  of  an  inter- 
est which  affects  equally  the  entire  nation  and 
the  preservation  of  which  is  equally  important 
to  all  classes  within  the  nation. 

Under  certain  exceptional  circumstances  all 
the  classes  within  a  nation  may  have  a  common 
interest  in  a  certain  result,  which  each  may  con- 
sider desirable  from  its  own  point  of  view.  But 
such  common  interest  is  not  therefore  or  neces- 
sarily a  truly  national  interest,  that  is  an  interest 


246  Socialism  and  War 

which  reposes  in  or  adheres  to  the  nation  qua 
nation.  And,  therefore  even  when  working  for 
such  a  common  end,  the  class  point  of  view  which 
makes  this  end  desirable  for  the  members  of  each 
class  must  never  be  lost  sight  of.  If  the  class  point 
of  view  is  lost  sight  of,  and  the  national  point  of 
view  adopted  in  such  a  case,  infinite  harm  is 
likely  to  result  to  the  under-class  struggling  for 
supremacy  and  therefore  interested  in  pushing 
the  class  fight.  Let  me  give  you  an  illustration: 
Supposing  the  carnage  of  the  war  in  the  Western 
battle  area  had  caused  the  plague  to  appear  in 
Belgium  and  Northern  France.  The  civil  pop- 
ulation of  Belgium  as  well  as  the  German  army 
of  invasion  now  occupying  Belgium,  would  be  in- 
terested in  stopping  the  ravages  of  the  plague. 
These  inimical  parts  of  the  present  population  of 
Belgium  would  then  have  the  common  object  of 
exterminating  the  plague  germ,  or  whatever  else 
has  to  be  done  in  order  to  stop  the  further  pro- 
gress of  the  scourge.  But  it  is  evident  that  this 
would  neither  unite  the  inimical  portions  of  the 
present  population  of  Belgium  into  one  har- 
monious whole,  nor  would  it  turn  this  community 
of  interest  into  an  identity  or  solidarity  of  in- 
terest. 

And  don't  imagine  that  this   is    a   distinction 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories        247 

without  a  difference.     On  the  contrary,  the  dif- 
ference is  a  deep-rooted  one  and  likely  to  have 
very  important  practical  results.     Supposing  it 
were  discovered  that  the  surest  and  most  effective 
way  of  combatting  the  plague  would  be  for  the 
German    army    to    withdraw    from    Belgium,  a 
real  identity  of  interests  would  of  course  make 
the  German  army  withdraw  at  once,  but  a  mere 
community  of  interest  in     fighting    the    plague 
wouldn't.     Again,   suppose  that  the  ravages  of 
the  plague  were  particularly  strong  in  the  army 
camps,  so  that  there  was  danger  of  the  army  be- 
coming so  weakened  as  to  be  compelled  to  with- 
draw into  Germany.    A  real  identity  of  interest 
would  evidently  dictate  to  the  Belgians  an  entirely 
different  policy  from  the  mere  community  of  in- 
terest in  fighting  a  common  enemy.  Woe  to  the 
side  that  would  mistake    community  for  identity 
of  interests !  You  may  be  sure  the  German  army 
wouldn't.    The  upper-dog  never  does. 

In  the  foregoing  I  have  attempted  to  give  the 
Socialist  position  on  war  generally  and  uninflu- 
enced by  local  conditions ;  the  Socialist  position  as 
it  would  be  in  a  case  where  the  issue  between  na- 
tional struggle  and  class  struggle  would  be 
squarely  presented  by  the  absence  of  complicating 
circumstances.  But  in  the  actual  world  of  fact 


248  Socialism  and  War 

issues  are  very  seldom  presented  in  a  simple  form. 
In  most  cases  issues  are  obscured  by  extraneous 
matter,  and  complicated  by  secondary  issues.  As 
far  as  the  subject  which  we  are  now  discussing 
is  concerned  the  issue  may  be  complicated,  prin- 
cipally, by  three  kinds  of  facts  or  considerations : 
(1)  Facts  relating  to  the  stage  of  development  of 
the  countries  coming  into  question  in  any  partic- 
ular war,  and  the  influence  that  the  war  may  have 
on  the  development  of  those  liberties  which,  as  I 
have  pointed  out  before,  we  Socialists  regard  as 
the  cultural  achievement  of  the  capitalist  epoch  to 
be  cherished  and  preserved  for  the  future  in  the 
countries  affected  by  the  war.  (2)  Facts  re- 
lating to  the  condition  and  development  of  na- 
tionalistic tendencies,  and  the  manner  in  which 
they  would  be  affected  by  the  war,  or  by  a  partic- 
ular manner  of  its  termination.  (3)  General  con- 
siderations of  justice,  and  the  influence  that  the 
war  may  have  on  the  general  development  of  the 
principles  of  liberty. 

To  take  up  the  last  class  of  facts  first:  As  I 
have  already  stated,  the  Socialists  do  not  believe 
in  any  superior  and  inferior  races.  They  there- 
fore cannot  see  any  reason  for  the  subjection  of 
one  race  or  nation  by  another.  On  the  other  hand 
their  ideal  looks  towards  a  time  when  there  will 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         249 

be  no  struggle  and  no  subjection  of  any  kind  of 
one  part  of  the  human  race  by  another.  They 
even  want  to  abdicate  the  predominance  of  their 
own  class  after  it  shall  have  achieved  supremacy 
in  order  to  accomplish  this  result.  Any  kind  of 
subjection,  and  for  whatever  cause,  be  it  sex, 
race,  color,  religion,  or  "previous  condition  of 
servitude",  is  equally  abhorrent  to  them.  They 
therefore  believe  in  national  freedom,  in  the  right 
of  each  nation  to  be  master  of  its  own  destinies,  so 
long  as  nations  do  exist.  This  includes  political, 
economic,  as  well  as  spiritual  and  intellectual 
freedom. 

And  they  are  ready  to  go  to  war  for  it  when  ne- 
cessary. That  is  why  the  Socialists  have  always 
been  in  sympathy  with  all  "wars  of  liberation", 
although  they  well  knew  that  a  "war  of  libera- 
tion" always  meant  to  the  great  masses  of  the 
people  the  liberation  from  a  "foreign  yoke"  so 
that  they  might  be  exploited  by  their  own  ruling 
class.  It  must  be  stated,  however,  that  by  rea- 
son of  this  latter  fact,  which  made  the  "liberty" 
in  question  a  pure  fiction,  the  Socialists'  enthu- 
siasm for  a  "war  of  liberation"  always  depended 
largely  on  whether  or  not  it  accorded  with  the 
development  of  liberal  institutions  generally,  and 
the  requirements  of  the  class  struggle.     To  the 


250  Socialism  and  War 

same  category,  although  somewhat  exceptional 
in  its  facts,  belongs  our  Civil  War,  which  was  on 
the  part  of  the  North  a  "War  of  Liberation"  for 
the  Negro  race  in  its  results  at  least.  It  therefore 
evoked  the  enthusiastic  support  of  Karl  Marx,  who 
did  much  to  uphold  the  cause  of  the  North  by  mar- 
shalling on  its  behalf  the  advanced  portion  of 
the  English  working  class,  at  a  time  when  the 
ruling  classes  of  England  were  favoring  the 
South,  and  although  the  immediate  interests  of 
the  English  workingmen  were  on  the  same  side. 
Such  wars  are  now,  however,  practically  a  thing 
of  the  past;  at  least  until  the  dawn  of  a  new 
revolutionary  epoch. 

A  fair  example  of  the  first  class  of  cases  re- 
ferred to  by  me  above  is  the  situation  in  Europe 
as  it  existed  immediately  prior  to  and  at  the  time 
of  the  Crimean  War,  when  Marx  was  in  favor  of  a 
war  by  the  Western  European  powers  against 
Russia.  As  I  have  already  stated  in  my  last  lecture 
the  differences  in  the  economic  development  be- 
tween Russia  and  the  West  of  Europe,  and  their 
international  balance  of  power  as  it  then  was, 
seemed  to  Marx  to  demand  a  war  by  a  Western 
European  coalition  against  Russia,  as  a  means 
of  insuring  the  unhindered  development  of  free 
institutions  in  Western  Europe.  I  have  already 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         251 

pointed  out,  in  the  same  lecture,  that  European 
conditions  have  changed  so  much  since  the  Crim- 
ean War,  that  a  war  against  Russia  is  now  in  no 
way  different  from  a  war  against  any  other  "civil- 
ized" nation.  And  I  may  add  here  that  the  general 
situation  the  world  over  is  now  such  that  no  war 
could  be  planned  that  would  serve  to  advance  the 
cause  of  free  institutions  either  in  any  of  the  war- 
ring countries  or  anywhere  else  in  the  world.  On 
the  contrary,  the  most  probable,  if  not  the  in- 
evitable result,  of  any  war  waged  at  this  time 
would  be  a  considerable  strengthening  of  the 
powers  of  reaction  everywhere,  and  almost  of  all 
naturally  in  the  warring  countries.  The  present 
war  has  already  furnished  abundant  proof  of  the 
correctness  of  this  assertion.  And  I  venture  to 
assert  that  we  have  not  seen  the  end  of  it  yet,  nor 
the  worst  of  it. 

The  present  war  also  furnishes  indisputable 
proof,  if  any  proof  were  indeed  necessary,  that 
every  war  serves  to  accentuate  national  divisions, 
intensifies  national  animosities  wherever  they 
existed  before  and  creates  new  ones  where  none 
existed  before,  and  generally  gives  new  life  and 
impetus  to  the  nationalistic  spirit;  and,  cor- 
respondingly,  lowers  the  vitality  of  the  forces 


252  Socialism  and  War 

carrying  on  the  class  struggle  on  behalf  of  the 
working  class. 

It  may  therefore  be  confidently  asserted  that 
no  matter  what  causes  Socialists  may  have  had 
for  desiring  war  in  the  past, — in  our  own  day  and 
generation,  at  least,  no  combination  of  circum- 
stances is  at  all  likely  to  arise  which  could  out- 
weigh the  great  objections  which  Socialists  must- 
have  to  war.  The  present-day  policy  of  Social- 
ism must  therefore  be  unalterable  opposition  to 
all  wars  of  aggression. 

And  not  only  before  war  has  broken  out,  but  all 
the  time. 

And  now  as  to  defensive  wars.  I  have  already 
stated  that  up  to  the  present  war  the  rule  of 
action  most  widely  accepted  among  Socialists  was 
based  on  the  distinction  between  wars  of  ag- 
gression and  defensive  wars.  Its  greatest  cham- 
pion was  Bebel,  and  it  found  its  classic  expression 
in  his  announcement,  that — "Wenn  wir  werden 
angegriffen  dann  wehren  wir  uns", — if  we  are 
attacked  we  shall  defend  ourselves.  I  have  also 
mentioned  already  the  criticism  which  Kautsky 
passed  on  the  distinction  between  aggressive  and 
defensive  war  as  a  rule  of  action.  Since  the 
commencement  of  the  present  war  it  has  been  re- 
peatedly stated  that  this  war  has  conclusively 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         253 

demonstrated  the  untenableness  of  that  distinc- 
tion. These  statements,  usually  made  by  the  apol- 
ogists of  Germany  and  of  the  conduct  of  the  Ger- 
man Socialists  in  this  war,  must  not  be  confused 
with  Kautsky's  criticism  of  Bebel's  position  at 
the  Jena  Congress. 

Kautsky's  contention  was  that  Bebel's  distinc- 
tion was  an  unserviceable  one  in  practice,  because 
of  the  fact  that  if  we  adhered  strictly  to  the  policy 
that  "if  we  are  attacked  we  shall  defend  our- 
selves" it  lies  easily  within  the  power  of  any 
government,  particularly  such  a  government  as 
the  German  Government  which  can  back  up  its 
lies  by  a  forcible  suppression  of  the  truth,  to  make 
an  aggressive  war  appear  to  the  majority  of  the 
working  class  as  a  defensive  one,  and  thus  drag  us 
into  an  aggressive  war.  He  therefore  sought  for  a 
rule  of  conduct  which  would  leave  us  our  liberty 
of  action  even  in  case  of  a  defensive  war.  The 
present  German  apologists  do  exactly  the  reverse. 
Asserting  that  the  present  war  has  demonstrated 
the  lack  of  all  distinction  between  wars  of  aggres- 
sion and  defensive  wars,  they  proceed  to  disclaim 
any  obligation  on  the  part  of  Socialists  to  refrain 
from  engaging  in  any  kind  of  war.  In  other 
words,  they  dwell  on  Kautsky's  criticism  of  the 
distinction  between  aggressive  and  defensive  wars 


254  Socialism  and  War 

not  for  the  purpose  of  emancipating  ourselves 
from  a  doctrinaire  rule  of  action  which  might  in 
practice  turn  us  over  bound  hand  and  foot  to  our 
enemies,  the  militarists;  but  for  the  purpose  of 
throwing  aside  all  restraint  of  Socialist  principle 
or  policy,  so  that  we  may  join  in  the  militarist  re- 
vels even  to  the  extent  of  joining  in  avowedly  ag- 
gressive wars.  We  know  that  the  devil  can  quote 
Scripture.  Socialist  opportunists  who  chafe  under 
the  restraints  imposed  upon  their  conduct  by  So- 
cialist principles  are  past  masters  in  quoting 
Marx,  Engels,  and  other  Socialist  authorities,  to 
cover  up  their — from  a  Socialist  point  of  view — ■ 
thoroughly  disrepubtable  conduct. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  far  from  proving  that  there 
is  really  no  difference  between  aggressive  and  de- 
fensive war,  the  present  war  has  proven  just 
the  contrary.  There  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  the 
decidedly  unfriendly  feeling  against  Germany 
which  now  prevails  all  over  the  world  is  due  in  a 
measure  at  least  to  the  fact  that  the  world  believes 
Germany  to  have  been  the  aggressor  in  the  pre- 
sent war.  And  the  strong  feeling  of  resentment 
prevalent  among  Socialists  the  world  over  against 
the  German  Socialists  over  their  conduct  in  this 
war,  a  feeling  which  pervades  circles  hitherto 
most  friendly  to  the  German  Socialists,  is  due  al- 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         255 

most  entirely  to  the  fact  that  they  are  believed  to 
have  engaged  in  aggressive  war.    All  the  protest- 
ations of  Germany  and  of  German  Socialists  that 
this  is  a  defensive  war  on  Germany's  part  could 
not  affect  the  world's  judgment,  arrived  at  with- 
out great  difficulty,  on  the  question  of  fact  as  to 
who  is  the  aggressor  in  this  war.  Nor  could  any 
specious  arguments  to  the  effect  that  there  really 
is  no  difference  between  aggressive  and  defensive 
war  affect  our  instinctive  feeling  to  the  contrary 
and  the  consequent  judgment  of  the  world  at  large, 
including  the  Socialists,  on  the  moral  questions  in- 
volved. 

That  does  not  mean,  however,  that  from  a  So- 
cialist point  of  view  every  defensive  war  is  right, 
—that  we  can  subscribe  to  the  rule  that  "if  we 
are  attacked  we  shall  defend  ourselves".  And  quite 
aside  from  the  fact  that  this  rule  may  be  impracti- 
able  as  a  guide  to  action,  as  pointed  out  by  Kauts- 
ky.  The  real  trouble  with  this  rule  is  that  it  is 
wrong  in  principle.  It  is  based  on  the  nationalistic 
principle  that  the  "nation"  or  "country"  must  be 
preserved  in  all  its  vigor  and  power;  any  attack 
upon  it  must  therefore  be  repelled,  as  it  is  likely  to 
diminish  that  power.  But  once  you  cast  the  na- 
tionalist principle  aside,  and  substitute  class-  in- 
terest for  national  interest  as  the  basic  principle 


256  Socialism  and  War 

determining  conduct,  why  should  the  members  of 
the  working  class  go  to  war  with  oiher  members 
of  the  working  class  in  order  to  defend  the  power 
of  their  respective  "nations".  Marx  said  that  the 
working  man  has  no  country.  Nor  has  it  any 
nation.  In  the  sense  in  which  the  words  "country" 
and  "nation"  are  used  by  nationalistic  patriots, — 
that  is  to  say  in  the  sense  that  their  "power"  is  his 
power,  which  it  is  in  his  interest  to  defend. 

Why,  for  instance,  should  English  workingmen 
go  to  the  defence  of  "their  country"  if  the  United 
States  were  to  attack  England  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  away  Canada  ?  What  interest  has  the  Eng- 
lish working  class  in  the  "power"  of  the  British 
Empire  which  expresses  itself  in  the  possession 
of  Canada,  Egypt,  South  Africa,  or  India, — that 
would  not  only  be  worth  the  sacrifices  which  a 
great  war  entails  upon  the  working  class  of  the 
country  engaged  in  war,  but  also  the  weakening 
of  the  working  class  generally  by  a  war  among  its 
different  local  divisions,  which  is  equivalent  to 
"civil  war"  in  the  domain  of  national  interests? 
Similarly,  why  should  French  workingmen  go  to 
the  defence  of  "their  country"  in  order  to  pre- 
serve their  "national  power"  which  expresses  it- 
self in  the  possession  of  Algiers,  Morocco,  or 
Tunis, — if  France  should  be  attacked  by  some 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         257 

power  coveting  the  same?  And  why  should  the 
German  working  class  rush  to  the  defence  of 
Germany  if  that  "country"  should  be  attacked  by 
Japan  for  the  purpose  of  wresting  from  it  Kiau- 
chau,  or  by  England  for  the  purpose  of  dispos- 
sessing it  from  Southwest  or  Southeast  Africa, 
or  even  by  Russia  for  the  purpose  of  despoiling 
it  of  the  Polish  Province  of  Posen?  What 
interest  have  German  workingmen  in  "Ger- 
many's" possession  of  Posen,  even  though  it  has 
been  part  of  Prussia  and  therefore  of  "Germany" 
for  more  than  a  hundred  years  ? 

In  general  what  interest  has  the  working  class 
of  any  country  in  the  so-called  "power"  or  "great- 
ness" of  that  "nation"  or  that  "country",  which 
would  make  it  worth— to  paraphrase  a  famous 
saying  of  Bismarck— the  bones  of  a  single 
workingman? 

Evidently  the  fact  that  "we"  are  attacked  does 
not  at  all  impose  upon  us  the  duty  of  defending 
"ourselves".  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we,  that  is  the 
working  class,  are  never  attacked,  in  any  war, 
for  we  have  nothing  worth  taking;  and  we  never 
defend  ourselves,  nor  anything  belonging  to  us. 

Does  that  mean  that  the  members  of  the  work- 
ing class  have  no  interest  whatever  in  their 
country,  and  that  they  need  not,  or  should  not, 


258  Socialism  and  War 

defend  it  under  any  circumstances?  Not  at  all. 
But  it  does  mean  that  they  have  no  interest  in 
the  ordinary  sense  to  preserve;  no  such  material 
interest  as  the  capitalists  or  members  of  the 
middle  class  have,  nor  such  spiritual  interests 
as  the  nationalists  profess  to  have.  His  interest 
is  a  broadly  human  one,  although  it  is  dictated 
by  his  class  interests  and  the  necessities  and  re- 
quirements of  the  class  struggle.  I  have  already 
pointed  out  that,  broadly  speaking,  the  interests 
of  the  working  class  engaged  in  the  class  struggle 
and  the  interests  of  humanity  and  progress  are 
identical.  Identical,  not  in  the  Pickwickian  or 
Nietzschean  sense  of  the  nationalists,  according 
to  which  it  is  to  the  interest  of  humanity  that 
the  vast  majoriy  of  humankind  should  be  de- 
graded into  an  enormous  pedestal  upon  which  a 
Super-man  or  Super-nation  could  stand  up  in  his 
or  its  glory,  but  in  a  real  human  and  common- 
sense  way.  The  human  ideal  of  those  engaged  in 
the  class  struggle  on  the  side  of  the  working 
class  therefore  abhors  all  and  any  kind  of  subjec- 
tion and  exploitation  of  man  by  his  fellow-men, 
including  the  subjection  and  exploitation  of  one 
race  or  nation  by  another. 

Furthermore,   any   inequality    among    human 
beings  and  the  subjection  of  any  part  of  the 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         259 

human  family  by  another  interferes  in  a  very  real 
and  practical  sense  with  the  successful  prosecution 
of  the  class  struggle.  Such  subjections  and  in- 
equalities lead  to  struggles  which  cross  the  path 
and  tend  to  obscure,  hamper  and  delay,  the  class 
struggle  of  the  working  class  and  its  successful 
issue.  As  long  as  nations  do  exist  in  fact  and  in 
the  consciousness  of  people,  the  class  struggle  can 
only  be  carried  on  successfully  within  free  nations. 
A  nation,  or  part  of  a  nation,  subject  to  the  en- 
forced dominion  of  an  alien  nation  is  unfit  for  the 
class  struggle,  because  that  struggle  is  obscured 
and  complicated  by  the  national  struggle  which  is 
inevitable  in  such  a  case. 

The  working  class  of  any  nation  or  country  is 
therefore  vitally  interested,  in  preserving  the 
freedom  from  alien  dominion  of  that  nation  or 
country.  And  the  Socialist  is  ready  to  go  to  war  in 
order  to  defend  that  freedom.  His  readiness  to  go 
to  war  in  defence  of  his  country  is  however 
strictly  limited  by  his  desire  to  preserve  this 
national  freedom.  The  words  "nation"  and 
"country"  therefore  have  for  him  a  different 
meaning  from  that  currently  given  to  them.  To 
begin  with  he  draws  a  distinction  between  his 
nation  or  country  and  its  government.  An  attack 
upon  the  armed  force  of  "his"  government  is  not 


260  Socialism  and  War 

necessarily  an  attack  upon  his  nation  or  country. 
Nor  is  an  invasion  of  his  "national  territory"  as 
the  same  is  shown  on  the  map  necessarily  an  attack 
upon  his  nation  or  country.  The  invasion  by  the 
United  States  of  Canada,  for  instance,  would  not, 
from  his  point  of  view  be  an  attack  upon  the 
English  Nation  nor  the  invasion  of  an  English- 
man's country.  Nor  would  the  invasion  by  Russia 
of  the  German  Province  of  Posen  inhabited  by 
Poles  be  an  attack  upon  the  German  Nation  or 
the  invasion  of  a  German's  country. 

But  there  is  another  and  even  more  important 
aspect  of  the  class-conscious  workingman's  readi- 
ness to  come  to  the  defence  of  his  country  which 
must  not  be  overlooked.  When  he  does  come  to 
the  defence  of  his  country,  it  is  not  because  it  is 
his.  He  is  not  actuated  by  the  narrow  and  sel- 
fish motives  of  your  nationalistic  patriot,  but  by 
the  broad  "humanistic"  motive  that  a  part  of  the 
human  race  is  threatened  with  subjection,  and 
that  another  obstacle  is  being  placed  in  the  path 
of  the  final  emancipation  of  the  entire  human  race 
from  the  inequalities,  degradations,  and  miseries 
incident  to  class-society. 

And  this,  again,  is  not  a  mere  metaphysical  dis- 
tinction without  any  real,  practical  difference. 
The  difference  is  both  practical  and  far-reaching. 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         261 

The  theory  of  nationalism  and  "national  inter- 
ests" in  whose  behalf  wars  are  to  be  fought,  has 
its  logical  complement  in  the  theory  of  neutrality. 
We  go  to  war  when  our  "national  interests"  de- 
mand it.  But  when  we  have  no  "national  in- 
terests" to  preserve,  we  don't  care  what  becomes 
of  the  human  race.  We  are  not  our  brother's 
keeper.  We  are  neutral.  So  any  nation  may  rob, 
pillage,  destroy  or  subjugate  any  other  nation 
without  it  being  the  least  of  our  concerns,  so  long 
as  our  national  interests  are  not  in  any  way  in- 
juriously affected  thereby. 

The  Socialists  reject  this  doctrine  as  a  monu- 
mental monstrosity, — the  acme  of  selfishness,  con- 
ceived, nurtured,  and  reared  in  the  atmosphere  of 
nationalism,  an  atmosphere  surcharged  with  sel- 
fishness and  deadening  to  all  sense  of  justice  and 
the  higher  impulses  of  humanity.  In  its  place  we 
substitute  the  doctrine  of  international  solidar- 
ity. The  human  race  is  one  family,  in  a  real 
sense  of  the  term.  An  injury  to  one  is  the  concern 
of  all.  When,  therefore,  war  is  upon  us,  and  its 
conditions  are  such  that  the  working  class  of  any 
warring  nation  is  properly  called  upon  to  defend 
that  nation,  or  any  part  of  it,  from  subjugation 
and  domination  by  another  nation,  the  working 
class  of  the  entire  world  has  an  interest  in  the 


262  Socialism  and  War 

defense  of  the  nation  whose  independence  and 
liberty  are  attacked,  and  it  should  rally  to  prevent 
the  outrage. 

That  does  not  mean  that  in  every  such  case  the 
workingmen   of  all  "neutral"   countries  should 
rush  their  governments  to  war.     Like  practical 
people  we  must  always  count  the  cost.    Not,  in- 
deed,  selfishly, — the   cost  to   our  nation  or   our 
working  class,  in  the  old  nationalistic  way.    But 
the  cost  to  the  international  working  class,  the 
cost  to  the  world  and  its  future  progress.    Every 
war,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  has  an  in- 
jurious effect  upon  general  progress  and  affects 
most  disastrously  the  class  struggle  of  the  work- 
ing class, — the  hope  of  humanity.    Every  exten- 
sion of  the  war  usually  and  almost  necessarily 
means  an  increase    of  these    injurious    effects. 
These  must  be  carefully  weighed  as  against  the 
injury  that  is  desired  to  be  averted,  to  which 
should  be  added  the  salutary  effect  which  true 
international  action,  based  not  on  a  chance  com- 
munity of  interest  of  the  different  nations  but 
on   the  identity   of   interest   of   the   proletariat 
of    all    the   nations,    must   have    on    the    class- 
struggle,  and  which  may  compensate  in  whole  or 
in  part  for  the  increased  national  hatreds  en- 
gendered by  the  extension  of  the  war. 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         263 

These  things  should  be  carefully  weighed,  and 
no  decision,  particularly  no  decision  in  favor  of 
war,  lightly  made.  Where  chances  are  to  be 
taken  we  should  take  the  chance  of  erring  on  the 
side  of  opposition  to  war  rather  than  in  favoring 
it.  But  whatever  the  decision,  it  must  be  con- 
trolled exclusively  by  considerations  of  its  results 
upon  the  international  working  class  and  its 
struggle  for  emancipation.  Indeed,  the  consid- 
erations leading  to  the  action  taken  may,  nay,  will, 
have  much  to  do  with  the  results  flowing  there- 
from as  far  as  the  working  class  is  concerned. 
The  same  action  may  have  different,  or  largely 
differing,  results  according  to  the  motives  which 
actuated  it.  Any  action  taken  in  a  honest  en- 
deavor to  act  in  accordance  with,  and  in  the  in- 
terest of,  international  solidarity,  and  with  a  total 
exclusion  of  selfish  national  interest — no  matter 
what  the  action  is — must  by  reason  of  the  very 
fact  that  it  was  intended  to  further  the  cause  of 
internationalism,  further  the  struggle  of  the 
working  class,  and  give  an  impetus  to  its  upward 
march,  with  all  that  that  implies  for  the  progress 
and  regeneration  of  the  entire  human  race. 

The  considerations  which  limit  the  occasions 
when  Socialists  may  give  their  support  to  war, 
also  prescribe  the  manner  in  which  that  support 


264  Socialism  and  War 

may  be  given.  Socialists  engagaing  in  war  are 
still  Socialists, — that  is  to  say,  provided  they 
enter  into  the  war  from  Socialist  and  not  from 
nationalist  considerations.  The  reasons  which  ac- 
tuated them  in  entering  the  war  will  therefore 
control  their  actions  and  shape  their  policies  dur- 
ing the  war. 

To  begin  with,  they  will  give  the  war  their  sup- 
port only  as  long  as  that  is  necessary  for  the  pur- 
pose of  achieving  the  object  which  made  the  war 
a  proper  one  from  their  point  of  view,  and  they 
will  withdraw  their  support  the  moment  that  ob- 
ject is  achieved.  And  while  they  are  giving  the 
war  their  support  they  will  insist  that  it  be  con- 
ducted in  a  manner  that  would  insure  the  pur- 
suit of  this  object  and  no  other.  A  defensive  war 
may  easily  turn  into  an  aggressive  one.  They  must 
therefore  be  on  their  guard  that  they  should  not 
by  their  action  inadvertently  help  in  a  war  of  con- 
quest. Before  giving  their  support  to  the  war 
they  must  therefore  exact  from  their  government 
proper  guarantees  that  the  war  will  under  no  cir- 
cumstances be  turned  into  one  of  aggression.  And 
while  the  war  lasts,  they  must  watch  the  manner 
in  which  it  is  conducted  with  that  end  in 
view,  and  keep  their  government  to  a  strict  ac- 
countability in  that  respect.    In  addition  to  that 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         265 

it  is  their  duty  to  carry  on  an  educational  pro- 
paganda which  would  make  the  turning  of  the  war 
from  one  of  defence  into  one  of  aggression  im- 
possible should  the  government  ever  be  tempted 
to  break  its  promises. 

At  the  same  time  they  must  carry  on  their  reg- 
ular Socialist  work,  in  so  far  as  their  energies  are 
not  taken  up  with  the  special  propaganda  against 
any  war  of  conquest.  Or,  rather,  they  should 
make  the  propaganda  against  a  war  of  conquest 
part  of  their  regular  work  in  furtherance  of  the 
class-struggle,  making  a  special  effort  to  show  the 
general  connection  between  war  and  capitalism, 
and  teaching  the  Socialist  principles  of  inter- 
nationalism which  would  make  all  wars  impos- 
sible. For  the  class  struggle  and  the  propaganda 
of  the  principles  and  policies  of  the  class  struggle, 
must  be  kept  up.  The  belief  that  the  class  struggle 
interferes  with  the  successful  carrying  on  of  war 
is  true  enough,  if  war  is  to  be  carried  on  for 
nationalistic  purposes,  that  is  for  the  acquisition 
of  power.  But  it  is  utterly  false  in  so  far  as 
purely  defensive  war  is  concerned, — using  the 
word  defensive  in  the  limited  and  circumscribed 
sense  mentioned  above.  And  for  that  very  reason 
the  carrying  on  of  the  class  struggle  is  the  best 
means  of  preserving  the  defensive  character  of  the 


266  Socialism  and  War 

war.  Besides, — the  support  of  the  war  being  it- 
self only  permissible  as  a  means  of  furthering  the 
class  struggle,  it  would,  of  course,  be  utterly 
absurd  to  suspend  the  class  struggle  in  order  the 
better  to  carry  on  the  war. 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  same  principles  that  de- 
fine and  limit  for  the  Socialist  the  meaning  of 
"country"  and  of  "defensive  war"  also  define  and 
limit  for  him  the  meaning  of  the  word  "enemy". 
The  Socialist  supporting  a  war  must  always  bear 
in  mind  that  the  "enemy"  against  whom  he  is  ar- 
rayed is  not  a  certain  nation  or  country,  but  a 
certain  government,  representing  at  most  the  gov- 
erning class  of  that  nation  or  country.  Bear- 
ing this  in  mind  will  have  most  important  prac- 
tical results.  It  will  prevent  atrocities,  for  one. 
It  will  prevent  the  passions  of  war  venting  them- 
selves on  the  members  of  the  enemy  nation  as  such 
either  in  speech  or  in  deed.  This  will  make  it  pos- 
sible for  the  war  to  terminate  the  moment  it  be- 
comes apparent  that  the  aggressors  lust  of  con- 
quest is  not  likely  to  succeed,  thereby  preventing 
useless  sacrifice  of  life  and  property  on  both 
sides.  And,  most  important  of  all,  it  will  make 
possible  the  conclusion  of  a  real  peace.  Of  a  peace 
that  will  not  merely  be  a  cessation  of  armed  com- 
bat, but  a  real  cessation  of  all  hostilities,  a  resump- 


Socialist  vs.  Bourgeois  Theories         267 

tion  of  neighborly  and  friendly  relations  between 
the  members  of  the  erstwhile  "enemies",  and  a 
co-operation  between  them  in  those  peaceful  pur- 
suits on  which  alone  can  be  built  the  happiness  of 
the  human  race. 


COLUMBIA    UNIVERSITY    LIBRARIES 


This  book  is  due  on  the  date  indicated  below,  or  at  the 
expiration  of  a  definite  period  after  the  date  of  borrowing,  as 
provided  by  the  library  rules  or  by  special  arrangement  with 
the  Librarian  in  charge. 


DATE 

BORROWED 

DATE  DUE 

DATE  BORROWED 

DATE  DUE 

DATE   DUE 

1 

I 

L  .MA]   1  p  «fc] 

_ 



. .    ., 





J L  _ , 

C2 

■jni-WM 

Printed 
In  USA 

Olll?HHbJ.u    , 

COLUMBIA    W*~nJ*2Zr 


Boudin  C~~^  ^ 

Socialism  and  war 


20  SEPylfc  /    fl£. 


